GREEK MORALITY

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IN RELATION TO INSTITUTIONS

AN ESSAY

BY

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TO

W. H. D. R. AND A. W. S.

PREFACE

GREEK ethics has been studied by generations of scholars, and the broad outlines are by this time familiar ground. Perhaps it is only in details that our knowledge will be increased or corrected. The case is somewhat different with Greek morality. Many writers on the subject practically confine their attention to the works of philosophers. But this method of procedure will not always give the accepted ideals of a nation. Hints of the average moral level may be gleaned from philosophic works, but they need supplementing by a careful study of non-philosophic literature. This has been done with splendid diligence by L. Schmidt. In an introductory chapter he discusses with great acuteness the testimony of Greek writers to Greek morality, and the suppositions which must be granted before an inquiry into that morality becomes possible. I would add one word of warning. It is extremely difficult to form a correct idea of a people's morality from its literature. A writer presupposes in his reader certain knowledge, sympathies, and modes of thought and feeling. How easy it is to be deceived on these points is familiar to every visitor to the Continent. Moreover, we have now descriptions of foreigners by authors of different nationalities. But there is no account of the Greeks by an outsider until Roman

times. Herodotus and Xenophon, who lived for some time out of Greece, furnish us with an approach to a stranger's description, and rank accordingly among our most valuable authorities. The only evidence outside literature proper is afforded by the inscriptions, which are very useful to the historian of Greek religion. So the historian of Greek morality must take his authorities, both philosophic and non-philosophic, and not only pay attention to their statements, but also try to infer the modes of thought and feeling they imply. This is a difficult task, and one in which approximate success only is possible. Its justification is that there is no other method of procedure.

In the present essay I have tried to let the Greek writers speak for themselves, but the following modern authorities have been consulted.

Adam, editions of *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*; *Gifford Lectures* as reported in the press.
Archer-Hind, editions of *Phaedo*, *Timaeus*.
Becker *Charicles*.
Burnet, edition of Aristotle's *Ethics*.
J. B. Bury *History of Greece*.
R. G. Bury, edition of *Philebus*.
L. Campbell *Religion in Greek Literature*.
Coulanges *La Cité Antique*.
Decharme *Euripide et l'Esprit de son Théâtre*; *Traditions Religieuses chez les Grecs*.
Denis *Histoire des Théories et des Idées Morales dans l'Antiquité*.
Dickinson *The Greek View of Life*.
E.E.G. *The Makers of Hellas*.
Gomperz *Greek Thinkers* (Eng. tr.).
Grant, edition of Aristotle's *Ethics*.
Grote *History of Greece*.
Harrison *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*.
Holm *History of Greece*.
Jackson, articles in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and the *Journal of Philology*.
Janet *Histoire de la Science Politique*.
Lloyd *Age of Pericles*.
Mahaffy *Social Life in Greece*.
Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings*.
L. Schmidt *Ethik der alten Griechen*.
Thomson *Euripides and the Attic Orators*.
Verrall *Euripides the Rationalist*; *Four Plays of Euripides*.
Zeller *History of Greek Philosophy* (Eng. tr.).

Ritter and Preller's *Historia Philosophiae Graecae* has proved of some help, but nearly all the quotations cited in the notes are the result of a study of Greek literature undertaken for the purpose of the present essay. I have quoted from the *Anthologia Graeca* for elegiac fragments, and from Christ's edition in the case of Pindar. Prof. Jackson has been followed for the sequence of the Platonic dialogues.

I had hoped to add fairly complete indexes of passages dealing with moral questions from all the principal non-philosophic authors. Limits of space compel me to analyse only the three tragedians, who represent a most important period. This book is only a sketch, not a treatise. Many points I must reserve until I have an opportunity of publishing all my indexes; but I trust that I have selected vital principles which throw light upon the general aspects of Greek morality.

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CHAPTER I

MORALITY AND RELIGION

θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγενομένους.

PLATO *Laws* 885 B.

CHAPTER I

MORALITY AND RELIGION

IT is incorrect to limit "religion" to cults and ritual. Greek religion includes, besides these formal ceremonies, every effort to apprehend that "power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." The recognition of this power is implied in the common speech, which designated it ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον. The moral ideals of a nation can never be understood unless an effort be made to see how they are connected with religious belief. The religious sanction to morality.

The fear and awe of divine power, innate in the human heart, will keep a man in the path of order and discipline, when other motives are either misleading or ineffective. The will of God is only conceivable as an authority which cannot vary,[1] and from which there is no appeal. But moral sanctions are essentially conservative; the religious sanction is particularly so. It conserves what is good. It may also tend to conserve blemishes and imperfections. Hence crude and barbarous moral ideals, when regarded as the will of Heaven, are emended with great difficulty, and sometimes only after a social or political revolution. It may even happen that belief in religion decays in consequence.

In the early Greek poets the gods reward the good and punish the wicked. "Verily," says the swineherd Eumaeus, "the happy gods love not wicked deeds, but honour justice and the righteous deeds of men."[2] The Religious sanction among the early Greeks.

ὄπις of the gods, man's reverence for them, and their vengeance when the divine laws, θέμιστες, have been broken, is frequently mentioned in the Homeric poems.[3] Among the gods, Zeus, the father of gods and men, ruler in Olympus and ruler among men, is supreme and all-wise, apparently only limited in that he cannot undo the past.[4] He is the god of the oath; is angry at deceit; does not help liars; helps the suppliant, and defends the laws of hospitality. In particular he is the guardian of δίκη, a word which even in Homer has, besides its narrower meaning, the wider one of fair dealing, good custom, law and order, discipline.[5] Hesiod presents us with a very similar picture: according to him also the eye of Zeus spies out wrong and punishes the sinner against δίκη.[6] The few fragments which still remain of Archilochus, Semonides and Solon, with the poems of Theognis, prove that their conception did not materially differ from that of Homer.[7]

The gods do not obey the moral law.

The evidence is in fact conclusive that the early Greeks considered the gods, especially Zeus, to be the guardians of the moral law. But they themselves are not bound by the law they enforce upon all men. Hermes instructed Autolycus in deceit; Helen's sin was caused by Aphrodite; Zeus is the dispenser of evil as well as of good; he deceives Agamemnon by a dream[8]; he is pitiless to men, although he himself did beget them.[9] Nevertheless men are more to blame than the gods for the woes which they endure.[10] The Hesiodic Zeus devises "baleful cares for men," and laughs at the thought of the misery he will cause.[11] Theognis tells us that a man does not become good or bad without divine aid. He cannot understand why Zeus should treat sinners and the righteous in exactly the same way.[12] In brief, the gods may do evil, and the fact has begun to perplex men and to require justification.

It has become almost a commonplace to say that the

relation between a Greek and his god was a sort of commercial contract. "The weak spot of Greek religion as orthodoxy conceived it in the fifth century B.C. . . . is *do ut des*." "The whole relation between man and the gods is of the nature of a contract. . . . The conception is legal, not moral nor spiritual; it has nothing to do with what we call sin and conscience."[13] Now this commercial view of religion certainly existed, but it was not the only view of religion common among the Greeks. Plato in the *Euthyphro* gives four other definitions of piety besides this. In early times at least, the dominant religious thought is the working of an invisible justice in the affairs of men. This idea has been amply illustrated already, and before proceeding I will give some passages bearing upon the other aspect.

Do ut des not the only feature of Greek religion.

Phoenix says to Achilles that the gods may be appeased by sacrifice and prayer.[14] "Gifts persuade gods," says Hesiod. In Euripides we find the remark, "It is a proverb that gifts persuade even gods."[15] Yet Socrates declared (and here I would remark that since the object of the *Memorabilia* is to prove the orthodoxy of Socrates, any teaching in it cannot have been very obnoxious to the Athenians) that sacrifice ought to be according to one's means, and that the gods are best pleased with gifts from the pious.[16] The fifth definition of piety in *Euthyphro* makes it equivalent to ἐμπορική. This certainly implies that the view was not uncommon in Plato's time. But it does not appear that it often resulted in a readiness to commit sin because it is easily atoned for by sacrifice. The only approach to this attitude of mind is to be found in the doings of certain degraded Orphics who, Plato tells us, were ready to purge away the sins of men or cities.[17] Plato distinctly states in the *Laws* that there were few who thought that the gods could be bought off.[18] We have other evidence of the rarity of the immoral aspect of *do ut des*. The whole

tone of the inscriptions to Greek votive offerings down to 400 B.C. is utterly opposed to it.[19]

But to return. We have seen that the early Greeks believed in gods who sanctioned morality without being themselves subject to its laws. As was not unnatural they usually assign these attributes to the supreme god Zeus, author of the weal and woe of humankind, who rewards the righteous and punishes the guilty. But already men have begun to wonder why the unrighteous sometimes flourish while the just suffer.

Such I take to have been the Greek view down to the middle of the sixth century B.C. But during this century occurs the rise of philosophy and of mysticism.

Philosophy and religion.

The fragments of the philosophers from Thales to Heraclitus contain little about the gods, and this little throws doubt neither upon their existence nor upon their championship of morality.[20] But nevertheless the growth of philosophy involved a danger to the national faith. The dominion of the gods, if I may so term it, was gradually limited. Natural causes took the place of a first cause. Scepticism followed as a matter of course, though we do not meet it until the middle of the fifth century.

Purification of the creed by Xenophanes.

But criticism was at work in another direction. During the latter half of the sixth century Xenophanes attacked Homer and Hesiod for imputing immoralities to the gods.[21] The perception that the gods ought not to commit sin resulted eventually in scepticism, but scepticism was not a necessary consequence. Xenophanes himself formulated what may be called a creed, to the effect that there is one God, greatest among gods and men, good and not evil, neither in body nor in mind resembling men, thinking throughout all his frame and ruling all things by his mind. Pythagoras, who was a contemporary of Xenophanes and deeply indebted to the Orphics, taught his brotherhood that the soul is immortal

Pythagoras and ὁμοίωσις.

and passes from body to body in a series of incarnations. The souls of men have been enclosed by the gods in bodies as in a tomb; the divine intention is that men should free themselves from this tomb, not by self-destruction, but by becoming like unto God.[22] The doctrines of Xenophanes and Pythagoras are thus mutually complementary. "God is good." "God is not like man." "Man must grow in the likeness of God." The Homeric gods were not such as man ought to copy.

I must here digress to say a few words about the mysteries and the Greek views concerning immortality.

Orphism and the mysteries.

Of Orphism and the mysteries I have not much to say, both because our knowledge is slight and also because their connection with morality was neither wide nor close.[23] Doubtless they had their dark side.[24] It is insisted upon by Plato.[25] The importance of Orphism for our purpose is that by holding out the prospect of communion with the divine nature it gave men the hope of sharing the divine immortality. It bore fruit when purer conceptions of the nature of God had been reached by the more thoughtful minds of Greece.

The belief in immortality among the Greeks.

I must delay a little longer over the belief in immortality. The view of the earlier Greeks has been well put by Zeller.[26] That the dead still continue to have some sort of existence was a current belief in Homeric times, which continued more or less throughout the course of Greek history. But the existence was one which inspired fear rather than hope. "Hateful to me as the gates of Hades," says Achilles.[27] Old men, remarks Cephalus in Plato's *Republic*, begin to fear that the tales about the next world are true, although they have laughed at them hitherto.[28] In what sense, then, is the hope of immortality due to the Orphic mysteries? The life of the dead was, in the popular view, a shadowy, dream-like

existence, not worthy to be called "life" at all. But the Orphics held that by union with the deity man shared his immortality, which was a life worth living. To this hope we have references in the Hymn to Demeter, in Heraclitus, in Pindar, and in Sophocles.[29] The last reference is extremely interesting. Only the initiated, says the poet, live; others suffer manifold woes in the next world. In a subsequent chapter I shall have to say something about the influence ancestor-worship exercised upon family religion, and the morality which grew up under its sanction.

Trans-migration.

Transmigration, a quite distinct idea, was probably Orphic also, and from Orphism found its way into the teaching of Pythagoras.[30] Pindar says that after three lives in either world free from unrighteousness, the good enjoy the life of bliss in the Islands of the Blest, an existence superior to the life in Hades.[31] The doctrine of transmigration was carefully woven into his philosophic system by Plato, the only philosopher after Pythagoras who made any real ethical use of it, though it was accepted by Empedocles.

By the end of the fifth century religious doubt, accentuated by the distress of the times, robbed the belief in an after-life of most of its moral value. The famous inscription on those who fell before Potidaea (432 B.C.), "The aether received their souls, the earth their bodies,"[32] may perhaps be taken to imply a belief in immortality. With it may well be compared a remark of one of the characters of Euripides. "The mind of the dead lives not (*i.e.* the dead cannot communicate directly with the living), but it has an immortal intelligence, falling into the immortal aether."[33] But in the same poet we find the current views clearly reflected. These seem to have been :—

Euripides and current views about death.

1. Death may be life. We ought to lament at births and rejoice at funerals.[34]

2. Death is annihilation.[35]

3. It is a blessing if death be annihilation.[36]

It is perhaps typical of current opinion that Antisthenes laughed at an Orphic priest, who was enlarging upon the felicity of the initiated in another world, and retorted, "Why don't you die then?"[37]

The monuments.

Independent evidence is afforded by the sepulchral monuments. During the fourth century their character "undergoes a change such that it is impossible to see any religious meaning in the designs,"[38] in other words the living ceased to feel that the dead had any real connection with them.

The epitaphs in the *Anthology*.

The epitaphs in the *Anthology* tell the same tale. In the fifth century we find a simple, noble acceptance of death which strikes every reader. The famous epitaph of Simonides is a good example.[39] But after the fifth century comes a change. There occurs much melancholy brooding over death. Men feel awe, and resignation even, in the face of it, but it is the resignation of despair. Yet the humbler folk had some belief in an afterlife. I would lay no emphasis on the distress displayed at death by shipwreck. The instinctive wish to be buried on land might well survive even when its religious meaning had lost its virtue, just as the poor nowadays desire above all things to have a decent or even costly funeral. But we have an epitaph by Leonidas of Tarentum (*circa* 270 B.C.), who was a poor man, leading a wandering life near his native city. In it a dead shepherd begs his fellows to honour his tomb with oblations of flowers and milk, and to let the sheep graze hard by to the music of pipes. "There are, there are returns for favours to the dead, even among those who have perished."[40]

Summary.

In brief, the hope of some sort of existence after death was rarely denied, but on the whole this existence was looked forward to with despair. The moral value of the belief was small. It nevertheless sometimes made men,

especially old men, uneasy because of the injustice they had committed. During the great period of Greek history death was accepted with a noble resignation; afterwards sorrow and dread were the dominant thoughts with regard to it. Orphism introduced the idea of transmigration; and, especially in the first half of the fifth century, inspired hopes of a future existence, which, in the case of noble minds, had a deep moral significance. But this was the exception. Ethics reflects current beliefs, and Plato was the only philosopher who made real use of the doctrines of immortality and transmigration. And Plato, be it remembered, is generally opposed to the current opinion of his time. Further, the desire of mystic union with the divine nature was opposed to the Greek love of moderation and fear of transcending human limitations.

Philosophy and religion.

Xenophanes and Pythagoras were not, strictly speaking, philosophers, and it was philosophy which dealt the national religion its death-blow. It was not that philosophy definitely attacked the popular faith, for even Democritus may have taken part in the customary religious services.[41] But the philosophers insisted, with ever-increasing force and clearness, upon the universality and fixity of natural law, and upon the sufficiency of secondary causes to explain the changes of phenomena. And in attacking one domain of the gods they were preparing the way for an attack upon the gods themselves. Other factors were wanting, but they came at length in the shape of national distress and increased disgust at the religious legends. It was the doctrine *πάντα ῥεῖ*, the law of the universe as formulated by Heraclitus, which bred a scepticism that called in question the existence of the gods and the validity of the moral law.

πάντα ῥεῖ.

But for a time religion kept a firm hold upon men's hearts. The Greek world passed through the trying crisis of the Persian Wars, and emerged victorious from

the struggle. There followed a period of prosperous expansion for Athens, at this time the centre of the intellectual life of the nation. How far religion steeled the hearts of the Athenians to fight the Persians at Marathon and Salamis, and how far the wonderful overthrow of their enemies deepened their religious feeling, it is of course impossible to determine. What we do know is that it was a profoundly religious age. Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophocles have a deep and sincere belief in the gods and their providence, combined with the reverent desire to clear away or pass over in silence any legend that casts discredit upon them. Aeschylus is impressed with the working of an invisible justice in the affairs of men. Sophocles sees in the gods the guardians of the great unwritten laws of morality.[42] But the new religious tendency exhibited by Pythagoras rarely appears in these poets. Their faith is the national faith. Herodotus also, the contemporary and friend of Sophocles, though not a particularly devout man, is in perfect accordance with traditional views. He believes in a providence which is envious and wont to check arrogance and excess, but he has no trace of the doctrine of ὁμοίωσις.[43]

The religious age of Greece.

But during the second half of the fifth century came a change, the extent of which may be estimated by the distressing doubt everywhere apparent in the plays of Euripides, and by the significant omission of divine agency from the pages of Thucydides. A period of prosperity was followed by a period of trouble. The acquisition of empire by Athens had enlarged the experiences of her citizens and presented complex problems for solution. At the same time she could only justify that empire by the theory that might is right, and that Heaven favours the side with better resources. Then came the Peloponnesian War with its attendant horrors of party strife and plague. Savage instincts bequeathed by remote

Religion during the Peloponnesian War.

ancestors revived from their dormant state to be guided by intellects developed by an advanced civilisation. Men ceased to believe in a providence that allowed such violations of natural justice. Thucydides deplores the decay of faith,[44] and he is an authority sufficient to settle the matter without further witness. In moments of reaction proceedings for impiety were set on foot against prominent individuals. A law was passed during the ascendency of Pericles which threatened with impeachment whoever did not believe in the gods or taught astronomy, an eloquent witness to the effect of natural philosophy upon religion. Even though the prosecutions were sometimes mere pretexts for attacking obnoxious enemies, they prove that the public conscience was uneasy, and subject to sudden revulsions of feeling.

Prosecutions for impiety.

The sophists were partly responsible for the growth of infidelity. Protagoras[45] expressed it in what appears to have been a sort of professorial treatise, and was expelled from Athens for his pains, besides suffering the indignity of having his books publicly burnt. There is also on record a saying of Prodicus to the effect that men deified the powers of nature that are helpful to human life,[46] while Thrasymachus denied the existence of a divine providence on the ground that the unrighteous are often unpunished.[47] But on the whole the sophists were not openly at variance with the established religion. The above is all that can be urged in proof of sophistic unbelief. It seems likely that the sophists fell in with the mood of their audience, and ventured on just as much atheism as they saw was likely to please it. When it suited their convenience they were perfectly orthodox. The real cause of scepticism was the teaching of the philosophers, operating during a period of national distress and unrest upon a people whose intellectual life had been widened by increased experience, by the spread of democracy, and by the rise of the Athenian empire.

The sophists partly responsible.

One philosopher, however, must be noticed in passing, because of his influence on later philosophic religion. This is Anaxagoras, who taught that Mind turned Chaos into the Universe.

The attitude of thinking people towards the national faith is clearly reflected in the plays of Euripides; and while the common people, led by conservatives like Aristophanes, who would have put new wine into old bottles, retained the form of the old belief, the doubts of the few leavened the ideas of the many, and destroyed much if not all of the moral value they once possessed. It is difficult for a man to find moral support in religion when he sees that most of the great thinkers of his time have lost faith in it, even though he may not have the intelligence to appreciate their doubts. The view of Euripides himself is probably that expressed in *Her. Fur.* 62, "Nothing of the divine is clear to men,"[48] but it matters little what the poet thought personally, for his characters certainly express views which met with sympathy from some at least among the audience. Whereas Pindar and Aeschylus had suppressed legends that imputed immorality to the gods, Euripides insists upon them, and draws the conclusion that if the gods do evil they are no gods at all. No god can be evil; mortals must not say that a god tempts to sin; it is monstrous to suppose that the gods require from men a morality to which they do not conform themselves; there are no gods at all, the only god is natural law, or perhaps the intelligence of human beings.[49]

Euripides' attitude to the legends.

A more dangerous scepticism is shown by the tyrant Critias, who was also a poet and composed a drama called *Sisyphus*.[50] In it he declared the laws were invented to check the violence which threatened the human race. But law can only touch offences which come to light. To deal with secret sins some "clever man" invented the myth of the gods, who see and know all, and deal with such crimes as escape the law of the State. Not only

Critias' explanation of religion.

does this extract illustrate the spirit of the time, but it shows by implication how strong the belief in a divine justice must have been, an aspect of Greek religion which I hold was far more prominent than that of *do ut des*.

It is plain that the national faith had lost its hold upon thinking men. Let us see what this implies. The chief sanction for moral conduct no longer influenced men. Utility, tradition, and State authority were the only moral supports. And the decay of religion meant decay of the authority of the State, with which belief in the State religion was in the closest connection.[51] It looked as though moral anarchy must ensue. How serious the crisis was may be judged from the fact that it resulted in the birth of philosophic ethics, the function of which has ever been to find a new moral sanction, in place of those principles of action which the advance of human intelligence and the shock of bitter experiences have shown to be inadequate. Philosophy must heal the wound that philosophy had inflicted.

Rise of philosophic ethics.

But there is a brighter side to the question. The old religion was dead, but its death is a landmark in the progress of thought. "If gods exist they are not evil." A new religion arose on this basis. For a time it could appeal only to the philosophic few, but it had a noble task in preparing the way for Christianity.

Religion purified.

The first attempt to harmonise the old and the new was made by Socrates. In times of doubt it is of great service to locate the difficulty, to know how far knowledge extends, and so limit the region of uncertainty. Socrates believed that much of the danger of moral anarchy would disappear if the intellect were brought to bear upon moral questions. Accurate definitions of virtues and vices would clear the ground, and men would at least have a common basis upon which all were agreed. His inquiries led him to conclude that virtue is knowledge of the good in its various relations,

Socrates both intellectual

and that the good is simply that which is useful for man's well-being. In other words, the ideals to which the Greeks had risen through centuries of development were given a new support independent of the divine sanction. Socrates was the founder of utilitarianism.[52]

But while he insisted upon the use of intelligence and blamed those who asked the gods to decide what they could decide for themselves,[53] Socrates was a sincere believer in the existence of divine powers. Whether or not he was "orthodox" is an open question.[54] He at least advised men to worship after the manner of their country, and followed his own advice. But that he was profoundly religious is not denied even by those who have no sympathy with religion and grudge any admission of its power for good. The simple teleology[55] by which he proved the existence of the gods was nevertheless new in his day. How striking it must have been then may be understood when we reflect that even now men of powerful intellect are satisfied with proofs of the divine care which are no more elaborate. Socrates believed that the gods care for men, know their words, deeds, and secret thoughts, are present everywhere and make known by various means, such as divination, what it concerns men to know.[56] Even the intellect, which Socrates valued so much as a guide to conduct, is a divine gift. But this intellect, although it can discover good means, cannot discover the supreme good. When pressed for an answer, Socrates can only say that the highest good for man is εὐπραξία.[57] This is an identity which carries us no further. He refuses to define the term "good," and shows temper to his questioners.[58] But although man is ignorant, the gods know. Hence, when he prays a man should ask for good things and leave it to the gods to decide what is good in his own particular case.[59]

and religious.

Socrates' idea of "good."

The gods are not only the guardians of men, but their lawgivers and rulers as well. If virtue viewed from the

point of view of the agent be knowledge, viewed objectively it is conformity with law. If δικαιοσύνη be σοφία, τὸ δίκαιον is τὸ νόμιμον.[60] And among the laws to which man owes obedience are certain unwritten laws, declared binding not by men but by the gods, infringement of which brings without fail its appropriate punishment. Socrates mentions four of these laws.[61] We must worship the gods, honour parents, avoid incest, and repay benefactors. And that worship of the gods included not ritual only but the carrying out of their will may be inferred from the fact that Socrates calls his own mission a λατρεία θεοῦ. He even says that he is a helper of the god, that is, an instrument by which the divine will is accomplished.

The "unwritten laws."

The doctrine of ὁμοίωσις had by this time become familiar to the Greek mind, union with a divinity being the essential idea of the mysteries. But in the mysteries it had an emotional rather than an ethical import. Socrates seems to have been the first to attempt to popularise the Pythagorean doctrine. The evidence is slight, but the Socratic teaching certainly held up the divine nature as a model for men to copy.[62]

The creed of Socrates seems to have been :—

The creed of Socrates.

1. There are gods.
2. They care for men.
3. They demand obedience to a moral code, which men instinctively recognise although they have not embodied it in their statutes.
4. They are good, and man should imitate them.

Socrates adhered to all that was good in the national faith. At the same time he submitted all ethical questions to the test of reason.[63] To show that these two attitudes of mind were not only not incompatible but even complementary was to have done good service.

It may occasion some surprise, as it did even to Xenophon, that during an age when unbelief was common

a truly pious man was convicted of impiety. The condemnation was not due to a revival of religious feeling. It was due to the instinctive dread of severing the national life from the institutions of the past, a dread which sprang out of the reaction from the horrors of the Peloponnesian War and its attendant miseries. There was no vital belief such as must have coloured the whole lives of men who could sympathise with an Aeschylus. But it became respectable to conform to the State religion. No unauthorised innovations were allowed.[64] Socrates was a conformist, but it would be easy to persuade the ignorant portion of the dicastery that his "divine sign" was an offence against the law. Possibly this part of the charge did not catch many votes. Perhaps it was intended merely to supplement the accusation of corrupting the youth.

Was there a revival of religion?

This outward conformity continued down to the loss of Greek independence. So striking is it that some have supposed that a real revival of religious feeling took place.[65] It may be asked what reasons there are for denying this. In the first place customs and creeds often remain as empty forms, and are even insisted upon by public opinion, without influencing character to any appreciable extent. In the second place the gradual disappearance of religion from ethics is very significant. But the best evidence, inasmuch as it is independent of philosophy and quite unconscious, is given by the inscriptions of votive offerings. It has recently been proved that during the fourth century the tone of these inscriptions gradually ceases to be laudatory of the god and becomes an encomium upon the giver. Statues begin to be honorific. The victors in the games no longer make their offerings from thankfulness of heart but regard them as a means of self-advertisement or glorification.[66]

Evidence of inscriptions to votive offerings.

In the eyes of Socrates at least the half of life was under the sway of religion. But his views do not seem

to have influenced any except his intimate circle of friends. Why the simple creed of Socrates did not win its way into the hearts of his contemporaries is difficult to explain. The truth, however, seems to be that while the Greeks still feared the gods, or at least felt uneasy and disinclined to neglect due ceremony, they had lost the spirit of sacrifice and devotion. The fourth century was at Athens an age of culture and self-development. Foreign affairs did not loom so large as before, but life within the city itself was rich and full. Party strife disappeared.[67] Men began to love comfort and ease. Such a society would not listen to a creed which set service to God above every other claim, and extolled contentment and few wants as the nearest approach to a divine life. Those who felt the religious impulse took refuge in the foreign worships which, with the permission of the State, were established in Athens and the Piraeus,[68] doubtless in order to minister to the needs of the many foreigners who dwelt in or visited Attica for trade purposes.

Attitude to religion in the fourth century.

Of the religious views of the minor Socratics we know very little. Probably the Cyrenaics were sceptics; one of them, Theodorus, was nicknamed the "atheist." An interesting remark of Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, is to the effect that *κατὰ νόμον* there are many gods, *κατὰ φύσιν* but one.[69] This is one of the first definite expressions of the monotheism which had long been implied in the popular use of *ὁ θεός*, *τὸ θεῖον*.

The minor Socratics.

It may be regarded as evidence of the religious indifference of the time that Plato insists so strongly upon the importance of a true conception of the gods. Perhaps the most attractive feature about Plato is the courageous way in which he upholds what is best in the old ideals, and refuses to give them up even when the struggle seems hopeless. Can philosophy prove that nothing exists? Granted, replies Plato, so far as this world is concerned,

Plato.

but if nothing exists on earth, this is only a proof that there must be another world where existence is possible. In a similar way, perceiving clearly that the old faith no longer controlled the hearts of men, he yet refused to abandon religion, and proceeded to gather together all that was good in the religious aspiration of the past, including Orphism and the mysteries. This nucleus he expanded and shaped into consistency by the application of metaphysic and logic, fondly hoping that herein would be found an all-sufficient sanction for moral conduct. "Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore, to him that would be really good, knowledge of the idea is indispensable." [70]

connected morality and ontology.

I give here a summary of Plato's theology. There is one eternal, never-changing God, who is good, not envious as is generally supposed, and the source of all the good in the universe though not of the evil. The eternal never-changing ideas are aspects of the divine nature. Man can attain to a knowledge of God, since the ideas are immanent in phenomena. Later, Plato probably held that only approximation to this knowledge is possible, inasmuch as phenomena are but imitations of the ideas. The highest end of man is to become like God by a careful cultivation of the divine intelligence within him, which enables him to apprehend the ideas. The soul, which is eternal, passes through a series of incarnations, rising or falling in the scale of existence in proportion to its success in controlling the bodily desires and in developing into pure intelligence.

Plato's theology.

The theology of Plato had little in common with the popular faith. Its source is to be found in Xenophanes and Pythagoras rather than in Homer and Hesiod. The gods of the poets are severely criticised in the *Republic* and

the *Laws*. But perhaps the most striking novelty in the Platonic system was his conception of the relationship of man to God. God is Truth and Beauty, and so a healthy soul must love him. And the word used by Plato to express this relationship, ἔρως, is a very strong word, denoting sentimental and passionate attachment.[71]

Upon this religion Plato bases his whole moral code. True virtue is the knowledge of the good, attainable only by a passionate devotion to what is divine. All other virtue, whether the result of utilitarianism or habituation, is unworthy of the name. Men who fight bravely because they are afraid of their comrades' reproaches are courageous through cowardice.[72]

Trans-migration and morality.

The doctrine of transmigration helps to complete the Platonic conception of morality. The union of soul and body fills the former with passions and fears which hinder its search after God. To reach the object of his soul's desire a man must free himself from the body and grow accustomed to dying daily.[73] If he succeeds, his soul will return at death to the region of the ideas and be subject to no more incarnations. If he fail he will sink at his next birth to a lower grade in the ladder of life. But it is always in his power to rise, however low he may have fallen. Virtue, then, brings its own reward, and vice a natural and inevitable punishment. Plato is the only philosopher who uses the hope of immortality, vaguely held out to the Greek mind by the mysteries, as a practical incentive to virtue. Literature does not give us a shred of evidence that his teaching was taken to heart, but it was a great gain to have the idea clearly enunciated. There it was for any to use to whom it appealed, and in Christian soil the seed bore fruit. This is one out of many instances in which Plato anticipates the convictions of future ages.

In this ethical scheme all sides of the human mind are taken into account; religion appeals to the intellect, the

moral sense, and the emotions. The imperfections in the national religion are avoided; the successful endeavours of predecessors to attain the truth are embodied. But it could appeal to philosophers only. The common people would have none of it, and no one saw this more clearly than Plato himself. Natural aptitude and a long course of dialectic were necessary for the attainment of the knowledge of the good. So Plato admitted that there must be two kinds of virtue, philosophic and popular. The philosopher is to study the absolute good, and produce an image of it in the souls of his unphilosophic fellowmen.[74] Purified myths and utilitarian motives must be the means employed.

Two sorts of virtue.

But this could only be achieved when rulers were philosophers of Plato's own way of thinking, and he never saw his ideal realised. So in his old age the philosopher tried to find a basis for morality which should be independent of the theory of ideas, although the theory was doubtless as dear as ever to his heart.

When Plato wrote the *Republic* he regarded virtue as knowledge—knowledge of the ideas. But in course of time he revised his theory, and despaired of knowing the ideas, being content perforce with an approximate knowledge attainable by a laborious study of natural kinds.[75] He was also compelled to abandon ideas of virtues and vices. Hence arose the necessity of a revised ethical theory. Not that he gave up his former theory, but he found that it could not be worked. The problem was to discover a δεύτερος πλοῦς. Virtue in the *Laws* is still a growing like God,[76] but Plato by this time saw no means of attaining to a knowledge of God except by patient deduction from the moral ideas of the wisest men and by divination.[77] Thus, whereas in the *Republic* he had neglected detailed legislation, in the *Laws* the greatest care is taken to find out the best enactments that the wit of man has discovered and to frame them

Revision of the ideal theory.

Consequent revision of ethical theory.

into a consistent polity. Plato still believed that no man is evil voluntarily.[78] But in course of time he came to believe that the existence of the will (*βούλησις*) must also be accounted for, and he does so by declaring that the greatest ignorance is to hate that which appears good and to love that which appears bad,[79] while wisdom (*φρόνησις* rather than *σοφία*) is a harmony of natural likes and dislikes with reason.[80]

By research the few legislators, *θεῖοί τινες*,[81] may approximate to a knowledge of the divine will. The citizens are to obey the laws imposed by the rulers, not mechanically, but by being convinced of their utility and necessity. Hence the preambles to the various enactments detailed in the *Laws*. But the chief impulse to right conduct is certainly the religious. Plato is careful to prove (1) the existence of the gods; (2) their care for men; (3) their assertion of the moral law.[82] Religious observances are to be the chief occupation of the citizens throughout their lives.[83] A sin against the laws is a sin against the gods.[84] Atheism and false notions about the gods are the source of all wickedness. Religion is to be public; private religions are forbidden. The law must be changed only with the consent of rulers, of the people, and of the gods, as expressed by the oracle. Only the good can please God. All the national religious impulses are enlisted in the service of morality. Daemons and heroes are to be reverenced and prayers offered to them, for they are our helpers and we are their property.[85]

Religion in the *Laws*.

The importance attached by Plato to the oracle is very striking. Taken with the way in which he includes as much of the national faith as he consistently can in his ethical scheme, it certainly signifies that he had been forced by bitter experience to the conclusion that the popular religion, purified by a knowledge of God's will, which the legislators acquire by careful observation and reason, was the only basis of morality possible at the

What Plato's attitude implies.

time.[86] This I take to be strong evidence that religious faith was rapidly decaying during the latter years of Plato's life. The other evidence that can be brought forward is the witness of votive inscriptions given above, and the tone of the references to religion in the orators.[87] With the fewest exceptions these express, not religious devotion, but a languid acquiescence in a conventional belief. A man may deem it right to say a grace before his meals without in the least increasing his thankfulness for God's gifts. Such is the spirit displayed in the orators, and Plato was convinced that society needed to have it replaced by deep and sincere religious feeling. But if religion provides the sanction for right conduct, it is ethical study, founded on rational observation, with occasional appeals to the oracle, that must discover what this right conduct is. Herein Plato shows himself a true Socratic, and does not essentially differ from his master. But Plato's pupil Aristotle was less opposed to the spirit of the age, perhaps because he saw the failure of his teacher's ethical endeavours, and made ethics independent of religious sanction. In doing so he was no doubt influenced by his analytic turn of mind, which favoured the division of knowledge into separated groups.

Religion in the orators conventional.

But before turning to Aristotle it is necessary to touch upon a very difficult point of Platonic theology. In a passage of the *Laws*[88] Plato speaks of an evil world-soul. This, says Zeller,[89] contradicts the spirit of his whole theory. It is impossible to regard the words of Plato as simply metaphorical. They are far too definite and precise. Without attempting a solution I would point out that Plato uses the word ψυχή, not νοῦς or θεός. He does not therefore mean necessarily a personal devil. In the Introduction to his edition of the *Phaedo*[90] Mr. Archer-Hind discusses various passages of the *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Phaedo* which are concerned with the nature of soul (ψυχή). The difficulty

The evil world-soul.

is this. In the *Philebus* passions are attributed to soul, in the *Phaedo* to the body. In the *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo* all soul is immortal. In the *Timaeus* Plato talks of "mortal soul." Mr. Archer-Hind summarises his argument thus—"All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connection with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and exist only in relation to body."[91] I believe that a similar line of argument holds good in the case of the evil world-soul. Soul in conjunction with matter admits of modes of existence which are evil. Evil impulses, due to the conjunction of soul and body, arise in man; why not in the world? The Platonic view of evil seems to have changed twice. First, evil is due to the ideas of evil; then it is a falling away from the perfect archetype inseparable from pluralisation; lastly it is a necessary mode of soul's existence when soul and body are conjoined. The difference between the second and third views is that in the former evil is negative, in the latter positive. This change is of great ethical significance. It shows a deepening of the sense of sin. The life of man is not merely development, but a struggle against an evil power.

In ethical inquiries Plato was always careful to make it clear that although the end of human action is well-being, it lies in the apprehension of the divine nature rather than in happiness as ordinarily conceived. Virtue, indeed, brings well-being with it, but it must have its source in philosophic knowledge of the ideas. Utilitarian morality he treated with scorn, admitting its necessity, but protesting against it at the same time. Hence the influence of Plato in Christian times. Hence also the small influence his ethical speculation appears to have exercised upon his contemporaries. Perhaps it was because Aristotle saw this that he adapted his teaching more to the feelings of his audience. He always attached a high value to *ἔνδοξα*, received opinions. Be this as it

may, Aristotle viewed conduct in the light of its influence upon human happiness. Happiness is harmonious development of a man's powers in a suitable environment, and this development, he shows, can only be attained by the practice of virtue.

Aristotle divorces religion and ethics.

In the *Politics*[92] religious institutions are assumed as a matter of course, but neither in the *Politics* nor in the *Ethics* is religion made a moral sanction. Yet, since God is "thought thinking itself" (ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις),[93] man ought, having the divine intelligence within him, to aspire after the divine life, and to partake of immortality so far as in him lies.[94] Hence the philosophic life is the best. God attracts the universe to himself, κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον.[95] This version of ὁμοίωσις is the only connection between Aristotelian ethics and theology. The motives of conduct are strictly ethical and not religious.[96] In Aristotle there is no hope of immortality, and consequently a future life cannot be made an ethical end. Moreover, "the conception of Providence . . . . finds no place in Aristotle,"[97] although the gods care for men in a general way. Not that Aristotle is averse to religion. The man who doubts whether he ought to love the gods he compares to one who doubts whether he ought to love his parents, or whether snow is white.[98] The current opinion that there are gods is true, but the legends owe their origin to their utilitarian value. Zeller well sums up the attitude of Aristotle in the following words[99]:—"Aristotle's philosophy thus stands in the loosest relation to positive religion. It takes advantage of its ideas as links of literary connection, but makes no further use of them. Just as little, however, does it desire to see religion purified or reformed; on the contrary, it seems to accept its imperfections as something which could not possibly be otherwise. Each stands to the other in an attitude of essential indifference; philosophy goes its own way, without much troubling itself about religion, or fearing from

He does not believe in immortality or Providence.

it any interruption in the prosecution of its own work."

Aristotle's successors.

The earlier successors of Aristotle seem to have followed closely in his footsteps. But Eudemus insisted upon the connection between human action and the divine, even declaring that God gives some men a natural inclination to virtue, and that God is the ultimate source of all morality. Dicaearchus refused to believe in immortality, and Strato violently opposed the arguments of the *Phaedo*. Perhaps one may see here Stoic and Epicurean influences.

In the *Laws*[100] Plato mentions a belief in the gods combined with a denial of their interference in the affairs of men. He adds that it was not shared by many. This

Epicurus.

is exactly the religious view of Epicurus. The saying that man is the inventor of his own gods is certainly true of this thinker. His physical theory, combined with a natural desire to account for the universal belief of men, required him to believe in anthropomorphic deities.[101] But he took as his ethical end *ἀταραξία*,[102] a freedom from all distress of mind. Now it is of the essence of religion that it requires certain duties to be performed, the omission of which brings punishment. Religion exercises discipline, and discipline is inseparable from mental tension and a certain degree of awe. Hence Epicurus, while assigning the usual attributes of immortality and happiness to his gods, denied that they interested themselves in human affairs. Such a belief, he insisted, was true piety. The common faith was productive of much cruelty, fear and misery.[103] Only one thing could be worse than the usual religious belief, namely, a belief in fate.[104]

What his doctrine implies.

I shall leave this doctrine with a brief summary of what it implies. The fact that the Epicurean School was popular proves that men were weary of the struggle in the world between good and evil, and preferred to retreat from active life and shut their eyes to all that could distress them. The denial of any relations between men

and gods was not altogether an unhealthy sign. It argues disgust with the existing religious beliefs, and I have given several indications that those beliefs were really disgusting. Scepticism is to be preferred to superstition. One more proof of the degraded state of religion shall be given here. We find quoted in Athenaeus[105] an ode in honour of Demetrius, written on his return from Leucas and Corcyra. In it the gods are disparaged. "They either are not, or they care not for us. Thou art our god." Perhaps the troublous times that followed the death of Alexander had something to do with the Epicurean denial of a providence. Disaster and sorrow lead many men to deny that the gods they have served exist at all, or at any rate that they interfere with the affairs of this world.

Duris' ode to Demetrius.

The Stoics, instead of denying the truth of religion, tried to reform it. While the Epicurean discarded religion for the harm it did, the Stoic accepted it for the blessings it could bestow. Their theology was lofty and pure, and had much in common with that of Plato. The Stoics believed in one God, whose various aspects were mind, fate, Zeus, etc. He is immortal, perfect and happy, and exercises providence over the world. He is not anthropomorphic. Every sin is an impiety towards God.[106] They rejected the popular legends, but allegorised them for purposes of popular instruction. These legends, they thought, proved the existence of God and formed a barrier against violent passions.[107] In a similar accordance with popular belief, they held that daemons, bound by a bond of sympathy, kept watch over the affairs of men. They had no hope of immortality, although they believed that in some cases the soul survived the body.[108]

The Stoics.

Religion and morality once more united.

The end of man, said the Stoics, is to live in accordance with nature.[109] Here is ὁμοίωσις in another form, and the Stoic God is worthy of imitation. He is good; evil results from the foolishness of men.[110]

New aspect of religion.

The Stoic religion touched morality at yet another point. The hymn of Cleanthes is a song, not of prayer only, but of praise. The greatest privilege of men and of gods, says the psalmist, is to praise God. It is a commonplace that this attitude of mind purifies the soul, raises the worshipper above the things of this world, and prepares him to do his duty with manliness and content. It is virtually equivalent to a religious sanction of morality. The popularity of the Stoic school proves that in spite of the superstition and indifference of the time, there was a considerable number of religious men.

Summary.

The above discussion has shown that the early Greeks had a religious faith which was a sanction of morality. They were also heirs to certain poetic legends purporting to describe the life of the gods. These legends ascribed to the gods acts which the development of morality condemned. At the time when this inconsistency was perceived arose the idea of ὁμοίωσις and the hope of immortality it implied. Accordingly noble minds tried to purify the legends; but the fault was inherent, and together with philosophy, which explained phenomena by natural causes, produced at the time of the disastrous Peloponnesian War scepticism with regard to the legendary tales, and finally doubts of the existence of the gods. But the State ritual continued, and the unintelligent still possessed a languid belief, but a belief robbed of its "content," the lively realities of the legends. After Sophocles we find no lofty discussion of moral problems based upon the national sagas. So the religious impulse, ever imperious in its demands, found satisfaction in the case of the less intellectual in debasing superstitions.

(*a*) Religion to the rise of ethics.

But morality had lost the sanction of religion. It was at this point that ethics arose, striving to give a new sanction to morality, and emphasising the happiness that right conduct brings with it.

The following table gives in brief what I have tried to show in the preceding pages :—

	Attitude to belief in gods.	Attitude to Monotheism.	Attitude to legends.	Attitude to belief in a providence.	Attitude to belief in immortality.	Attitude to doctrine of ὁμοίωσις.	Moral sanction.
Socrates	Positive	Did not clearly define	Did not believe unworthy tales	Positive	Uncertain	Showed a tendency, but did not follow up the idea	(1) Desire for εὐπραξία (2) Religious
Plato	Positive	Monotheistic, but he believed in subordinate divinities	Purified legends necessary for popular instruction	Positive	Positive	Positive	(1) Philosophic ἔρως for philosophers (2) Utilitarian and religious
Aristotle	Positive	Same as Plato	Neglect	Positive, but only in a general way	Negative	For the philosophic few	Desire for εὐδαιμονία
Epicureans	Positive	Negative	Unbelief	Negative	Negative	Negative, except in a very limited sense, i.e. that man should live free from care	Desire for ἀταραξία
Stoics	Positive	Same as Plato	Unbelief, but they upheld legends, with allegory, for popular instruction	Positive	Negative[1]	Positive in the sense of conformity to nature	(1) Desire for εὐδαιμονία and (2) Religious

[1] See Zeller *Stoics* p. 219.

I would lay stress upon the following points :—

(*b*) The philosophers.

1. All philosophers from Socrates to the Stoics believed in the existence of deities.
2. Declaring, with the exception of Epicurus, and possibly Socrates, that God is one, they did not deny the existence of subordinate divinities.

   There is scarcely a hint that monotheism was thought necessary for morality.
3. None believed in the unworthy legends, but some of the most morally earnest wished to retain them in a purified form for purposes of popular instruction.
4. Only Plato believed in immortality, and connected that belief with morals.
5. Those who retained the legends as a basis of popular instruction taught the doctrine of ὁμοίωσις, and also made use of the religious sanction as well as of the utilitarian.
6. Socrates felt ἔρως towards noble souls, and Plato his pupil, to whom religion and philosophy were one, conceived of ἔρως as the ideal relation between man and God. Aristotle believes that God moves the world "as a loved object inspires movement." The notion was philosophic only. As a rule the relation of man to the gods was not a sentimental one.[111]

Implications from the teaching of the philosophers.

It may be inferred that among the common people belief in the gods did not die out. But this belief was robbed of its content. The legends had fallen into discredit. Expurgation and allegory were tried, but are suicidal. Recollecting that Aristotle reflects the general opinion of his time, while Plato is usually opposed to it, we shall assume that philosophy with its doctrine of natural causes had almost destroyed the belief in a providence. There was no inspiring hope of a future life.

Men did right through custom, or through fear of punishment, unhappiness or dishonour in this world.

The evidence from non-philosophic sources bears out these conclusions at every point.

Ethics and religion.

The work of ethics was to support morality when the religious sanction failed. In the following pages I hope to show that it did so in a very efficient manner. It pointed out to the more intellectual that there were other reasons besides the religious why men should be moral. The example of those who studied ethics, presumably the most highly gifted and intellectual, prevented complete moral decay, but not without a loss of the devotional instinct. Nevertheless, some philosophers were convinced that religion was necessary to enforce good conduct, for neither a nation nor a man can continue to succeed without devotion. In course of time this Platonic and Stoic view triumphed at the birth of Christianity, but too late to save the Greek nation. It was good that the imperfect religion of Hellas should be abandoned, but our gain was loss for the Greeks. They perished that we might live.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

I APPEND a few passages from the comic poets which bear upon the attitude of the Athenians towards religion during the closing years of the fourth century.

Sometimes unbelief or indifference is apparent.

τὸ γὰρ τρέφον με τοῦτ' ἐγὼ κρίνω θεόν.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* lvi. 3.

ὦ μεγίστη τῶν θεῶν
νῦν οὖσ' ἀναίδει', εἰ θεὸν καλεῖν σε δεῖ,
δεῖ δέ· τὸ κρατοῦν γὰρ νῦν νομίζεται θεός.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* xxxii. 7.

ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι λέγει
ἀνέμους, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἥλιον, πῦρ, ἀστέρας.
ἐγὼ δ' ὑπέλαβον χρησίμους εἶναι θεοὺς
τἀργύριον ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* xci. 29.

"Believe in and worship God, but inquire not into His nature." This implies belief, but belief which verges upon superstition.

θεὸν νόμιζε καὶ σέβου ζήτει δὲ μή·
πλεῖον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔχεις.
εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ βούλου μαθεῖν,
ὡς ὄντα τοῦτον καὶ παρόντ' ἀεὶ σέβου.

PHILEMON *apud* STOB. *Ecl.* ii. 1, 5.

τί ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς οὐ θέλει σε μανθάνειν·
ἀσεβεῖς τὸν οὐ θέλοντα μανθάνειν θέλων.

PHILEMON (Kock 166).

Love is supreme even over Zeus.

δέσποιν', Ἔρωτος οὐδὲν ἰσχύει πλέον,
οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ κρατῶν τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν
Ζεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ πάντ' ἀναγκασθεὶς ποιεῖ.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* lxiii. 21.

The following imply disbelief in a divine providence.

παύσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον
ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστιν ἄλλο τῆς τύχης,
εἴτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον εἴτε νοῦς.
τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κυβερνῶν ἅπαντα καὶ στρέφον
καὶ σῴζον, ἡ πρόνοια δ' ἡ θνητὴ καπνὸς
καὶ φλήναφος. πείσθητε κοὐ μέμψεσθέ με·
πάνθ' ὅσα νοοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν
τύχη 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.
. . . . . .
τύχῃ κυβερνᾷ πάντα. ταύτην καὶ φρένας
δεῖ καὶ πρόνοιαν τὴν θεὸν καλεῖν μόνην,
εἰ μή τις ἄλλως ὀνόμασιν χαίρει κενοῖς.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Ecl.* i. vi. (v.) 1 a.

οἴει τοσαύτην τοὺς θεοὺς ἄγειν σχολήν,
ὥστε τὸ κακὸν καὶ τἀγαθὸν καθ' ἡμέραν
νέμειν ἑκάστῳ;

MENANDER (Kock 174).

The last two have an Epicurean ring.

πῶς ἂν μὲν οὖν σώσειεν ἶβις ἢ κύων;
ὅπου γὰρ εἰς τοὺς ὁμολογουμένους θεοὺς
ἀσεβοῦντες οὐ διδόασιν εὐθέως δίκην,
τίν' αἰελούρου βωμὸς ἐπιτρίψειεν ἄν;

TIMOCLES *apud* ATHEN. vii. 300 (Kock 1).

God requires a return for the blessings he gives.

τοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας ἐπιφανῶς
δεῖ ζῆν φανεράν τε τὴν δόσιν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ
ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς δεδωκὼς τἀγαθὰ
ὧν μὲν πεποίηκεν οἴεται χάριν τινὰ
ἔχειν ἑαυτῷ· τοὺς ἀποκρυπτομένους δὲ καὶ
πράττειν μετρίως φάσκοντας, ἀχαρίστους ὁρῶν
ἀνελευθέρως τε ζῶντας ἐπὶ καιροῦ τινος
λαβὼν ἀφείλεθ' ὅσα δεδωκὼς ἦν πάλαι.

ALEXIS *apud* ATHEN. ii. 40 (Kock 265).

In the following there are signs of a nobler faith. God is good, and helps the righteous. He works silently.

ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται
εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου
ἀγαθός· κακὸν γὰρ δαίμον' οὐ νομιστέον
εἶναι βίον βλάπτοντα χρηστόν.
ἅπαντα δ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν θεόν.

MENANDER (Kock 550, 1).

ὅταν τι πράττῃς ὅσιον, ἀγαθὴν ἐλπίδα
πρόβαλλε σαυτῷ, τοῦτο γινώσκων ὅτι
τόλμῃ δικαίᾳ καὶ θεὸς συλλαμβάνει.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* vii. 4.

ἅπαντα σιγῶν ὁ θεὸς ἐξεργάζεται.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Ecl.* i. i. 11.

Superstition is rampant, but the poet condemns it.

λυπούμεθ' ἂν πτάρῃ τις, ἂν εἴπῃ κακῶς
ὀργιζόμεθ', ἂν ἴδῃ τις ἐνύπνιον σφόδρα
φοβούμεθ', ἂν γλαὺξ ἀνακράγῃ δεδοίκαμεν.

MENANDER *apud* STOB. *Fl.* xcviii. 8.

A. ἀγαθόν τί μοι γένοιτο, πολύτιμοι θεοί·
ὑποδούμενος τὸν ἱμάντα γὰρ τῆς δεξιᾶς
ἐμβάδος ἀπέρρηξ'. B. εἰκότως, ὦ φλήναφε,
σαπρὸς γὰρ ἦν, σὺ δὲ μικρολόγος ἄρ' οὐ θέλων
καινὰς πρίασθαι.

MENANDER *apud* CLEM. ALEX. *Str.* vii. 4. 24.

οὐδεὶς μ' ἀρέσκει περιπατῶν ἔξω θεὸς
μετὰ γραός, οὐδ' εἰς οἰκίαν παρεισιὼν
ἐπὶ τοῦ σανιδίου. τὸν δίκαιον δεῖ θεὸν
οἴκοι μένειν σῴζοντα τοὺς ἱδρυμένους.
MENANDER *apud* CLEM. ALEX. *Protr.* vii. 75.

Compare Theophrastus' account of the δεισιδαίμων (*Char.* xvi.).

These passages seem to imply that the Athenians were not altogether without religious belief. But the general tone suggests belief with indifference, disbelief in Providence, a tendency to set material advantages before trust in God, and the presence of much superstition. There are no expressions of sturdy atheism. This is evidence in support of the view taken in the preceding chapter, for the combative spirit is only to be found in the presence of a living faith. The contrast with the faith of Aeschylus in a divine justice is very marked.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Of course polytheism involves moral difficulties. What may please one god may displease another. See Plato *Euthyphro* 7 E. It is remarkable, however, that the Greeks, even their philosophers, felt little difficulty in accepting a plurality of gods, provided one was supreme.

2. *Od.* xiv. 83

οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων.

3. e.g. *Il.* xvi. 386

Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥ' ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

4. See *Makers of Hellas*, pp. 242-253.

5. *Il.* iv. 168; iv. 235; *Od.* vi. 207; *Il.* xvi. 386.

6. *Works and Days* 267

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας
καί νυ τάδ', αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσ', ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει
οἵην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἔντος ἐέργει.

7. Archilochus *fr.* 84; *fr.* 101; Semonides *fr.* 1; Solon *fr.* 12 ll. 17-36; Theognis l. 171; l. 377.

8. *Il.* ii. 6.

9. *Od.* xx. 201

Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὔ τις σεῖο θεῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος·
οὐκ ἐλεαίρεις ἄνδρας, ἐπὴν δὴ γείνεαι αὐτός.

10. *Od.* i. 32

ὦ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται·
ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.

11. *Works and Days* ll. 49 and 59.

12. Theognis ll. 165, 166; l. 377

πῶς δή σευ, Κρονίδη, τολμᾷ νόος ἄνδρας ἀλιτροὺς
ἐν ταὐτῇ μοίρῃ τόν τε δίκαιον ἔχειν;

13. Harrison *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* p. 3. Dickinson *Greek View of Life* p. 23.

14. *Il.* ix. 499

καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.

15. Hes. *fr.* 272 (Christ)

δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασλῆας.

Eurip. *Med.* 964

πείθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὺς λόγος.

16. Xen. *Mem.* A iii. 3 ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. ἐπαινέτης δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τούτου·

Καδδύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

17. See Decharme *Critique des Traditions Religieuses chez les Grecs* pp. 207, 208. Plato *Rep.* 364-366.

18. *Laws* 888 c.

19. Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings* pp. 350, 351

20. I quote the most pertinent.

Thales, Diels, § 22 πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.

Anaximenes, Diels, § 7; Ritter and Preller 28 Ἀναξιμένης . . . ἀέρα . . . ἔφη τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ . . . θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα γίνεσθαι.

Heraclitus, Diels, *fr.* 30 κόσμον, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν.

fr. 67 ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός, ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ ⟨πῦρ⟩.

fr. 102 τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια.

fr. 114 τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

fr. 119 ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.

fr. 78 ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.

21. See Adam *Gifford Lectures* 2. Xenophanes, Diels, *fr.* 11 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

fr. 14
ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς,
τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.

fr. 23
εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὔτε νόημα.

fr. 24
οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει.

fr. 26
αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταὐτῷ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδὲν
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιτρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ.

fr. 34
καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ γένετ' οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων.

22. For Pythagoras see Zeller *Pre-Socratic Philosophy* i. pp. 486 foll.
Ritter and Preller 90 ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.
Plato *Cratylus* 400 C, *Gorgias* 493 A } σῶμα σῆμα.
Plato *Phaedo* 62 B (*a*) ἐν φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. (*b*) τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
Iambl. *v. Pyth.* 137 (Diels p. 293) ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν διορίζουσιν, ἐστόχασται τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμιλίας, καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ βίος ἅπας συντέτακται πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὁ λόγος οὗτος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὅτι γελοῖον ποιοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ζητοῦντες τὸ εὖ ἢ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν βασιλευομένῃ χώρᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν τινα ὑπαρχον θεραπεύῃ, ἀμελήσας αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἄρχοντος καὶ βασιλεύοντος. τοιοῦτον γὰρ οἴονται ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἔστι τε θεὸς καὶ οὗτος πάντων κύριος, δεῖν δὲ ὡμολόγηται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου τἀγαθὸν αἰτεῖν, πάντες τε, οὓς μὲν ἂν φιλῶσι καὶ οἷς ἂν χαίρωσι, τούτοις διδόασι τἀγαθά, πρὸς δὲ οὓς ἐναντίως ἔχουσι, τἀναντία, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα πρακτέον, οἷς τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς χαίρων.
Iambl. *v. Pyth.* 174 ἔτι τοίνυν ἀνυσιμώτατον πρὸς τὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης κατάστασιν ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀρχήν, ἄνωθέν τε ἀπ' ἐκείνης πολιτείαν καὶ νόμους, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ τὰ δίκαια διέθηκεν.

23. For Orphism see Gomperz *Greek Thinkers* vol. i. book 1, chap. 5.

24. Harrison *Prol.* p. 518.

25. *Rep.* 364 B.

26. *Pre-Soc.* i. 67-75.

27. *Il.* ix. 312.

28. *Rep.* 330 D.

29. Hymn to Demeter l. 480; Heraclitus *fr.* 27 Diels; Pindar *fr.* 137 Christ; Sophocles *fr.* 753
ὡς τρὶς ὄλβιοι
κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
μόλωσ' ἐς Ἄιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.
For family religion see Coulanges pp. 103-110.

30. Zeller *Pre-Soc.* i. p. 70.

31. *Ol.* ii. 75 foll.
ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἑστρὶς
ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου
τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
νάσος ὠκεανίδες
αὖραι περιπνέοισιν κτλ.

32. Hicks and Hill 54
αἰθὴρ μέμ φσυχὰς ὑπεδέχσατο, σώ[ματα δὲ χθών]
τῶνδε· Ποτειδαίας δ' ἀμφὶ πύλας ἑλ[υθεν].

33. Eur. *Hel.* 1014

ὁ νοῦς
τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει
ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών.

34. Eur. *fr.* 638

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

fr. 449

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους
τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον
χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

35. *Alc.* 381

οὐδέν ἐσθ' ὁ κατθανών.

36. *Heracl.* 592

εἴ τι δὴ κάτω χθονός·
εἴη γε μέντοι μηδέν.

37. Diog. Laert. vi. 4.

38. Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings* p. 350.

39. *Anth. Pal.* vii. 249

ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

40. *Ibid.* 657

εἰσὶ θανόντων,
εἰσὶν ἀμοιβαῖαι κἀν φθιμένοις χάριτες.

41. Zeller *Pre-Soc.* ii. p. 290.

42. For the "unwritten laws" see *Ant.* 454; *Oed. Tyr.* 865; *Ajax* 1343. For Sophocles' estimate of piety, *Philoct.* 1440

τοῦτο δ' ἐννοεῖθ' ὅταν
πορθῆτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς·
ὡς τἄλλα πάντα δεύτερ' ἡγεῖται πατὴρ
Ζεύς· οὐ γὰρ εὐσέβεια συνθνῄσκει βροτοῖς·
κἂν ζῶσι, κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.

43. For the religious views of the writers of the fifth century see Decharme *Traditions* chaps. iii. and iv. For Euripides see Verrall *Euripides the Rationalist*; Decharme *Euripides et l'Esprit de son Théâtre*; Wilamowitz-Moellendorf *Herakles*; Thomson *Euripides and the Attic Orators*. The quotations and references in the last work are especially useful. An important work, which I had not seen when I wrote my pamphlet on Euripides, is the *Euripides* of Wilhelm Nestle. Holm (ii. 433) thinks that the Athenians of this period were attached to their religion, or at least had faith in the efficacy of their ceremonies.

44. Thucyd. ii. 53 θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους, τῶν δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι.

For the view that the sophists were not generally antagonistic to religion see Holm ii. p. 434.

45. Protagoras *apud* Diog. Laert. ix. 51 and Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 3. 7 περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

46. Prodicus *apud* Sext. *ad. Math.* ix. 18 "ἥλιον," φησί, "καὶ σελήνην καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὠφελοῦντα τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαν, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν Νεῖλον," καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δήμητραν νομισθῆναι, τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον κτλ.

Themist. *Or.* 30 p. 422 Dind. ἱερουργίαν πᾶσαν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μυστήρια καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ τελετὰς τῶν γεωργίας καλῶν ἐξάπτει, νομίζων καὶ θεῶν ἔννοιαν ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐλθεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐσέβειαν.

47. Thrasymachus *apud* Herm. on Pl. *Phaedrus* 239, Diels p. 544 οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον, τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτῃ μὴ χρωμένους.

48. *Her. Fur.* 62

ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν θείων σαφές.

49. *fr.* 292 Nauck

εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί.

Iph. Taur. 391

οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.

Ion 442

πῶς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς
γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;

fr. 286

φησίν τις εἶναι δῆτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ θεούς;
οὐκ εἰσίν, οὐκ εἴσ', εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων θέλει
μὴ τῷ παλαίῳ μῶρος ὢν χρῆσθαι λόγῳ.

Tr. 886

Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν.

50. Diels p. 571; Nauck p. 771

ἦν χρόνος, ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος,
. . . . . .
ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἆθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίγνετο.
κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ᾖ
<ὁμῶς ἁπάντων> τήν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχῃ·
ἐζημιοῦτο δ' εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τἀμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
ἀπεῖργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ,
λάθρᾳ δ' ἔπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
<πρῶτον> πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνὴρ
<θεῶν> δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν, ὅπως
εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἂν λάθρᾳ
πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονῶσί <τι>.

51. Coulanges *La Cité Antique* pp. 141, 142.

52. ὠφέλιμος and its cognates are mentioned more than eighty times in the *Memorabilia*, besides other words of similar meaning.

53. *Mem.* A i. 9 ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι.

54. Cf. Decharme *Traditions* pp. 164, 165, and Gomperz ii. p. 85.
Mem. A iii. 1 ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτω κτλ.

55. *Mem.* A iv. Compare the Theseus of Euripides' *Supplices* 296, 594.

56. *Mem.* A i. 19 καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

57. *Mem.* Γ ix. 14.

58. *Mem.* Γ viii. 3.

59. *Mem.* A iii. 2 καὶ ηὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὁποῖα ἀγαθά ἐστι.

60. *Mem.* Δ iv. 12.

61. *Mem.* Δ iv. Cf. for the idea of serving God, Plato *Apol.* 23 B and *Crito* 54 C.

62. *Mem.* A vi. 10 ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου. See also Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2. 64 Σωκράτης Πλάτων ταὐτὰ τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ, τέλος ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ.

63. Cf. Adam *Crito* Intr. p. xv.

64. See Decharme *Traditions* p. 168.

65. Mahaffy *Social Life in Greece* pp. 366-368.

66. Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings* pp. 135, 136, 137, 168 ("that change which is completed in the fourth century, by which the votive offering becomes chiefly a means of self-glorification"), 185, 227 (a temple raised to Lamia, the mistress of Demetrius Poliorcetes), 260, 261, 269, 351, 378, 379.

67. Cf. Holm iii. pp. 187-191.

68. Holm iii. p. 190.

69. Ritter and Preller, 285.

70. Archer-Hind on *Phaedo* 69 B

71. Plato *Theaetetus* 176 A, B ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν . . . ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἐνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

Symposium 211 E ἆρ' οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ᾧ δεῖ, θεωμένου καὶ ξυνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ;

Phaedo 82 B εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι . . . οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς αὐτούς, οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

Timaeus 29 E ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ.

Cf. also *Rep.* 377. For the doctrine of ἔρως, see *Symp.* 211 and Zeller *Plato* pp. 191-196; Gomperz ii. pp. 379-393.

72. Archer-Hind *Phaedo*, Appendix I.

73. *Phaedo* 64 A; 66 C.

74. *Rep.* 500 D.

75. H. Jackson in *Journal of Philology* vol. xiii. on the *Timaeus*.

76. *Laws* 716 C τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ; μία, καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὔτ' ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις. ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος. τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ ἄδικος.

77. *Laws* 951 B.

78. *Timaeus* 86 D κακὸς γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδείς.

79. *Laws* 689 A. Of course "will" is an inadequate translation of βούλησις, which Aristotle carefully distinguishes from προαίρεσις, *Ethics* 1111 b. But Plato seems to have partly realised the notion of "will."

80. *Laws* 689 D.

81. *Laws* 951 B.

82. *Laws* 889 E–898 C. The following passages are important:

890 A [φασκόντων] εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον ὅ τί τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος, ὅθεν

ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, ἐλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον.

885 B θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἔν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγενομένους.

83. *Laws* 835 E.

84. *Laws* 716 A τῷ [sc. τῷ θεῷ] δ' ἀεὶ ξυνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός. Cf. 729 E foll. ; 842 E foll.

85. *Laws* 890 A, 909 B, 772 C, D. For the worship of daemons and heroes see Zeller *Plato* p. 526 quotation, and Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings* p. 12. *Laws* 906 A ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων.

86. *Laws* 716 D.

87. See Thomson *Euripides and the Attic Orators* pp. 38-44. I give here the passages which contain the noblest theology :

Isocrates *frag.* iii. (α') 7 οἱ ἄνθρωποι τότε γίγνονται βελτίους, ὅταν θεῷ προσέρχωνται· ὅμοιον δὲ ἔχουσι θεῷ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν καὶ ἀληθεύειν.

Dem. *Lept.* § 126 εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατὰ μηδέν' ἄλλον ἔχουσι τρόπον δεῖξαι δίκαιον ὑμᾶς ἀφελέσθαι, ταῦτ' ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματι ποιεῖν ζητήσουσι, πῶς οὐκ ἀσεβέστατον ἔργον καὶ δεινότατον πράξουσι ;

Aesch. *against Tim.* § 190 μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰς τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀσελγείας γίγνεσθαι.

88. *Laws* 896 D, E A. ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν ; Κ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; Α. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι ; Κ. τί μήν ; Α. μίαν ἢ πλείους ; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

See also 898 C, 904 A and Xen. *Cyrop.* vi. i. 41.

89. *Plato* p. 545.

90. Archer-Hind *Phaedo*, Introd. § 4.

91. P. xxxvi.

92. Arist. *Pol.* 1328 b.

93. *Meta.* Λ 1074 b.

94. *Ethics* x. 1177 b οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ.

Here Aristotle is opposed to common Greek feeling. See quotations of Burnet, *in loc.*

95. *Meta.* Λ 1072 b *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον.*

96. The *νοῦς ποιητικός* is eternal, but the *νοῦς παθητικός* is *φθαρτός.* Since both are necessary for conscious thought there are gaps in consciousness, that is, there is no personal immortality. See *de Anima* Γ 430 a *χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.*

97. Zeller *Aristotle* ii. p. 326. *Ethics* x. 1179 a.

98. *Top.* xi. 105 A.

99. Zeller *Aristotle* ii. p. 335. For Aristotle's views on the legends see *Meta.* Λ 1074 b *τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.*

100. *Laws* 888 c.

101. The views of Epicurus about the gods are given in a letter of his quoted by Diogenes Laertius x. 123 *πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη· μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον, μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα, περὶ αὐτὸν δόξαζε. θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν. ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις. οἵους δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ πόλλοι νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν. οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νοοῦσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων.* 124 *οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις. ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι, αἴτιαι τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται· καὶ ὠφέλειαι, τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.*

Ibid. 139 *τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.*

102. *Ibid.* 136.

103. Lucretius i. 62-101. The last line sums up the thought of the passage: *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*

104. Diog. Laert. x. 134 *κρεῖττον ἦν τὸ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν.*

105. Duris *apud* Athen. vi. 253

ὦ τοῦ κρατίστου παῖ Ποσειδῶνος θεοῦ,
χαῖρε, κἀφροδίτης.
ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχονται θεοί,
ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὦτα,
ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἕν.
σὲ δὲ παρόνθ' ὁρῶμεν,
οὐ ξύλινον οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ' ἀληθινόν.

It is difficult to say which is the most striking feature of this passage, its impiety, flattery, or despair. For an estimate of the moral value of Greek religion at this time see Holm iv. p. 68.

106. Diog. Laert. vii. 135 ἕν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία, πολλαῖς τε ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι.

Ibid. 147 θεὸν δὲ εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα, Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ' ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιός ἐστιν κτλ.

Stobaeus *Eclogae* ii. 216 ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ἀσέβημα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν βούλησίν τι πράττεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ ἀσεβείας εἶναι τεκμήριον.

107. See Zeller *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* p. 343.

108. Diog. Laert. vii. 151 φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας, ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας, τὰς ὑπολελειμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς. For the Stoic view of immortality see Diog. Laert. vii. 156, 157.

109. *Ibid.* 87 τέλος εἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν.

Ibid. 88 διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύει εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Διὶ καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι.

110. Cleanthes *apud* Stobaeum *Ecl.* i. p. 25

κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεί,
Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν,
χαῖρε· σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν.
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ὅλου μίμημα λαχόντες
μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν·
τῷ σε καθυμνήσω κτλ.

οὐδέ τι γίνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,
οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε
θνητὸν ἐόντ', ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον,
οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

111. See L. Schmidt *Ethik* i. p. 166.

CHAPTER II

MORALITY IN SOCIETY

ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, Aristotle *Politics*, 1253 a.

CHAPTER II

MORALITY IN SOCIETY

The State.

To a Greek the most important society was undoubtedly the State. He regarded it as an institution for which man is naturally adapted.[1] Loss of country was regarded as almost equivalent to loss of life. At Athens the death penalty could nearly always be avoided by voluntary banishment.[2] Citizenship was thus a privilege, and one which was jealously guarded from usurpation. Greeks as such had few rights. Theoretically they might be made slaves, and it was only with the growth of a more humane spirit that the practice became unusual. The Greek prisoners in the Sicilian War became the slaves of the Syracusans.[3] I can find no reprobation of this practice before Plato.[4] Socrates, at least, expresses no disapproval. By the time of Demosthenes *δοῦλοι* and *βάρβαροι* are practically synonymous terms.[5] Metics (resident aliens) were debarred from citizenship, and had to be represented in the law courts by a patron.[6]

Connection of the State and virtue.

It was in the city-state, strictly limited to male citizens of full age, that the most characteristic Greek virtues grew and flourished. It must be remembered that during the great age in Greece the State was more influential and considered more important than any other social institution, even the family. Closely bound up with the State religion, its dictates had all the force of a religious sanction, until questioning minds, and the violence of the

Athenian empire, caused doubt as to the validity of State authority. Plato places the happiness of the State before that of individuals[7]; and although Aristotle quarrels with this view,[8] it is plain that in his ideal State he never allows individual happiness to interfere with the public benefit. Both wish to further the general happiness of the citizens, although, as Zeller well puts it, Plato "demands that the individuals should seek their highest happiness in unselfish devotion."[9]

δικαιοσύνη, the State virtue.

The characteristic virtue of man's relation to the State is δικαιοσύνη, "righteousness" or "justice." Δίκη, an older word, is righteousness viewed objectively but in the abstract; δίκαιος is the adjective corresponding to both. I intend to base my discussion upon the history of these words.

In Homer and Hesiod δίκη is opposed to βία.[10] It signifies good custom, discipline, or "law," and its validity is derived from the gods. Even as early as this we may see that both the wide term "righteousness" and the narrow term "justice" are equivalents of δίκη, for Hesiod constantly uses it with reference to the verdicts of "bribe-devouring princes," while he calls men who neglect their parents χειροδίκαι, "making might their right."[11] To Hesiod δίκη is a gift of Zeus, which differentiates men from beasts. Zeus is also its guardian. He blesses the man who observes justice and punishes the race of him who violates it.[12]

Draco's code.

Between the age of Hesiod and the next age from which much literature survives occurred the codification of the law. At Athens this took place in 621. The moral results of this were very great. It at once drew a distinction between legality and morality. The written law was severed from the unwritten law. Thus δίκη, or rather a large part of it, received a legal sanction, which is something quite different from the sanctions of religion and custom. In time the relation between legality and morality called for an explanation. Of course men

perceived the distinction gradually, but the important point is that it had been definitely made.

Δίκη in Theognis and Heraclitus.

I think that the rise of a legal sanction was partly responsible for the independent position assumed by δίκη in subsequent literature. The Hesiodic Zeus punishes violations of justice, but in later writers, although the religious sanction remains, δίκη is its own avenger. Death, says Theognis, sometimes prevents justice from seizing the criminal.[13] Heraclitus declares that justice will arrest workers of, and witnesses to, lies.[14] It is in Heraclitus that occurs the first mention which I can find of "law" (νόμος) in the sense of "constitution." The discoverer of the fixed regularity of natural law declares that the State should "fight for its law as for a wall." [15]

The narrower and broader senses not carefully distinguished.

But scarcely any attempt is made to separate clearly the broader and narrower senses of δίκη, which are almost identical with "morality" and "legality." All virtue, says Theognis, is included in δικαιοσύνη.[16] In the fragment of Heraclitus quoted above δίκη includes telling the truth.[17] Aeschylus declares that honouring parents is a decree of δίκη.[18] On the other hand, Pindar closely connects δίκη with εὐνομία,[19] which Aristotle defines as "good discipline." [20] Δίκη, in fact, is used indifferently with either the broad or the narrow meaning. The only hint at a conflict between the two that I can discover before Sophocles is in the *Septem* of Aeschylus.[21] There Eteocles is the defender of δίκη, inasmuch as he is the defender of the State, while Polynices, the rebel, declares that δίκη is fighting for him. It is in the *Antigone* of Sophocles that the contrast is first clearly made.[22] There Creon is the champion of legality, "the written law," while Antigone insists upon obeying "morality," the "unwritten law" of the gods. The question is raised, when these laws clash, which is to be obeyed? The reply of Sophocles is "the unwritten law," but it is obvious that no solution is satisfactory which does not explain the relations of the

The *Antigone*.

one to the other, and why any law should be obeyed at all.

φύσις and *νόμος*.

There were not wanting those who declared that convention was the origin of all law, and that the latter had no sanction in nature. It was only to be expected that the fundamental doctrine of the atomists, "everything exists conventionally except atoms and the void,"[23] would be transferred to the region of ethics and politics. Those who took this view were doubtless encouraged by the half-understood distinction between legality and morality. Legality cannot but appear somewhat artificial, and it is to be noticed that the term contrasted with *φύσις* is *νόμος*, the regular word for a legal enactment.

"Might is right."

Apparently it was Archelaus, a pupil of Gorgias, who first definitely propounded the proposition that *τὸ δίκαιον* was not natural, but merely conventional.[24] The doctrine took various forms, two of which have been preserved by Plato, who, in spite of the disgust he felt, has expressed them with admirable candour.

Thrasymachus in the *Republic*.

Thrasymachus, the sophist, holds that *δικαιοσύνη* is the interest of the stronger.[25] In other words, the strongest party in a State is the Government; the Government passes laws in its own interest; it is *δικαιοσύνη* to keep the laws; hence *δικαιοσύνη* is the interest of the stronger.

Callicles in the *Gorgias*.

In the *Gorgias*, Callicles puts forward with great clearness and force the following theory.[26] The weaker portion of the citizens in a State, who form the majority, pass laws to protect themselves from the stronger and more energetic spirits. By long and continuous education these strong characters have been led to believe that *ἀδικεῖν* is a greater disgrace than *ἀδικεῖσθαι*. But this view is pure convention. The example of animals, as well as that of men in cities and races, proves that nature considers it *δίκαιον* for the strong to rule, and accordingly *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is really more disgraceful than *ἀδικεῖν*. Although the theories of Thrasymachus and Callicles are not identical, for the one assumes the

powerful few to rule, the other the weak many, yet they agree in that they both assert might to be right.

Be it observed that Plato is not stating mere theoretical speculation, but a wide-spread belief. Heraclitus had sung the praises of "King War."[27] Plato himself says in the *Gorgias* that the view put forward by Callicles is what other people think but do not care to state openly.[28] We have also the witness of Thucydides. In the Funeral Speech, indeed, he makes Pericles praise the Athenians for their obedience to law, written and unwritten.[29] But in the famous Melian dialogue, the supposed occurrence of which was in 416, the Athenian envoys put forward the doctrine of "might is right" in the plainest and most brutal terms.[30] Bury remarks that "this was a doctrine which it was Hellenic to follow, but barbarous to enunciate in all its nakedness; and in the negotiations which preceded the blockade no Athenian spokesmen would have uttered the undiplomatic crudities which Thucydides ascribes to them."[31] The fact is that the Athenian empire presupposed the theory, however much the people shrank from confessing it openly.

The evidence of Thucydides. The Melian dialogue.

It cannot be denied that the danger was grave. A serious blow had been struck at political morality. The state of affairs was only aggravated by the fact that the theory "might is right" contained an element of truth, although it might well be asked, what is meant by "might"? When the furious passions aroused by the Peloponnesian War had subsided, law and order resumed their sway once more. The cause was partly the return of peace, and partly the good sense of the Athenian people. But much was also due to philosophic ethics, which found a reason for law that appealed to the intellect. To demand a reason was an Athenian characteristic, and the satisfaction of thoughtful minds produced by ethical study could not fail to have an effect lower down.

Philosophic ethics and "Might is Right."

Socrates' solution of the difficulty was simple. Accord- Socrates.

ing to him what the law commands is right.[32] Οἱ δίκαιοι are those who know what is lawful with respect to men. The laws, however, include not only the commands of men, but the unwritten commands of the gods, violation of which brings its own appropriate and natural punishment. Further than this Socrates did not go. Had he been pressed, I think he would have said that obedience to the law is useful to each individual. "Break the law," as he says in the *Crito*, "and you wrong your mother, who gave you birth, reared and educated you, and allowed you a share in all the beautiful things she could."[33] And it must be remembered that in Socrates' theology the gods also identified the lawful and the right, so that morality had a divine sanction.[34]

I cannot refrain from quoting a few sentences from Dr. Adam's edition of the *Crito*,[35] which describe the Socratic position admirably. "It may appear strange that a man so prone to doubt and inquiry should have hesitated to call in question the authority of the laws; but the fact is undeniable. . . . His whole life was distinguished by absolute fidelity to the laws of his country; . . . and now he consents to death rather than break them. . . . The generation before his birth appeared to him a kind of golden age, when the State flourished and the citizens were happy under the old unreflecting morality, where no right was known but that of law. The limitation of Socrates' genius appears here. Had he carried out his principles to their fullest logical development, he would not have shrunk from submitting to the test of his dialectic the whole question of the validity and authority of law as a condition of the stability of social life; but to him it is almost an axiom that the law should be obeyed."

To complete the picture we must add Socrates' thorough-going utilitarianism, and his belief in a religious sanction to morality.

In the eyes of Socrates, then, might is not right; right is the law, and obedience to the law is the will of the gods, and is also useful to man, the individual as well as the community. This is the old view, with the additional sanction of utilitarianism.

Summary. I must here recapitulate what I have tried to make clear. Citizenship was the nursery of the Greek virtues, and in particular of δικαιοσύνη, which means both "justice" and "righteousness." Codification of the law helped to accentuate the difference between these two ideas by distinguishing the written law (νόμος) from the unwritten. For a long time the distinction did not lead to any moral conflict. The *Antigone* of Sophocles is the first instance of a definite antagonism between the written and the unwritten law. Natural philosophy distinguished between νόμος and φύσις, and this distinction was transferred to ethical questions at a time when the decline of political morality had produced a general belief that only might is right. There was in consequence great danger of moral anarchy, because in the attack upon νόμος there was a treacherous attack upon δίκη.

Socrates did somewhat to lessen the danger by insisting that all νόμοι, both those of men and those of the gods, ought to be obeyed, because such obedience is conducive to human happiness.

Socrates' vigorous championship of the old political morality on utilitarian grounds was not a complete answer to the difficulties of the time. However "useful" it may be as a general rule to yield implicit obedience to the laws from which a man derives birth, education, and all that makes life worth living, experience proves that laws may command what is distinctly not useful, as Socrates had been himself forced to admit in the case of election by lot.[36] He was, in fact, guilty of a serious inconsistency, which was aggravated by the declaration that the true rulers are only those who know how to rule.[37] The

human intellect had reached a stage of development when it could only rest satisfied in an elucidation of the relation of legal to moral right; in other words, it was necessary to find out the meaning of "right" before a satisfactory theory of morals could be formulated. This was the task that fell to Plato.

Plato. The precise statement of the problem at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic* shows that Plato was not blind to the partial truth that is involved in the theory "might is right." But never for a moment would he admit that there could be any real discrepancy between what is right φύσει and what is right νόμῳ. Righteousness is better than unrighteousness.[38] Unrighteousness is the greatest of all evils.[39] It is a disease of the soul. But the antithesis between two kinds of right was the result of the many bad forms of government in vogue, tyrannies of oligarchs, despots and despotic democracies. Politics must be reformed, and legal right be assimilated to moral right. In the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus occurs a fragment of Archytas the Pythagorean, who was a great friend of Plato, to the effect that "the law ought to follow nature."[40] True righteousness is to be sought for in the perfect State, and in the citizen of the perfect State. A necessary corollary is that the State must assume supreme control over every department of human life. Philosophic ethics tried to lessen the antagonism of legality and morality by merging the latter in the former. But morality has first to determine what legality is. Care must be taken that the constitution be as perfect as possible.

By means of his tripartite division of the State into guardians, auxiliaries and workmen, and of the soul into rational, courageous and appetitive parts, Plato concludes that δικαιοσύνη results, whether in a State or in an individual, when each part performs its own functions without interfering with those of the others.[41] Since this

limitation of each part to its proper function produces a harmonious co-operation of the whole, δικαιοσύνη is better than ἀδικία, it is more shameful ἀδικεῖν than ἀδικεῖσθαι; while might is right only in the sense that knowledge of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν gives the sole claim to rule.

Plato does not appear to have essentially changed his view of δικαιοσύνη as he grew older. But by the time he wrote the *Laws* he had lost all hope of reaching the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. So the rulers of that dialogue are compelled to govern, not by a knowledge of the idea, but by prudent legislation and administration of the law. Hence the care which Plato desires to be devoted to the collection of good laws from all quarters, and hence their incorporation into the constitution. In other words, legal right is still the formal expression of, and guide to, moral right, but Plato sees that, in the absence of a knowledge of the ideas, complete correspondence is impossible.[42]

A heavy debt is due to Plato for being the first to attempt seriously a science of politics. He had had predecessors in Hippodamus of Miletus and Phaleas of Chalcedon, but it does not appear that the politics of these men had any philosophic basis. Plato would have merged all institutions in the State. He thus showed that he had caught the spirit which had animated the great age of Greece, and desired to perpetuate it by a radical reconstruction of city-life. But in founding his State upon a basis of metaphysics he attempted the impossible. There is no short cut to knowledge. The αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν can never be reached. Even an approximation thereto can only be attained by laborious classification and patient study. Plato tacitly confesses as much in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. In the latter he abandons—with regret, it is true, and with the conviction that his old view, were it only possible, is still the better—the philosophic government hinted at in the *Politicus* and worked out in the *Republic*. The patient research declared necessary in the *Laws* was

attempted by Aristotle, who carefully investigated as many constitutions as he could before writing the *Politics*. But the work is exceedingly slow, and even at the present day we have advanced but little toward the goal at which Plato aimed.

Aristotle.

Aristotle, too, identifies legality and morality.[43] When they clash, as they must occasionally, owing to the necessary imperfection of human institutions, harmony is restored by equity. While admitting a narrow meaning of δικαιοσύνη in the sense of (1) the distribution of State advantages and State property, and (2) the maintenance of equality in contracts, he affirms that δικαιοσύνη and virtue are one and the same, the former being the latter regarded as duty towards others. Virtue being an essential condition of happiness, it is the function of the State to promote them both to the utmost. In demanding δικαιοσύνη the State is affording the only means of attaining happiness. So the powers of the State must be comprehensive enough to effect this. A fixed condition of the will being necessary for virtuous conduct, mere knowledge will not make a man good. Habituation and strict discipline alone can insure the virtue of young people and of the many who listen not to honour but to fear.[44] Hence the State is a necessary institution that only beasts or gods can do without. Aristotle leaves much to the individual and the family that Plato would have brought under State control, but he agrees with him in making the State responsible for the education of the young.[45] No doubt this view was suggested to both Plato and Aristotle by the actual practice of existing States, but it is nevertheless of great significance. Aristotle is usually at one with current Athenian feeling in ethical matters, and if he recommended State control of education it must be because the existing system was unsatisfactory. The education which was perfectly adequate in 500 B.C. to produce a splendid body of

citizens proved deficient two hundred years later. Whether daily life had changed much in the interval we have scarcely any means of judging, although it was probably more complex. But assuredly the intellectual horizon of the people had widened enormously. Questions which had then seemed simple now proved to be difficult in the extreme. Tradition was no longer blindly followed. Mental distress and perplexity appear to have been present everywhere. Hence the peculiar names which philosophers gave to the goods they most valued, *ἀπάθεια*, *ἀταραξία*, thus clearly signifying the desire to escape from an unhappy state of mind. Hence also the peculiar doctrines of Epicureans and Stoics, since men at all times are prone either to drown their cares in the pursuit of pleasure or to shut their eyes to facts and try to assure themselves that pain is a thing indifferent. Quite a controversy has raged whether the Athens of 300 B.C. was or was not less moral than the Athens of one hundred or two hundred years before. Stated in this way the problem is, and must be, insoluble. It was not immorality which made the contrast between the two epochs so striking, but the incompatibility of old institutions and an enlightened intelligence. Dissatisfaction, amounting at times almost to querulousness, is painfully obvious in the tendency to withdraw from the world met with in philosophy, in the sadness of Menander, who could cry out, "How sweet is solitude,"[46] and in the views concerning death about which I have spoken above. These morbid feelings naturally manifested themselves most in hours of relaxation, and this is surely one reason why Aristotle insists that the great object of education is to teach men to spend their leisure nobly.[47] No doubt Aristotle traced the rise of the prevailing mental dissatisfaction to its origin in the divergence between State and individual. For this reason he would have the State educate its citizens from the very first, in order

that constitution and national character might go hand in hand.

It has often been remarked that although Aristotle declares monarchy to be the best form of government, he constructs his ideal State after the ordinary Greek plan, in apparent ignorance that the conquests of Alexander were destined to bring the city-state to a final close. But revolt from the idea of the city-state is clearly apparent in the minor Socratics and their descendants, the Stoics and Epicureans. The Socratic desire for independence, which is a transference of the Athenian democratic ideal to the domain of ethics, was pushed to extreme limits in all these schools, but in two different directions. The Cynic extolled freedom above all things, but could not conceive of freedom apart from law. Righteousness is to be preferred to kinship.[48] But the wise man will not live according to the laws of the State, but according to the law of virtue.[49] The only true citizenship is that of the world.[50] The Cynics put their preaching into practice, so that Diogenes could say that he possessed no city, no home, no fatherland, that he was a beggar and a wanderer with only sufficient sustenance to last for the day.[51] The Stoics likewise declare that δικαιοσύνη is natural and not conventional.[52] They too desired to be citizens of the world.[53] But nevertheless they felt that, since association with one's fellow men is natural, and tends to the observance of law, the wise man will not shrink from the duties of citizenship.[54] He will take part in city-life, legislation, and education. He will marry and beget children.[55] He will die if necessary for his country.[56] This inconsistency can only mean that the Stoics had an ideal too lofty for their own age, and were compelled to compromise, yet without abandoning their ideal. A similar compromise has already been noticed in the *Laws* of Plato. The work of both Cynics and Stoics was to set before the

Cynics.

Stoics.

eyes of men an ideal, which, although never realised, has gradually led mankind to believe in the universal brotherhood of man.

Cyrenaics.

The Cyrenaics insisted upon independence no less than the Cynics.[57] They also called the world their fatherland.[58] But their reasons were vastly different. The Cynic yearned after a better city. The Cyrenaic avoided politics because it interfered with the life of pleasure which he held to be the supreme good.[59] Pleasure is all in all. Righteousness (*τὸ δίκαιον*), moral beauty and ugliness are conventional.[60] The wise man will take care not to violate the laws of the State or of society because of the penalties which such violation brings with it. He has no need of friends. Everything he does is for his own sake.[61] It is absurd for a man to die for his country.[62] Why should he lose his wisdom because of others' folly?

Epicureans.

Epicurus declared that justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) has no real existence.[63] Justice is merely an agreement not to harm in return for freedom from harm. Since justice is a social compact, it will vary according to circumstances. The wise man will take no part in public life unless compelled to do so for his own safety.

The ethical doctrines of Aristippus and Epicurus have one great merit. They are quite free from cant, and boldly state what many men have thought and still think, although they are afraid to say so. But hedonism of this type can only be accepted as a creed by those who have no faith in the soundness of social institutions. The Epicurean submits to law because he must.[64] *Noblesse oblige*, *esprit de corps*, devotion to duty are to him meaningless phrases. He is discontented at the battle of life and would flee from it to the refuge of his *ἀταραξία*, or drown his cares, like the Cyrenaic, in pleasurable indulgences. The existence of such an ethical system is further evidence that by the year 300 B.C.

there had grown up a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction, the result of rapid intellectual advance amid institutions that could not keep pace therewith. The assertion of the individual's self-sufficiency, his rights and responsibilities, was attained only by the payment of a heavy price. It was not achieved before faith in the virtue of patriotism ceased to be a power in the city-state. With the decay of this faith decayed also the virtues it had fostered. Greece died to bequeath an heirloom to her descendants among the nations.

Individualism was at first a solvent rather than a creative power. "The age of Greek emancipation was innocent of any serious attempt to transfer its theories into the practice of social and political life. . . . At the same time it would be completely erroneous to conclude that ancient Radicalism was deficient on the side of intensity. The history of Cynicism will show us that there was no lack of persons ready to push their break with tradition to the extreme length of their serious convictions. . . . Still, generally speaking, philosophy may be said to have been a powerful intellectual fermentation without directly becoming a factor in practical life." [65] But nevertheless an ideal, although never realised, cannot fail to influence character and conduct. If a man sincerely believes that he can have no other object in life save his own pleasure, he certainly does not establish the same relation to his environment as the man who is inspired with the spirit of duty and devotion. It is indeed possible to possess a creed, to believe it sincerely, and yet be unwilling to make the sacrifices it demands. Nevertheless, such a creed will influence conduct, for it will affect the spirit in which such duties are performed as do not command the willing obedience of the agent. The Cynic and the Cyrenaic were nonconformists in word and deed. The Epicurean and Stoic were too often nonconformists in word and conformists in deed.

The majority may be regarded as happy in their environment so long as the only opponents of the existing order practise what they preach. Society is sound when only those rebel who have the courage of their convictions. But no society can last long when its members, or a majority of them, believe one thing and do another, whether the cause be love of ease, as with the Epicureans, or force of circumstances, as with the Stoics.

Friendship among the Greeks.

Friendship was a relation which the Greeks always held in high honour. At the dawn of Greek literature we meet the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus, and the determination of the Homeric hero, when he cannot die to save his friend, at least to die that he may avenge him.[66] The Greeks were never tired of dwelling upon this picture of affection, and upon the love of another celebrated pair, Pylades and Orestes. The Pythagorean brotherhood not only gave conspicuous examples of devoted friendship, but emphasised by their manner of life the fact that friendship implies community and sacrifice. Hence the proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων. That man does not deserve to live, says Democritus, who does not possess one good friend.[67]

A comparison of this noble estimate of friendship with its treatment in early philosophic ethics shows plainly that ethics may often lag behind the morality it seeks to explain, and that it is dangerous to attempt to estimate the latter from the former without taking into account non-philosophic literature.

Socrates.

The utilitarian aspect of Socratic ethics may be in part due to the selfish impulses which sprang up like weeds during the Peloponnesian War. At any rate, the distressing conditions of civil strife must have brought out more clearly than before the usefulness of friends in time of trouble. Socrates would have men take very much the same view of their friends as they do of their

other possessions.[68] They ought to be careful to acquire and keep friends, to know their number and value, in the same way as they make an inventory of ordinary goods and chattels.[69] Even trees are cultivated for their fruit, and yet most men completely neglect their friends.[70] Surely this is not the ideal of friendship which is presented by non-philosophic writers. Even when Socrates takes a nobler view, as for instance in his recommendation that a man should make himself as valuable to his friend as he can, the selfish reason is added "in order that his friends may not desert him."[71] It was the utilitarianism of his ethics which led Socrates to acquiesce in the current Greek precept to do good to friends and evil to enemies.[72] Plato, on the other hand, is convinced that to do evil is in all cases wrong.[73] And yet what a contrast there is between the theory of Socrates and his practice! The preacher of consistency is here himself inconsistent. The idea that Socrates calculated how much benefit he obtained by a life of devotion to the education of his young compatriots is absurd. The fact is that he had attained in his life but not in his philosophy to that φιλαυτία in the higher sense which is discussed with so much insight by Aristotle. Before leaving Socrates I should like to remark that he saw dimly the connection, which was quite plain to Aristotle, between friendship and political justice.[74] He is accordingly very careful to point out the great advantage which accrues when friends work together in politics for the common good. From this we see also that Socrates was not blind to the mischief caused by the rivalry of demagogues.

Minor Socratics.

As far as can be judged from the slight extant evidence, Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, carried his master's utilitarian principles to their logical consequences. It is recorded that he believed that friendship exists by reason of its utility,[75] while Theodorus held that the wise man, being self-sufficient, has no need of friends.[76] Antisthenes

does not appear to have dealt at length with the question of friendship, but there is extant a remark of his to the effect that "the good are friends,"[77] which means probably not so much that friendship is based upon goodness, as that the Cynic wise men are, *ipso facto*, friends.

Plato. Plato conceived the impulse to friendship to be ἔρως, that attractive force which makes man yearn after the beautiful. Friendship as a relation he has discussed at length in the dialogue *Lysis*. In the first part of this dialogue the pupil of Socrates repeats his master's conviction that friendship depends upon usefulness, which is apparently identified with wisdom and goodness.[78] The discussion that follows seems to be directed to elucidating the different meanings of the word φίλος, which is sometimes active, sometimes passive, and at other times both. The rest of the dialogue is occupied with discussing whether friendship exists between persons like and unlike, and so on. No definite conclusion is reached, although it is hinted that the solution may be found in the proposition that friendship depends upon goodness.[79]

The reader of the *Lysis* feels constrained to admit that the discussion had for Plato a dialectic rather than an ethical interest. He regarded the method as far more important than the matter. The argument is concerned too much with words, too little with facts. But the dialogue is truly Socratic in that it shows the necessity of forming clear concepts of common expressions, such as "like," "unlike," "good," "friend," "to love." It suggests problems without attempting to solve them. It breaks new ground, but is an admirable illustration of the fact that philosophic ethics is not always a good test of the general level of morality.

Aristotle. Aristotle's account of friendship in the eighth and ninth books of the *Ethics* has aroused the sympathy and admiration of reader after reader. Zeller's words may be taken as typical. "So morally beautiful is the conception

of this relationship which we find here unfolded, so deep the feeling of its indispensableness, so pure and disinterested the character assigned to it, so kindly the disposition that is indicated, so profuse the wealth of refined and happy thoughts, that Aristotle could have left us no more splendid memorial of his own heart and character." [80] And it may be added that no surer proof could be found of the noble character of friendship as realised during the latter part of the fourth century.

But it must not be too readily assumed that Aristotle's beautiful description, as compared with the meagre account in the *Memorabilia*, represents a corresponding advance in current morality. That there was some advance seems certain. The weakening of the ties of country was compensated by a development of other relationships. "That the decline of Athens," says Holm, "of which we hear so much, is little better than a fable, is also proved by a careful study of her domestic institutions as they appear, for instance, in Haussoullier's, Foucart's, and other writers' works on the municipal life and religious associations of Attica, based on the orators, the inscriptions, and other sources." [81] The existence of these institutions, and their development during the fourth century, imply a fertile soil for the growth of friendship. The philosophic schools, also, must have furnished the conditions in which friendships are made and ripened. In modern days what friendships reach a higher ideal than those which spring up in the corporate life of our universities? But in spite of all this the advance exhibited by Aristotle is as much intellectual as moral. Aristotle had a clearer insight than his predecessors into the ethical problem, and more than all, set the great facts of human experience far above dialectical discussion about concepts. Perhaps no part of ancient ethics throws more light upon the tendencies of the day, or has suggested so many problems for subsequent thinkers to solve.

Aristotle attempts in the first place a solution of the problems put forward by Plato in the *Lysis*. By an analysis of τὸ φιλητόν he shows that there are three sorts of friendship, founded upon the good, the useful, and the pleasant respectively.[82] Much of the difficulty encountered in the *Lysis* is due to a failure to perceive that the verb φιλεῖν and the noun φίλησις ("to like" and "a liking") have a wider connotation than φιλία and φίλος, which imply a mutual relationship.[83] Aristotle adds a touch characteristic of the Greeks, who always attached importance to reputation (δόξα), when he decides that the goodwill of the friend must not be unperceived by the person to whom it is directed.[84] May we say that the interrogative tone in which Aristotle introduces the question is a sign that even by this time it was possible to conceive of a friendship all the purer and nobler because felt by one only of the persons concerned? The justification of friendship is that it is natural, necessary, and morally beautiful (καλόν).[85]

Aristotle's view of friendship is marked by a breadth of mind which is remarkable in a Greek, and which is doubtless caused in part by the fact that it was not in his native city that he achieved his life's work. Every association of human beings, every relation of life, those of sovereign to people, father to son, brother to brother, even that of fellow-voyagers, exhibits friendship in one or other of its many "analogous" forms, although in the highest sense it is only possible among good men who are on a footing of equality. Even among animals there is an analogous relationship. Burnet thinks that Aristotle conceived of a scale of friendship, beginning with the instinctive affection of, for example, mother and child, and gradually rising to the perfect relation between two good men which is based upon φρόνησις, "or knowledge of the good for one's own kind."[86] Aristotle, in fact, notices with great penetration that friendship has a most intimate connection with justice.

Where friendship exists justice has no work to do. A higher relation has taken the place of a lower.[87] I would venture to suggest that Aristotle was influenced, unconsciously no doubt, in forming this view by the decay of the city-state, and with it of that conception of *τὸ δίκαιον* which the city-state fostered.[88] Duties continued to be performed, but the motive was no longer the same. Men still believed in *τὸ δίκαιον*, but its sanction now was not the command of the State but *φιλία*. The change, however was not yet complete; rather, it was only just beginning. But once clearly stated, the value of *φιλία* as the guide of life gradually grew into a familiar notion, until it became the corner-stone of Christian ethics.

The individualistic tendency, which owed its birth to Socrates, and was developed by the Cynics and Cyrenaics, has left its mark upon the ethics of Aristotle. Individualism leads to an appreciation of man as man, and Aristotle clearly states that friendship can exist between any who are able to take part in laws and covenants.[89] Aristotle would doubtless have reconciled this statement with the declaration of the *Politics* that barbarians are the natural slaves of the Greeks,[90] by denying that barbarians could take a share in laws and covenants, but he expressly says that Nature makes mistakes sometimes, and we may draw the conclusion that even among barbarians Aristotle admitted that there might be men "naturally" free. Further, although friendship is impossible between master and slave, *qua* slave, it may exist, says Aristotle, between master and slave, *qua* man.[91] The whole discussion of this question, with its inconsistencies, and, I may almost say, unwilling concessions, is the sign of a mind in which the old and the new are in conflict, and is all the more significant on that very account. The birth of the idea of the universal brotherhood of man was not unaccompanied by doubts and misgivings. This could not help

being so, since it meant the death of the city-state to which the heart of the Greek was so attached.

The tendency towards individualism was also responsible for Aristotle's beautiful conception of friendship as an extension of the personality. The friend is "one soul dwelling in two bodies";[92] he is "another self."[93] Egoism and altruism here find reconciliation. The idea is not a mere fanciful conceit. It is a truth to which modern science and modern psychology bear ever-increasing testimony.

Self-love.

The claims of the individual had also resulted in a readiness to admit that self-love was not in all cases to be condemned. The language of Plato implies that some men justified self-love as natural and, therefore, right.[94] And yet the extracts collected by Stobaeus show that the general conscience of the Greeks did not differ from that of other civilised peoples in its abhorrence of selfishness.[95] Even Plato knows of no other self-love than self-conceit. Aristotle solves the difficulty in a way which has ever since brought satisfaction to the minds of thinking men. Love of the higher self is commendable; love of the lower self is to be condemned.[96] This teaching is in perfect harmony with the explanation of friendship as an enlargement of the self.

Aristotle has given us the noblest description of friendship which has come down from pre-Christian times. He marks the highest point to which the Greek conscience attained. In his account we doubtless have what many of his contemporaries felt but could not express. It would be difficult to exaggerate the benefit that resulted from the clear formulation of the highest thought of the time. It represents a landmark which cannot be effaced. *Littera scripta manet.* But the ideas which are seen germinating in Aristotle were slow to ripen. The truths already gained were slowly assimilated, until at last a fresh start was made with Christianity.

Stoics.

Post-Aristotelian philosophy added nothing of great value to Aristotle's account of friendship, while it borrowed largely from it. The Stoics insist that friendship can exist only among wise men.[97] This may be Cynic teaching, but I think it doubtful. The source is more probably Aristotle's view that the highest friendship is limited to good men who are in a position of equality. Diogenes Laertius relates that Zeno defined a friend as "another self."[98] This again is Aristotelian. In spite of the high value which the Epicureans placed upon friendship, they added nothing to the ethics of it. Epicurus declared it to be the most important condition of happiness, and prized it for the sense of security it affords.[99] A higher note is struck in the declaration that the wise man will die for his friend,[100] but the context shows that it is meant to glorify the wise man and not to lay stress upon a duty of friendship. In brief, the value attached by this school to friendship, the form in which it was conceived, and the pains taken to reconcile it with individualism, show that the clear expression which Aristotle gave to the highest instincts of the Greeks was slowly producing its effect.

Epicureans.

Affection for animals among the Greeks.

Notwithstanding the narrow sphere to which the Greek limited his duties and responsibilities, here and there appear glimpses which show that even the claims of the brute creation were not always disregarded. The intimate relations between man and domesticated animals cannot but give rise to feelings of affection which are perhaps all the more tender because of the impassable barriers which limit the communications between the one and the other. The wild Polyphemus, belonging to a tribe that "knew not law,"[101] has tender feelings towards his pet ram.[102] Even the man of the world, Odysseus, is moved to tears at his recognition by the dying hound Argus.[103] But instances like these are rare, and are furthermore confined to relations between master and

domesticated animals. Respect for the animal as such, apart from sentimental considerations, was of slow growth, and never developed to any great extent. But the few scattered hints which occasionally occur deserve the most careful consideration.

Sympathy with animals hindered by two causes.

Respect for the claims of animals has been greatly diminished by ignorance, and by the necessity under which man lies of using flesh as food. Perhaps ignorance is the greater drawback. In recent years the immense progress made by zoology has been followed by the prevention by law of cruelty to animals, and by a literature, such as Kipling's *Jungle Book* and the works of Seton-Thompson, in which the brutes are endowed with human characteristics without losing, as they do in fables, their brute nature.

Transmigration and sympathy with animals.

Greek philosophy partially broke down both barriers to sympathy with animals. The spread by the Pythagoreans of the Orphic doctrine of transmigration made those who believed therein loth to touch animal food. That there resulted an increased kindness towards brutes might have been expected, and is conclusively proved by the well-known story about Pythagoras told by Xenophanes.[104] The former passed by a man who was beating a dog, and told him to stop, because he recognised the voice of a dead friend. Empedocles considered it unrighteous to destroy anything that had life in it. Euripides, in this as in other cases, seems to have been in advance of his age.[105] Plato was enough of a Pythagorean to see one life pervading the kingdoms of men, brutes, and plants, but the importance he attached to mind, and his conviction that brutes were degraded human beings, account for the absence in his works of any sympathy with animals. But to judge from the history of post-Platonic philosophy, and from the biological portions of the *Timaeus*,[106] Plato began in earnest the study of animals and plants. This new tendency must have influenced

The influence of natural science.

Xenocrates. Xenocrates, although he himself does not appear to have specialised in biology, and in his case it was joined to a decided leaning towards Pythagoreanism. This philosopher asserted that even beasts partake of some instinct of the divine nature.[107] Diogenes Laertius relates of him that once a sparrow, chased by a hawk, took refuge in the folds of his garment. The philosopher stroked it, and afterwards let it go free with the remark, "One must not give up the suppliant."[108] Theophrastus was as zealous a student of botany and zoology as his teacher, and his philosophic views were greatly influenced by the result of his researches. He cannot see any difference, except in degree, between the souls of animals and the lower powers of the human soul.[109] Since beasts are akin to man, man ought not to kill them even for food, except when absolutely necessary. The animals possess rights "which forbid us forcibly to rob them of life."[110] But the Stoics, who did not care for biology, refused to recognise that animals have any claim upon man,[111] as did also Epicurus.[112]

Theophrastus.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Aristotle *Pol.* 1253 a ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

2. Kennedy, translation of Demosthenes' *Leptines* etc. p. 345.

3. Thuc. vii. 87 πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδοντο. Holm ii. 479 does not mention this distinction.

4. Plato *Rep.* 469 B. In the *Mem.* Δ ii. 15 it is agreed that ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὰν πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσηται his action is righteous.

5. Demosthenes *against Midias* § 48. Nevertheless any one usurping citizen rights was upon conviction sold as a slave. Kennedy *loc. cit.*

6. For the resident aliens see the very clear account in Kennedy, *op. cit.* pp. 251–254.

7. Plato *Rep.* 420 B, C.

8. Arist. *Pol.* 1264 b.

9. Zeller *Aristotle* ii. 225.

10. Homer *Il.* xvi. 386; Hesiod *Works* 275–285.

11. Hesiod *Works* 187

> σχέτλιοι, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν εἰδότες· οὐδέ κεν οἵ γε
> γηράντεσσι τοκεῦσιν ἀπὸ θρεπτήρια δοῖεν,
> χειροδίκαι.

12. *Ibid.* 275 foll.

> καί νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλάθεο πάμπαν.
> τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
> ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς,
> ἐσθέμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς·
> ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἢ πολλὸν ἀρίστη
> γίγνεται. εἰ γάρ τίς κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεύειν
> γιγνώσκων, τῷ μέν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·
> ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας
> ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,
> τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
> ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

13. Theognis 205

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔτεισε κακὸν χρέος οὐδὲ φίλοισιν
ἄτην ἐξοπίσω παισὶν ἐπεκρέμασεν·
ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρψε δίκη· θάνατος γὰρ ἀναιδὴς
πρόσθεν ἐπὶ βλεφάροις ἔζετο κῆρα φέρων.

14. Heraclitus *fr.* 28 Diels

Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας.

15. *Ibid. fr.* 44 μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος.

16. Theognis 147

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή 'στιν,
πᾶς δέ τ' ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, Κύρνε, δίκαιος ἐών.

17. Heraclitus *fr.* 28.

18. Aeschylus *Supp.* 707

τὸ γὰρ τεκόντων σέβας
τρίτον τόδ' ἐν θεσμίοις
Δίκας γέγραπται μεγιστοτίμου.

Aeschylus felt keenly the importance of *σέβας* "awe." See *Eumenides* 516–557.

19. Pindar *Ol.* xiii. 6

ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει, κασιγνή-
τα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,
Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνα, ταμίαι ἀνδράσι πλούτου,
χρύσεαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος.

20. Aristotle *Pol.* 1326a ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι.

21. Aeschylus *Septem* 646–671. In the same play, 1026–1053, there is a hint of the problem worked out by Sophocles in the *Antigone*.

22. Sophocles *Antigone* 449 foll.

ΚΡ. καὶ δῆτ' ἐτόλμας τοὐσδ' ὑπερβαίνειν νόμους;
ΑΝ. οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε,
οὐδ' ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη
τοιοὐσδ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὥρισεν νόμους·
οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ᾠόμην τὰ σὰ
κηρύγμαθ', ὥστ' ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν
νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄντ' ὑπερδραμεῖν.
οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου 'φάνη.

23. Democritus *apud* Sext. *adversus Math.* vii. 135 νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροίη· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.

24. Diog. Laert. ii. 16 καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. See Zeller *Pre-Soc.* ii. 393; Gomperz i. 402.

25. *Rep.* 338 C τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον.

26. *Gorgias* 482 C–486 D. Especially 483 D ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου· δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν.

27. Heraclitus *fr.* 53 Diels

πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς.

28. *Gorgias* 492 D σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. See Grote 1904 ed., vol. vii. p. 68.

29. Thucydides ii. 37 ἀκροάσει . . . τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι.

30. Thucydides v. 89 δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.
Ibid. v. 105 ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ, τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ πάντος ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν.

31. Bury *History of Greece* p. 463.

32. Xen. *Mem.* Δ iv. 12 φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι.
For the "unwritten laws" see *Mem.* Δ iv. 19 ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, νόμους; τούς γ' ἐν πάσῃ ἔφη, χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομιζομένους. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἵ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; ἐγὼ μὲν ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι.

33. See the magnificent passage, full of the true Hellenic patriotism, in *Crito* 50 A–54 D.

34. Xen. *Mem.* Δ iv. 25.

35. Adam *Crito* Introd. pp. xiv, xv.

36. Xen. *Mem.* A ii. 9.

37. Xen. *Mem.* Γ ix. 10 βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τυχόντων αἱρεθέντας οὐδὲ κλήρῳ λαχόντας οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασαμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν.

38. Plato *Rep.* 358 C δικαιοσύνη ἄμεινον ἀδικίας.

39. *Gorgias* 469 B μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
Cf. *Gorgias* 504 D.

40. Stobaeus *Flor.* xliii. 133 δεῖ δὲ τὸν νόμον ἀκόλουθον ἦμεν τῇ φύσει, . . .

ἀκόλουθος μὲν οὖν καὶ ᾗ τᾷ φύσει, μιμεόμενος τὸ τᾶς φύσιος δίκαιον. (Tauchnitz ed.)

41. See *Rep.* 433, where δικαιοσύνη is defined as τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν.

42. See *Laws* 875 D διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάξιν τε καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀδυνατεῖ.

43. Aristotle *Ethics* 1129 a, *sub fin.* τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

1129 b τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. . . . ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾴου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ "οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος" οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι." Cf. *Pol.* 1253 a ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν.

For Aristotle's treatment of equity (ἐπιείκεια) see *Ethics* Book V. chap. x. Law can only deal with general questions, and is therefore imperfect; ἐπιείκεια supplements its deficiencies.

44. Aristotle *Ethics* 1179 b οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν (sc. οἱ πολλοὶ) αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας . . . ἐκ νέου δ' ἀρωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα· οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Cf. Aeschylus' opinion of σέβας, note 18.

45. For Aristotle's views on education see *Politics* 1337 a foll. with the introductory remarks: ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κτλ. Xenophon (see *Resp. Lac.*), Plato, and Aristotle keenly appreciated the efforts of Sparta to form the national character.

46. Menander *apud* Stob. *Florilegium* lviii. 8

ὡς ἡδὺ τῷ μισοῦντι τοὺς φαύλους τρόπους
ἐοημία.

47. Aristotle *Politics* 1337 b *νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς μουσικῆς*)· *οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς.*

48. Diog. Laert. vi. 12 *τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ συγγενοῦς* (of the Cynic wise man).

49. *Ibid.* 11 *καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς.*

50. *Ibid.* 72 *μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ.* Cf. vi. 63.

51. *Ibid.* 38 *εἶναι γοῦν ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοὐφημέραν.*

52. Diog. Laert. vii. 128 *φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει.*

53. For the Stoic ideal State, where only the wise are free, friends and kindred, see *ibid.* 33.

54. *Ibid.* 123 *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ βιώσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος· κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός.*

55. *Ibid.* 121 *πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ . . καὶ γαμήσειν . . καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι.* Cf. Stobaeus *Ecl.* ii. 186.

56. *Ibid.* 130 *εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν . . ὑπὲρ πατρίδος.* Stobaeus *Ecl.* ii. 186 *ὑπομένειν· περὶ ταύτης* [sc. *τῆς πατρίδος*], *ἐὰν ᾖ μετρία, καὶ πόνους καὶ θάνατον.*

57. Diog. Laert. ii. 98 *τοὺς δὲ σοφοὺς αὐτάρκεις ὑπάρχοντας μὴ δεῖσθαι φίλων.*

58. *Ibid.* 99 *εἶναί τε πατρίδα τὸν κόσμον.*

59. Xenophon *Mem.* B i. 9 (Aristippus speaks) *ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.*

60. Diog. Laert. ii. 93 *μηδέν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον, ἢ καλόν, ἢ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει.*

61. *Ibid.* 95 *τόν τε σοφὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα πράξειν.*

62. *Ibid.* 98 *ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ εὔλογον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον μὴ ἐξαγαγεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἑαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀποβαλεῖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν ἀφρόνων ὠφελείας.*

63. Diog. Laert. x. 150 *οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς, καθ' ὁμιλίας δή ποτε ἔδει τόπους συνθήκην τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.* See also *ibid.* 152 *ἐὰν νομοτεθῆταί τι, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει κτλ.* See further 151.

64. Seneca *de Otio* iii. 2 (*fr.* 9) duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diversa via mittit. Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam sapiens nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam nisi si quid impedierit, alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa.

65. Gomperz *Greek Thinkers* i. pp. 410, 411. For the means of spreading theoretic teaching, see Appendix.

66. Homer *Iliad* xviii. 95

"ὠκύμορος δή μοι, τέκος, ἔσσεαι, οἳ' ἀγορεύεις·
αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος."
τὴν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς·
"αὐτίκα τεθναίην, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλον ἑταίρῳ
κτεινομένῳ ἐπαμῦναι· ὁ μὲν μάλα τηλόθι πάτρης
ἔφθιτ', ἐμεῖο δ' ἔδησεν ἀρὴς ἀλκτῆρα γενέσθαι."

67. Democritus *fr.* 99 Diels ζῆν οὐκ ἄξιος ὅτῳ μηδὲ εἷς ἐστι χρηστὸς φίλος.

68. Xenophon *Mem.* B iv. 2 φίλον δέ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔτε ὅπως κτήσωνται φροντίζοντας οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες αὐτοῖς σῴζωνται.

69. *Ibid.* 4 ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὀλίγων ὄντων οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυνθανομένοις τοῦτο καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας, οὓς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἔθεσαν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι.

70. *Ibid.* 7 ἔνιοι δένδρα μὲν πειρῶνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκεν, τοῦ δὲ παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὃ καλεῖται φίλος, ἀργῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπιμέλονται.

71. Xen. *Mem.* B v. 4 πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἥττον αὐτὸν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν.

72. Xen. *Mem.* B vi. 35 ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.

73. Plato *Crito* 49 C οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

74. Xenophon *Mem.* B vi. 24–26, especially the concluding sentence: πῶς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τοὺς βελτίστους φίλους κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι, τούτοις κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνεργοῖς τῶν πράξεων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνταγωνισταῖς χρώμενον;

75. Diog. Laert. ii. 91 τὸν φίλον τῆς χρείας ἕνεκα.

76. *Ibid.* 98 τοὺς δὲ σοφούς, αὐτάρκεις ὑπάρχοντας, μὴ δεῖσθαι φίλων.

77. Diog. Laert. vi. 12 οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλοι.

78. Plato *Lysis* 210 C ἆρ' οὖν τῳ φίλοι ἐσόμεθα καί τις ἡμᾶς φιλήσει ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ

οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος. οὐκ ἔοικεν, ἔφη. ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένῃ, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται· χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσει· εἰ δὲ μή, σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ φίλος ἔσται οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ οὔτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι.

79. *Lysis* 214 E ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οἳ ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί (sc. εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι).

80. Zeller *Aristotle* ii. p. 191.

81. Holm *History of Greece* iii. p. 187. See also the note on p. 197.

82. For the analysis of τὸ φιλητόν see Aristotle *Ethics* 1155 b.

83. *Ethics* 1155 a.

84. *Ibid.* 1155 b εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέο μὴ λανθάνουσαν;

85. *Ibid.* 1155 a φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον . . . οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν. *Ibid.* 1161 b δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος.

86. Burnett's *Ethics* pp. 344, 345.

87. Aristotle *Ethics* 1155 a ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

88. See also chapter xi. (1161 a, b).

89. See *Ethics* 1161 b quoted above.

90. *Politics* 1255 a διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν κτλ., especially the last sentence ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.

91. *Ethics* 1161 b ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος.

92. Diog. Laert. v. 20 ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι φίλος; ἔφη, Μία ψυχὴ δύο σώμασιν ἐνοικοῦσα.

93. Aristotle *Ethics* 1166 a ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.

94. Plato *Laws* 731 E τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν ὡς φίλος αὐτῳ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

95. Stobaeus *Florilegium* xxiii. περὶ φιλαυτίας.

96. Aristotle *Ethics* 1168 b εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται. *Ibid.* 1169 a ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ.

For Plato's view see *Laws* 731 E τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε· τυφλοῦται γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φιλῶν, ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς κρίνει, τὸ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀεὶ τιμᾶν δεῖν ἡγούμενος· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τε παρ' αὐτῷ ἐάν τε παρ' ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πραττόμενα τυγχάνῃ. ἐκ ταὐτοῦ δὲ ἁμαρτήματος τούτου καὶ τὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι γέγονε πᾶσιν κτλ.

97. Diog. Laert. vii. 95 σπουδαῖον φίλον.

Ibid. 124 λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα. φασὶ δὲ αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τινα εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς.

98. *Ibid.* 23 ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ἐστι φίλος; ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἐγώ. See the last clause of the preceding quotation.

99. The Epicurean view of friendship is discussed by Cicero in *de finibus* I. See also Diogenes Laertius x. 148 ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κτήσει δεῖ νομίζειν συντελουμένην.

100. Diog. Laert. x. 121 καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλου ποτὲ τεθνήξεσθαι.

101. *Odyssey* ix. 215

ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας.

102. *Ibid.* 447–460.

103. *Odyssey* xvii. 304

αὐτὰρ ὁ νόσφιν ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ
ῥεῖα λαθὼν Εὔμαιον.

The many epitaphs on animals in the Anthology (*Anth. Pal.* vii. 189–216) show how the affection grew for them in later times.

104. Diog. Laert. viii. 36

καὶ ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
φασὶν ἐποικτεῖραι, καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος·
παῦσαι, μηδὲ ῥάπιζ'· ἐπεὶη φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ
ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων.

105. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1373 b ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ' οὐ δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὖ γῆς.

For Euripides see Verrall *Four Plays of Euripides* p. 194. Verrall quotes *Hipp.* 1240, 110–112, 1219; *Ion* 179; *Hercules Furens* 1386–1388.

106. For Plato's views on biology see *Timaeus* 77 A–C and 90 E, 91 D foll.

107. Clemens *Strom.* v. 590 C καθόλου γοῦν τὴν περὶ τοῦ θείου ἔννοιαν Ξενοκράτης . . . οὐκ ἀπελπίζει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις.
Quoted by Zeller *Plato* p. 592 note 36.

108. Diog. Laert. iv. 10 στρουθίου δέ ποτε διωκομένου ὑπὸ ἱέρακος, καὶ εἰσπηδήσαντος εἰς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ, καταψήσας μεθῆκεν, εἰπών· τὸν ἱκέτην δεῖν μὴ ἐκδιδόναι.

109. See Zeller *Aristotle* ii. pp. 395, 396, with quotations from Porphyry.

110. *Ibid.* p. 413, where see quotations from Porphyry.

111. Diog. Laert. vii. 129 ἔτι ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα.

112. Diog. Laert. x. 150.

CHAPTER III

MORALITY IN THE FAMILY

ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν.

Aristotle *Ethics* 1162 a.

CHAPTER III

MORALITY IN THE FAMILY

"L'ISOLEMENT de la famille," says Coulanges,[1] "a été, chez cette race, le commencement de la morale. Là les devoirs ont apparu, clairs, précis, impérieux, mais resserrés dans un cercle restreint." Since man first became conscious of duties, and capable of appreciating virtues, in the circle of his family, it is *a priori* unlikely that an institution so natural as marriage, and so potent for good in the training of men and citizens, should ever have fallen very low in the respect of a people who were so essentially human as the Greeks. That the Greeks knew little or nothing of moral purity may be readily admitted. But it is quite possible for considerable appreciation of the value of marriage to exist side by side with great laxity of morals outside the family circle. The character of Odysseus in the *Odyssey* is a proof. Examination will show that the Greek view of marriage was higher than is generally supposed. In Aeschylus the family tie is more prominent than citizenship, and Aristotle regards marriage as more natural than the State.

Greek view of marriage.

The beautiful pictures of married life which are presented to us in the Homeric poems are largely due to the high honour in which women were then held. With the degradation of woman consequent upon the development of city life, in which she cannot play so important a part, marriage loses the delicate bloom it

Position of women.

once had, but assumes other aspects, due to the necessity of marriage for the purposes of the State.

Reasons for marriage.

The Greek of every period was influenced strongly by religious motives in entering the married state. It was a duty to his ancestors that there should always be a line of descendants to pay the customary rites to the departed. They, at death, became spirits whose felicity depended upon the service of those on earth, and who, in their turn, were able to bestow blessings for favours rendered.[2] However little this feature appears in Greek literature, it was certainly a reality which was not destroyed by the decay of religion or the feebleness of the hope of immortality. Isaeus says that childless men on their death-beds take care to adopt children in order that they may not leave their homes desolate without any successor to perform all accustomed rites.[3] This relation of marriage to family religion grew into a relation to the State religion as soon as city life became common. The relationship of brother and sister also was a religious one, as is plain from the *Antigone* of Sophocles. But in its relation to religion lay the weakness of the Greek idea of marriage as well as its strength. Religion required that the family stock should be kept pure. This condition satisfied, it made no further demand for moral purity.

Another reason for marriage was to secure a housekeeper, as well as children who should protect their parents in old age. There was a solid basis of utilitarianism in a Greek marriage.[4]

Finally, marriage was a State duty. It is to be noticed that this aspect of it was necessarily absent in Homeric times, and did not appear before the development of city life.

Affection in married life.

Mutual affection does not appear to have been a cause of marriage, but there is no evidence to show that it was not generally the result of it.[5] The manner in which Socrates dismisses Xanthippe in the prison has

often been quoted to show the scant respect Greek husbands had for their wives.[6] But it surely indicates the desire of Socrates to shorten a painful parting that was prostrating his wife with grief. Not callousness, but genuine kindness, shines through the brief request of Socrates to his friend, "Crito, let some one take her home." The *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon describes the relations of man and wife without indeed dwelling upon affection, but implying it throughout. If the Greeks were educated by studying Homer, they must have been influenced by the pictures he gives of marital affection. The heroines of the drama, Antigone, Macaria, Deianira, Alcestis and the rest, would have been meaningless had they not struck a sympathetic chord in the audience. What does strike the modern is the absence of sentimental relations between men and women. Sentiment, a great power for evil as well as for good, was in Greece thrown away on degrading indulgence. Between man and wife there existed affection, but not romantic love, *φιλία* not *ἔρως*. The first three chapters of Xenophon's *Hiero* show this well.

Education and life of women.

The blot upon the pictures of married life which have come down to us from the great period of Greek literature is the imperfect education and secluded life of the women. The young wife of Ischomachus—she was not more than fifteen at the time of her wedding—had been taught by her mother to spin, to weave, and *σωφρονεῖν*.[7] Care had been taken that she should see, hear and ask as little as possible.[8] Ischomachus undertakes to educate his wife to fulfil her new station, but even he assents to the belief that a woman's place is indoors,[9] and declares that both custom and the divine will have so decreed. This cramped life resulted in ignorance and lack of self-control. The Athenian lady's virtue was a "cloistered virtue." Hence no doubt the frequency at Athens of adultery on the part of the wife,

and the loose morality of the husband outside the family circle. The physique of the race, as well as the morality (in the widest sense) of the women, must have suffered from the exclusion from open-air life and physical exercise. How much of this the Athenian woman enjoyed may be gauged from the recommendation of Ischomachus to his wife to attend to the clothes and coverlets in order to benefit her health.[10]

Euripides and marriage.

It seems to have been Euripides who first perceived the inadequacy of women's education and its deplorable consequences. He does not definitely state this, for he took great pleasure in innuendo, and assumed that his hearers (or readers) would draw their own conclusions. The facts are these. The plays of Euripides contain many fiery outbursts against the spite, cunning and immorality of women. They also show some of the finest female characters that have ever been conceived. The conclusion is obvious. The poet means, "Here you see women as they are. There you see them as they might be, and ought to be."

If Euripides must receive the credit of having mooted the question of the position of women, it was philosophic ethics which first attempted a serious solution. The utilitarian views of Socrates appear in his followers as a tendency to fling aside the fetters of convention, and to settle the matter by an appeal to utility and to the analogy of animal life. The Cynics seem to have carried this to the extent of violating all modesty and decency.[11]

Plato and marriage.

By the time of Plato the position of woman in the family had become a generally discussed problem. Aristophanes had written the *Ecclesiazusae* to parody the communistic theories which were then being mooted.[12] In his treatment of the subject Plato seems to have been influenced by:—

(*a*) The example of Sparta, where women enjoyed

greater freedom than in the rest of Greece, and where their physical culture was an object of great attention.

(*b*) The tendency to appeal to nature characteristic of the Socratic school.

(*c*) The manifest deficiencies in the family life of his age.

I have already had occasion to notice that Plato was a severe critic of the institutions and manners of his native city. So much is this the case, that if any position is defended by him with great heat, it is worth while inquiring whether the opposite view is not the one current at the time. In the present case he saw that the life of women was cramped and maimed by artificial restrictions. Accordingly these must all be abolished. Women were uneducated. They must therefore be subject to the same education, physical and intellectual, as the men. In all this Plato was governed by utilitarian motives of the strictest kind. In the animal world there is no waste of a whole sex; why should this waste occur in the case of human beings? Ridicule is no answer to this question, for the golden rule is that "the useful is noble, and the hurtful base." So no distinction is to be drawn between the duties of the two sexes, except in so far as less must be expected from woman, owing to her physical disabilities.

Why Plato recommended a community of wives.

The community of wives and children recommended by Plato was no new idea to the Greeks. Herodotus noticed it among certain foreign peoples.[13] But Plato was the first to propose it seriously as an improvement upon the monogamous state in vogue throughout Greece. In this suggestion one of his objects was to bring the regulation of marriage under a close State supervision in order to secure the best possible offspring. Another object was to make the State a more harmonious whole

by turning it into one large family, for Plato was by no means blind to the many advantages to be derived from family life. The distinction between *meum* and *tuum* was to be obliterated to the utmost. Everyone would then look upon his neighbour as a father or mother, brother or sister, and in place of magistrates and law-suits the two powerful warders, Fear and Shame, would prevent violence and crime.[14] Surely all this points to the conclusion that in spite of its imperfections, Greek family life fostered an affection which Plato wished to extend so as to embrace the whole State.

Women and Philosophy.

Philosophic discussion seems to have had but little influence upon the position of women in Greece, and the increased fondness for home life manifested after the close of the fourth century is probably due to the unsatisfying nature of civic life as compared with what it was a century before. There are nevertheless a few scattered hints that help received in the study of philosophy caused a few men to value the aid of women in matters outside of purely household cares. What general effect was produced by this it is quite impossible to state. Pythagoras is said to have had a wife Theano, who appears to have helped him in his philosophical pursuits. A story is reported of her which contains one of the few instances of a consciousness of moral purity which I can find in pre-Christian times.[15] The daughter of Pythagoras, Demo, is said to have been entrusted by him with the care of his books, with the command to give them to no one outside the home. Though a heavy price could have been obtained she refused to sell them, in obedience to her father's command, "and that though a woman," adds the narrator.[16] It is therefore not surprising that in the Pythagorean school we find a high ideal of marital relations.[17] In the next century Aspasia was much esteemed by Pericles for her culture and wisdom. Later on, the daughter of Aristippus, Arete, studied

philosophy, and instructed therein her son, Aristippus the younger, who was accordingly styled μητροδίδακτος.[18] Themista, the wife of Leonteus, was a student of philosophy, to whom Epicurus wrote some of his didactic letters.[19] Hipparchia, who fell in love with the Cynic Crates, and threatened to commit suicide unless she were united to him, is deemed worthy by Diogenes Laertius of a whole chapter in his history of philosophy.[20]

The example of these ladies must have shown the Greeks that women could share with profit the intellectual pursuits of men.

Aristotle's views on marriage.

Aristotle's remarks about family life form strong evidence that it was held in high esteem in his day, and that the speculations of previous philosophers concerning a community of wives and children must not be taken to imply the existence of hopeless defects, or general dissatisfaction with the actual state of things. It is a significant fact that the community of wives, so strongly advocated by Plato, is dismissed by Aristotle as destructive of affection.[21] The family relation to Aristotle is a natural and moral one. Man and wife form an aristocracy in which both partners are equal but have unequal rights; father and children form a monarchy, brothers a club of associates on equal terms. Parents, he says, love their children as being themselves; children love their parents as the source of their being, and one another because they owe their existence to the same parents. The love of man and wife is natural.[22] Aristotle is here analysing society as he found it, and the beautiful picture he draws is not marred by any disfiguring blots. It would even appear that as citizen life became less absorbing with the decay of political liberty, the activities of the Greek found expression in an increased fondness for home life. Such at least is the conclusion hinted at by the change from the Old Comedy to the New, wherein political life gives place to that of the family. Further evidence is afforded

by the Anthology. It is about the time of Aristotle that family relations begin to form an important theme of the epigrammatists. It is true that we have to wait until almost the Christian era for the beautiful epitaph of Apollonides upon man and wife "rejoicing in their tomb as in a bridal chamber,"[23] but there are others, chiefly on children who have died young, reminding us of Menander's well-known "he whom the gods love dies young," which prove that home life was as dear to the hearts of men as it always has been. If two centuries had brought degeneration to Greece by the year 300 B.C., home life at least must be considered exempt.

The minor Socratics; the Epicureans and Stoics.

How then are we to regard the continuous line of thinkers who, from the dawn of ethics, disparage the family, or even advocate the abolition of marriage and the substitution of free love? Ever since the time when Socrates had asserted the right of every man to test all things before the judgment-seat of his own reason, there had been some who insisted upon the self-sufficiency of the individual, and his independence of all institutions, whether that of the State or that of the family.[24] The idea was new to the Greek, and was pursued with all the zest that novelty inspires. Cynics, Cyrenaics, Stoics, and Epicureans are all, in different ways and in different degrees, supporters of the rights of the individual. In spite of this there is sometimes found in these philosophers acquiescence in the existing institutions or even approval of them. These facts need reconciliation. The attempt to effect such a reconciliation will at least throw some light on the condition of society at the time. The above-mentioned schools had become conscious of the moral value of the individual. But with the one-sidedness which nearly always characterises makers of new discoveries, they tried to make it the basis of their whole ethical system. Family, society, the State, were nothing; the individual, his virtue or his

pleasure, was everything. The "wise man" of the Cynics and Stoics could violate the received code of conduct and still be virtuous. He would not possess conventional virtue, it is true; but he would be living in accordance with natural virtue. If he belonged to any society at all, it was the world. A sublime idea, the true meaning and bearing of which we are only now beginning to realise. But in contrast to this ideal, the philosopher found himself in the midst of societies, some of great antiquity, which formed an environment from which escape was impossible. These societies must be taken into account. Life must be harmonised therewith. Even the Cynics, with their generally consistent radicalism, show inconsistencies when treating of the family and married life. Hence Antisthenes, while declaring that the "safest rampart" is wisdom, was forced to believe that in the world as it is the common life of united brothers is safer than any rampart.[25] Antisthenes said that the wise man would marry; Diogenes that women should be in common. Aristippus thought righteousness good, and yet his wise man will not hesitate to commit adultery, surely at any time an offence against righteousness, "in fitting circumstances."[26]

It must not be forgotten that Antisthenes was partly a Thracian, while Aristippus, Diogenes, and Zeno all came from the outskirts of the Greek world, and must have been acquainted with the customs and institutions of non-Greeks. This would help to account for their revolt against Greek morality. We are not left to conjecture, for Diogenes justified cannibalism on the ground that some nations practised it.[27] The inconsistencies which are often apparent in the Cynic and Stoic ethics are certainly due to the two impulses which influenced the lives of the philosophers, new experiences of life, and the imperious nature of the social pressure which was encountered in Greek cities. The fruit of the new teaching was

slow to ripen. The universal brotherhood of man, partly realised in the Roman empire, became an accepted truth only with the advent of Christianity, in which is neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, and even now, after the lapse of centuries, the ideal seems as far as ever from being realised in practice.

Parents and children.

The love of parents for their children and of children for their parents is so natural an affection that it would be surprising if literature had not reflected it plainly. As far as can be seen, filial and parental love suffered no change from the beginning to the end of Greek history, except in so far as it became a dearer possession when the State began to lose its hold upon the hearts of men. Occasionally among the philosophers we hear the cry that the rearing of children is so uncertain in its issue that a man if he be wise will refrain from having children of his own. Several fragments of Democritus to this effect are quoted by Stobaeus.[28] The philosopher recommends adoption on the ground that this course enables a man to have children of the character he desires. Epicurus appears to have disparaged marriage for the same reason as caused Democritus to advocate adoption.[29] It is instructive that Euripides[30] and Menander,[31] who were contemporaries of the philosophers mentioned above, both contain many allusions to the troubles brought upon parents by their children. These facts point to a common origin. The closing years of both the fifth and the fourth centuries were periods of distress. At such times men are wont to see that the greater a blessing is, the greater the pain it can inflict. But the mood was temporary, and during the third century love of children shines out brightly in the epigrams of the anthology, while Euripides himself is the author of some of the most beautiful lines ever written on the subject.[32] Menander, too, in some places asserts what a blessing it is to have children.[33] Perhaps the typical form of the New Comedy accounts for the presence of both

these sentiments in Menander. The irate father, when his son wishes to marry someone of whom his parent disapproves, cries out upon the trouble of the thankless child. The childless father (whose long-lost son is probably going to be found in the course of the plot) extols the joy of having an heir. The speeches of Isaeus are an eloquent testimony to the value of children in the eyes of the Athenians. If further witness were needed we have it in Aristotle, who assumes as a matter of course that the best happiness is impossible without good birth, beauty, and *εὐτεκνία*.[34] The Greek certainly desired children to sustain his old age (*γηροτροφεῖν*), and to succeed him when he died. It was a disaster for the stock to die out. It is not surprising, however, to find that the selfish hedonist Aristippus failed to see that his own son had a claim upon his care and attention.[35]

Daughters were considered an encumbrance.[36] It is probable that it was this deep-rooted feeling which caused Plato to be alarmed about the physical condition of future generations, and to assert so strongly the wisdom of giving to each sex, as far as possible, the same education in gymnastic as well as in music. His words do not appear to have been taken to heart immediately. Once again we find an ethical ideal which, first clearly enunciated by this philosopher, took centuries to find its way into general conduct.

Honour due to parents.

That children owe their parents honour and obedience is a simple moral precept which the Greeks always accepted as freely as any other nation. No duty is more strictly insisted upon in Greek literature. "Love your mother, children," says Euripides, "for there is no sweeter love (*ἔρως*) than this."[37] Alexis declares that religion can never be superior to the claims of a mother.[38] Menander says that *νόμος* assigns to parents honour equal to that of the gods.[39] Plato insists upon this duty in language of the greatest beauty and solemnity, and

declares that no household image of the gods can equal father, mother, or grandparents still living in the home. Nemesis, the messenger of righteousness, keeps watch and ward over these matters to punish the transgressor.[40] It was not to obliterate filial piety but to make it embrace the whole State that Plato, in the *Republic*, recommended a community of children and wives. Finally, the State punished unfilial children.[41]

Socrates' attempt to find a new sanction for parental and filial affection.

We can therefore understand the alarm with which the Athenians regarded the teaching of Socrates. He seems to have wished to give to the parental and filial ties a new sanction, that of utility. Father must show himself useful to son. Son must prove to be of service to father.[42] His countrymen were indignant. That parents and children ought to help one another is right and proper enough. But it ought to be taken for granted. Utility should not be made a sanction, for it removes responsibilities just in those cases (aged parents, weakly children) where the responsibility is greatest. Even Socrates himself does not appear to have been consistent here. He bases his rebuke to his son Lamprocles chiefly on the ground of common gratitude,[43] while Stobaeus attributes to him, we do not know on what authority, the saying that one must accommodate oneself to an unkind father as to a harsh law.[44]

Exposure of children.

We are curiously in the dark concerning the exposure of such children as the father, for some reason or other, did not want to rear. It may be taken for granted that a Greek felt no horror at the custom. Aelian says that it was condemned by law at Thebes,[45] but it is almost certain that this was the exception. Probably illegitimate children and daughters were the greatest sufferers. The clearest proof that in classical times children were not seldom left to perish is in the *Theaetetus* of Plato. Socrates compares his art of cross-examination to the art of a midwife, adding that many are angry when

robbed of their pet ideas, "like a mother when her first-born is taken from her."[46] The mere existence of this practice shows that, however much the shedding of blood was looked upon as a religious pollution, the ordinary Greek attached no value to human life as such. Provided that a man did not kill his child with his own hands, he had no scruples about leaving it in a desert place to perish.

Attitude of philosophic ethics to the question.

Plato and Aristotle alone of the philosophers have dealt with the exposure of children. Both deal with the matter from the point of view of the State, and are accordingly strongly utilitarian. Plato would apparently expose all sickly children,[47] and commands parents not to rear offspring from unions outside the legal limits of age.[48] Aristotle condemns exposure but recommends abortion when too many children are born.[49] The reason he assigns is curious. The morality of the act, he says, depends upon the presence or absence of sensation. Aristotle was no doubt led to this view by his conviction that both active and passive reason are necessary for thought.[50] The latter cannot exist without sensation. Therefore in a sense the embryo has no life. Aristotle, it will be seen, regarded all developed human life as sacred, and exhibits a slight advance upon the position of Plato.

Philosophic ethics on this subject clearly reflects the common morality. But philosophy had little to teach in return. We have no evidence that the recommendation of Aristotle was ever followed. A utilitarianism based upon a wide induction and a deep knowledge of biology and medicine might have had a considerable influence upon conduct, but the superficial utilitarianism of Greek philosophy could do scarcely anything beyond endorsing a practice which, if not customary, was at least rarely condemned.

The family, says Aristotle, consists of father, mother, children, and slaves.[51] It still remains to study the position of the last.

Slavery.

Slavery was an institution which Greek ideas of the State and the family rendered indispensable. That slaves were often kindly treated was in all cases due to the humane nature of their masters. They had no rights, with the exceptions that they were protected by law from ὕβρις, insulting violence, and in cases of murder were not put to death without trial.[52]

The Greek view.

This view of slavery was accepted by the average Greek without comment or question, although in course of time it came to be considered improper to enslave Greeks, so that slaves and barbarians became practically synonymous. Nothing else could be expected from the insistence of the Greeks upon an exacting ideal of citizenship which made considerable leisure an absolute necessity.[53] To this must be added the characteristic dislike to all forms of work that dwarfed the body and dulled the mind.[54] Far from opposing this dislike philosophic ethics generally regarded freedom from degrading toil as an essential condition for virtue.[55]

Slavery then is accepted as natural and necessary. "In the orators there is not . . . a single passage which so much as suggests that the slave is the equal of the freeman, or that slavery is in opposition to natural right."[56] On the other hand we see that slavery was regarded as a degradation and a misfortune; in Homer's words it took away half of a man's worth.[57] Quotation is unnecessary. The connotation of the word ἀνδραποδώδης is sufficient evidence. The first Greek to raise his voice in defence of the slave was Euripides. It is likely enough that his study of natural philosophy contributed not a little to this result. A glimpse of the universality of natural law makes human conventions appear petty and unreal, and the contrast between φύσις and νόμος was

Euripides.

a commonplace in the time of Euripides.[58] The poet clearly sees the vices and degradation of the slave. A man who believes a slave is a fool.[59] The slave has no

higher thought than care for his belly.[60] But on the other hand it is declared that the only shame of slavery lies in the name ;[61] some slaves are better than free men.[62] May we assume that Euripides attacked slavery by showing the evil of its results ?

Views of the philosophers.

The great philosophers are in complete accord with Greek sentiment. Socrates considered it δίκαιον for a victorious general to enslave the inhabitants of a conquered city.[63] Plato merely demands that no Greek be made a slave.[64] Aristotle defends slavery on the ground that it is natural for those who are not capable of governing themselves (i.e. non-Greeks) to be governed by those who are (i.e. Greeks).[65] His definition of a slave is "a tool with a soul in it." [66]

But in Aristotle we begin to see signs that the work begun by Euripides had not been altogether in vain. While denying that there could be any friendship between master and slave, *qua* slave, he admits that there may be, *qua* man.[67] This can only be explained as a half-admission that after all humanity as such admits of the highest moral relations. Doubtless Aristotle had seen many cases of friendship between master and slave, and felt called upon to explain the anomaly.

In a passage of the *Politics*, Aristotle informs us that there were some who regarded slavery as altogether contrary to nature.[68] He may be referring to Alcidamas, a pupil of Gorgias. Perhaps, however, it is a reference to the Cynics.[69] It is only in those schools of thought which wrenched themselves away from citizen life or aspired to a citizenship of the world that any condemnation of slavery is to be found until quite late. It is said that the followers of Hegesias, the Cyrenaic, declared that to the wise man slavery and freedom are equal.[70] This is not, indeed, a condemnation of slavery, but it is a direct departure from the current Greek view. It seems to have been held by some Stoics that the possession of

slaves was an evil.[71] Later Stoics are very humane in their discussions of the question.[72]

Ethics and slavery.

The attitude of philosophic ethics towards slavery shows clearly that it could not rise above a sentiment ingrained in the national character. A few philosophers held that slavery was unnatural, but we do not know even their names. Now and then those who have deserted the national institutions show faint signs of what will happen when those institutions have passed away. But on the whole it must be confessed that in this case conduct stamped itself deep upon ethics and was totally uninfluenced in return.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Coulanges *La Cité Antique* p. 110.

2. See Euripides *Alcestis* 995 foll. (but A. is a "heroine").

μηδὲ νεκρῶν ὡς φθιμένων χῶμα νομιζέσθω
τύμβος σᾶς ἀλόχου, θεοῖσι δ' ὁμοίως
τιμάσθω, σέβας ἐμπόρων.
καί τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον
ἐμβαίνων τόδ' ἐρεῖ·
αὕτα ποτὲ προύθαν' ἀνδρός,
νῦν δ' ἐστὶ μάκαιρα δαίμων·
χαῖρ', ὦ πότνι', εὖ δὲ δοίης.

3. Isaeus *Or.* vii. § 30 πάντες γὰρ οἱ τελευτήσειν μέλλοντες πρόνοιαν ποιοῦνται σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἐξερημώσουσι τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν οἴκους, ἀλλ' ἔσται τις καὶ ὁ ἐναγιῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτοῖς ποιήσων· διὸ κἂν ἄπαιδες τελευτήσωσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν υἱὸν ποιησάμενοι καταλείπουσι.

See also *Or.* ii. § 10 ἐσκόπει ὁ Μενεκλῆς ὅπως μὴ ἔσοιτο ἄπαις, ἀλλ' ἔσοιτο αὐτῷ ὅστις ζῶντα γηροτροφήσοι καὶ τελευτήσαντα θάψοι αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τὰ νομιζόμενα αὐτῷ ποιήσοι.

4. Aristotle *Ethics* 1162 a οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον.

5. See especially the striking words of Aristotle which assume affection between man and wife as a matter of course: ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν (*Ethics* 1162 a). Haemon and Antigone, however, are unique in Greek literature.

6. Plato *Phaedo* 60 A.

7. Xenophon *Oecon.* vii. 6, 14.

8. *Ibid.* 5 ἔζη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας ὅπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄψοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἔροιτο.

9. *Ibid.* 30 τῇ μὲν γὰρ γυναικὶ κάλλιον ἔνδον μένειν ἢ θυραυλεῖν.

10. Xenophon *Oecon.* x. 11 ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἔφην εἶναι γυμνάσιον καὶ τὸ δεῦσαι καὶ μάξαι καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα ἀνασεῖσαι καὶ συνθεῖναι.

Euripides' views on the education of women are expressed in *fr.* 212 Nauck

εἰ νοῦς ἔνεστιν· εἰ δὲ μή, τί δεῖ καλῆς
γυναικός, εἰ μὴ τὰς φρένας χρηστὰς ἔχοι;

11. For the indecencies of the Cynics see Diog. Laert. vi. 69 and vi. 46, 49. Antisthenes said that marriage existed *τεκνοποιΐας χάριν*, apparently not recognising other motives. Diogenes recommended a community of wives (Diog. Laert. vi. 72).

12. For the connection between the *Ecclesiazusae* and Plato see Adam Appendix I. to Book V. of the *Republic*.

13. Herodotus iv. 104 [*οἱ Ἀγάθυρσαι*] *ἐπίκοινον τῶν γυναικῶν τὴν μίξιν ποιεῦνται, ἵνα κασίγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι, καὶ οἰκήϊοι ἐόντες πάντες, μήτε φθόνῳ μήτ' ἔχθεϊ χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους*—a most remarkable anticipation of Plato *Rep.* 463–465. See also Herodotus iv. 180.

14. See *Republic* 462–466.

15. Diog. Laert. viii. 43 *ἀλλὰ καί φασιν αὐτὴν ἐρωτηθεῖσαν ποσταία γυνὴ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς καθαρεύει; φάναι, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἰδίου, παραχρῆμα· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου, οὐδέποτε. τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον ἄνδρα μελλούσῃ πορεύεσθαι, παρῄνει ἅμα τοῖς ἐνδύμασι καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην ἀποτίθεσθαι, ἀνισταμένην τε πάλιν ἅμα αὐτοῖσιν ἀναλαμβάνειν.* See also Stobaeus *Florilegium* lxxiv. 49, 53, 55.

16. Diog. Laert. viii. 42.

17. E.g. *ibid.* 21 *κολαζομένους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας συνεῖναι ταῖς αὐτῶν γυναιξί.*

18. Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 18, 32 *τούτου γέγονεν ἀκουστὴς σὺν ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ Ἀρήτη, ἥτις γεννήσασα παῖδα ὠνόμασεν Ἀριστιππον, ὃς ὑπαχθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς εἰς λόγους φιλοσοφίας μητροδίδακτος ἐκλήθη.*

19. Diog. Laert. x. 25.

20. Diog. Laert. vi. chapter vii.

21. Aristotle *Politics* 1262 b *δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις.*

22. Aristotle *Ethics* 1160 b *ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται* κτλ. 1161 a *φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν . . . ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν.* 1161 b *γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς* (*τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι*), *τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι.* 1162 a *ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν.*

23. *Anth. Pal.* vii. 378

ἔφθανεν Ἡλιόδωρος, ἐφέσπετο δ', οὐδ' ὅσον ὥρῃ
ὕστερον, ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ Διογένεια δάμαρ.
ἄμφω δ', ὡς ἅμ' ἔναιον, ὑπὸ πλακὶ τυμβεύονται,
ξυνὸν ἀγαλλόμενοι καὶ τάφον ὡς θάλαμον.

To the period 300–200 B.C. belong (1) the beautiful epitaph of Callimachus, *Anth. Pal.* vii. 453—

δωδεκέτη τὸν παῖδα πατὴρ ἀπέθηκε Φίλιππος
ἐνθάδε, τὴν πολλὴν ἐλπίδα, Νικοτέλην.

(2) two by Leonidas (vii. 463, 662) on four daughters dead in child-birth, and on a dead girl of seven; (3) four by Anyte (vii. 486, 490, 646, 649) on dead maidens; (4) and one by Mnasalcas (vii. 488) on a dead maid. After 200 B.C. such epigrams become very common.

24. For the Cynic view of marriage see Diog. Laert. vi. 11 *γαμήσειν τε τεκνοποιΐας χάριν.* vi. 54 *ἐρωτηθεὶς (ὁ Διογένης) ποίῳ καιρῷ δεῖ γαμεῖν; ἔφη, τοὺς μὲν νέους μηδέποτε, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μηδεπώποτε.* vi. 72 *ἔλεγε δὲ (ὁ Διογένης) καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας· γάμον μηδὲν ὀνομάζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισάσῃ συνεῖναι. κοινοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς υἱέας.*

The Cyrenaics do not seem to have paid much attention to the question, but the whole tone of their system shows that they could not have had a noble ideal.

Epicurus said (Diog. Laert. x. 119) *καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν . . . κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου οὐ γαμήσειν.* But Cobet reads here *μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν . . . γαμήσειν* (omitting *οὐ*).

The Stoics: Diog. Laert. vii. 121 *καὶ γαμήσειν* (sc. *τὸν σοφὸν*) *. . . καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι; Ibid.* 120 *φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐν φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι.* See also the quotations in Zeller *Stoics* p. 321. Diog. Laert. vii. 33 *ὥστε τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς οἱ γονεῖς καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐχθροί· οὐ γάρ εἰσι σοφοί. κοινάς τε τὰς γυναῖκας δογματίζειν, ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.*

25. Diog. Laert. vi. 13 *τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον, φρόνησιν.*

Ibid. 6 *ὁμονοούντων ἀδελφῶν συμβίωσιν παντὸς ἔφη τείχους ἰσχυροτέραν εἶναι.* See above for the views of Antisthenes and Diogenes about marriage.

26. Diog. Laert. ii. 98 *ἀγαθὰ δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην: ibid.* 99 *κλέψειν* (sc. *τὸν σοφόν*) *τε καὶ μοιχεύσειν καὶ ἱεροσυλήσειν ἐν καιρῷ.*

27. Diog. Laert. vi. 73 *μηδ' ἀνόσιον εἶναι τὸ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων κρεῶν ἅψασθαι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐθῶν.*

28. For Democritus' views on rearing children see Stobaeus *Florilegium* lxxvi. 13, 15, 16, 17.

29. For the views of Epicurus on this subject see Zeller *Stoics* 492, 493, with the authorities there quoted.

30. See e.g. Euripides *fr.* 491 Nauck

ἴστω δ' ἄφρων ὢν ὅστις ἄτεκνος ὢν τὸ πρὶν
παῖδας θυραίους εἰς δόμους ἐκτήσατο,
τὴν μοῖραν εἰς τὸ μὴ χρεὼν παραστρέφων·
ᾧ γὰρ θεοὶ διδῶσι μὴ φῦναι τέκνα,
οὐ χρὴ μάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλ' ἐᾶν.

31. For Menander see Stob. *Florilegium* lxxvi. 1, 4, 7, 8, 11.

32. Some good quotations showing the Greek love of children are collected in the seventy-eighth chapter of Stobaeus' *Florilegium*. The dead child is a

constant theme in the sepulchral epigrams of the Anthology. Of the many allusions to family affection in Euripides I may quote *fr.* 316 Nauck

γύναι, καλὸν μὲν φέγγος ἡλίου τόδε,
καλὸν δὲ πόντου χεῦμ' ἰδεῖν εὐήνεμον,
γῆ τ' ἠρινὸν θάλλουσα πλούσιόν θ' ὕδωρ,
πολλῶν τ' ἔπαινον ἔστι μοι λέξαι καλῶν·
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οὕτω λαμπρὸν οὐδ' ἰδεῖν καλὸν
ὡς τοῖς ἄπαισι καὶ πόθῳ δεδηγμένοις
παίδων νεογνῶν ἐν δόμοις ἰδεῖν θάλος.

And *fr.* 358 Nauck

οὐκ ἔστι μητρὸς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τέκνοις·
ἐρᾶτε μητρός, παῖδες, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως
τοιοῦτος ἄλλος ὅστις ἡδίων ἐρᾶν.

33. e.g. Menander *apud* Stob. *Fl.* lxxv. 6

ὡς ἀγαθόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα τὸ γενέσθαι τινὸς
πατέρα.

Ibid. 8 ὀδυνηρόν ἐστιν εὐτυχοῦντα τῷ βίῳ
ἔχειν ἔρημον διαδόχου τὴν οἰκίαν.

Ibid. 9 οὐκ ἔστι μείζων ἡδονὴ ταύτης πατρὶ
ἢ σωφρονοῦντα καὶ φρονοῦντ' ἰδεῖν τινα
τῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.

34. Aristotle *Ethics* 1099 b ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους.

35. See the disgusting story in Stob. *Florilegium* lxxvi. 14.

36. See Stob. *Florilegium* lxxvii. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8.

37. Eurip. *fr.* 358 Nauck.

38. Alexis *apud* Stob. *Florilegium* lxxix. 13

τὰ θεῖα μείζω μητρὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ποτέ.

39. Menander *apud* Stob. *Florilegium* lxxix. 26

νόμος γονεῦσιν ἰσοθέους τιμὰς νέμειν.

40. Plato *Laws* 931 A πατὴρ οὖν ὅτῳ καὶ μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες ἐν οἰκίᾳ κεῖνται κειμήλιοι ἀπειρηκότες γήρᾳ, μηδεὶς διανοηθήτω ποτὲ ἄγαλμα αὐτῷ, τοιοῦτον ἐφέστιον ἵδρυμα ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχων, μᾶλλον κύριον ἔσεσθαι.

Plato *Laws* 717 D πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος.

41. Xenophon *Mem.* B ii. 13 οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμίας ἐπιμελεῖται οὐδὲ δικάζει, ἀλλὰ περιορᾷ τοὺς εὖ πεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντας, ἐὰν δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ εὐσεβῶς θυόμενα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τούτου θύοντος οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν τούτου πράξαντος;

See also Isaeus viii. 32 κελεύει γὰρ [ὁ νόμος] τρέφειν τοὺς γονέας κτλ.

42. *Mem.* A ii. 55.

43. See especially *Mem.* B ii. 3.

44. Stobaeus *Florilegium* lxxix. 42

ἀγνώμονι πατρὶ καθάπερ αὐστηρῷ νόμῳ συμπεριενεκτέον.

45. Aelian *Var. Hist.* ii. 7 (νόμος) οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀνδρὶ Θηβαίῳ ἐκθεῖναι παιδίον, οὐδ' εἰς ἐρημίαν αὐτὸ ῥῖψαι, θάνατον αὐτοῦ καταψηφισάμενος.

46. Plato *Theaetetus* 151 c καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι κτλ.

47. Plato *Republic* 460 c τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει.

48. Plato *Republic* 461 c καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μήδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γε ἕν, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.

49. Aristotle *Politics* 1335 b πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται.

I take it that the future ἔσται implies that Aristotle is not giving a current view but his own opinion.

50. Aristotle *de Anima* Γ 430 a.

51. Aristotle *Politics* A chap. i.

52. Demosthenes *against Midias* §§ 47, 48 and Antiphon περὶ τοῦ Ἡρῴδου φόνου § 48. Euripides *Hecuba* 291.

53. For the necessity of slavery in ancient society see Lightfoot *Colossians* p. 321 :—"Slavery was interwoven into the texture of society; and to prohibit slavery was to tear society into shreds. Nothing less than a servile war . . must have been the consequence."

54. See Xen. *Oecon.* vi. 5 πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας οὔτε μαθεῖν οἷόν τε ἡμῖν ἐδόκει, συναποδοκιμάζειν τε ταῖς πόλεσι τὰς βαναυσικὰς καλουμένας τέχνας, ὅτι καὶ τὰ σώματα καταλυμαίνεσθαι δοκοῦσι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καταγνύουσι.

55. Plato *Rep.* 590 c; Arist. *Pol.* 1337 b; and for the whole subject of βαναυσία see Schmidt *Ethik* ii. 435 foll.

56. Thomson *Euripides and the Attic Orators* p. 94.

57. Homer *Od.* xvii. 322

ἥμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἀνέρος, εὖτ' ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσιν.

58. For νόμος and φύσις see Gomperz i. pp. 402 foll.

59. Eurip. *fr.* 86

ὅστις δὲ δούλῳ φωτὶ πιστεύει βροτῶν,
πολλὴν παρ' ἡμῖν μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνει.

60. *Ibid. fr.* 49

οὕτω γὰρ κακὸν δούλων γένος·
γαστὴρ ἅπαντα, τοὐπίσω δ' οὐδὲν σκοπεῖ.

61. *Ibid. Ion* 854

ἓν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,
τοὔνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων
οὐδεὶς κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ᾖ.

62. *Ibid. fr.* 511

δοῦλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν τοὔνομ' οὐ διαφθερεῖ,
πολλοὶ δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων.

63. Xen. *Mem.* Δ ii. 15.

64. *Rep.* 469 B.

65. *Pol.* 1252 a, b. See Plato *Polit.* 309 A.

66. *Ethics* 1161 b ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον.

67. *Ethics ibid.* ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος.

68. *Pol.* 1253 b τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν· νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν· διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ. See Zeller's note *Pre. Soc.* ii. 477.

69. Zeller *Socrates* p. 323.

70. Diog. Laert. ii. 94.

71. Diog. Laert. vii. 122.

72. Zeller *Stoics* p. 330.

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE MORALITY

πῆ παρέβην ; τί δ' ἔρεξα ; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη ;

Pythagoras *apud* Diog. Laert. viii. 22.

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE MORALITY

The idea of "conscience" among the Greeks.

How far the Greeks felt what is now called conscience is a difficult question to answer. Certainly the Greek and the Christian stand on quite different planes in this respect. "We have all sinned," would have been to a Greek either a truism or nonsense. "It was," says Dickinson, "a distinguishing characteristic of the Greek religion that it did not concern itself with the conscience at all; the conscience, in fact, did not yet exist, to enact that drama of the soul with God which is the main interest of the Christian, or at least of the Protestant faith." [1]

In what sense it existed.

Although a Greek would never have cried out as did the publican, "God, be merciful to me a sinner," yet he did experience something very akin to the feelings of a conscience-stricken man. The Greek recognised the existence of a moral law, and felt shame before himself if he transgressed it. He often regarded sin as a lowering of the self, *Selbsterniedrigung*, as Schmidt terms it.[2] Vice is morally ugly, τὸ *αἰσχρόν*. "Hateful unto me as the gates of Hades is he who hideth one thing in his heart and speaketh another." [3]

The *Antigone*.

Ismene might easily have held her peace and escaped the wrath of Creon, but her self-respect compelled her to confess that she shared the offence of Antigone.[4] Stobaeus, in the twenty-fourth chapter of the *Florilegium*,

has collected some passages dealing with "conscience," τὸ συνειδός. Reasonable doubt has been thrown upon the authenticity of those attributed to Periander, Bias, and Pythagoras, so of these I will quote but one. "The sinner who is tortured by conscience suffers greater evils than he whose body is scourged with blows."[5] There are others which may be construed to mean that the sinner is afraid of shame before others, just as Aristotle defines αἰδώς as φόβος ἀδοξίας.[6] For example, Antiphanes says, "To be conscious of no wrong-doing brings much joy."[7] Others are quoted in the notes.[8] But there are some which must imply shame of one's self. A character in Diphilus says, "How can one who is not ashamed of himself when he is conscious that he has done wrong be ashamed before one who knows nothing about the matter?"[9] When Orestes is asked what disease is destroying him, he replies, "Knowledge, in that I am conscious that I have done awful deeds."[10] Here is a saying of Isocrates, "Never expect that you will keep hidden a sin (αἰσχρόν). For even if you conceal it from others, you will be conscious of it yourself."[11] In the thirty-first chapter of Stobaeus (περὶ αἰδοῦς) are found other quotations illustrating those already given. Of the three quoted in the notes, I translate here the one from Democritus. "Learn to feel shame before yourself much more than before others."[12]

Quotations from Stobaeus.

I cannot find that Greek ethical writers treated the subject of conscience at any length. Deep psychological inquiry is altogether foreign to their spirit. Although Aristotle had an advanced psychology of his own, he is content in the *Ethics* with the imperfect one of Plato. It is quite in accordance with the character of Greek ethics that the nature of evil and of man's relation to it is not dwelt upon. The Greek instinct was to avoid evil by becoming good; philosophy delighted to analyse virtue rather than vice. Aristotle's discussion of αἰδώς in

Ethics and conscience.

Aristotle.

the fourth book of the *Ethics* is unfortunately incomplete, but he there disparages it as a mere preventer of sin, which befits the young only, the implication being that older people should be so trained to virtue that they need nothing to hinder them from vice.[13] But there are signs that Aristotle admitted a nobler kind of *αἰδώς*, which was not so much "fear of disgrace" as dislike for sin. "The many," he says, "are naturally disposed to obey not *αἰδώς* but fear, and they abstain from evil, not through the ugliness of sin (*τὸ αἰσχρόν*), but on account of the punishment it involves."[14] The idea of conscience, as present in the quotations given above, is thus reflected in the ethics of Aristotle, but he did not make any ethical use of it.

Plato.

If Aristotle represents the normal Greek attitude, Plato seems in this case, as in others, to have emphasised what he thought to be a fault of popular morals. Regarding vice as a disease of the soul, he insists again and again that it should be hated for its own sake and not for the punishments it entails. If a man has sinned he ought to endure, nay, voluntarily seek, any punishment, even death, in order to be rid of his sin.[15] In the *Republic* Adimantus requires a proof that sin which escapes the notice of gods and men is the greatest evil, and that righteousness, though similarly hidden, is the greatest good.[16] Plato had thus clearly conceived of conscience in one of its aspects, namely that sin, in and for itself, is an evil, a hurt to the soul.

The *Gorgias*.

The *Republic*.

Effect of Plato's teaching.

We know that the publication of the *Gorgias* produced a powerful effect.[17] The idea of "conscience" becomes more prominent in post-Platonic writers. Some credit, I think, must be given to the philosopher who defended righteousness with so eloquent a pen.

To him, too, is partly due the healthy moral tone of his pupil Aristotle. The latter never finds it necessary to show that righteousness is better than unrighteousness.

With him the proposition is axiomatic. Plato's influence is also to be traced in the pure, almost ascetic, morality of the Stoics, who, by their strenuous assertion that virtue is the only good, prepared a soil for the reception of Christian ethics.

Had the Greeks a "sense of duty"?

"The Greeks," says Dickinson,[18] "had no sense of duty. Moral virtue they conceived not as obedience to an external law, a sacrifice of the natural man to a power that in a sense is alien to himself, but rather as the tempering into due proportion of the elements of which human nature is composed. The good man was the man who was beautiful—beautiful in soul." And later on we read, "Such being the conception of virtue characteristic of the Greeks, it follows that the motive to pursue it can hardly have presented itself in the form of what we call the 'sense of duty.' For duty emphasises self-repression. Against the desires of man it sets a law of prohibition, a law which is not conceived as that of his own complete nature, asserting against a partial or disproportioned development the balance and totality of the ideal, but rather as a rule imposed from without by a power distinct from himself, for the mortification, not the perfecting, of his natural impulses and aims. Duty emphasises self-repression; the Greek view emphasised self-development."

Duty in the modern sense.

I quote these passages in full because, admirably as they describe the way in which virtuous excellence presented itself to the minds of the Greeks, they are very far from showing that Greek morality was without any sense of duty. While fully admitting that no Athenian considered himself bound to obey "a rule imposed from without, for the mortification of his natural impulses and aims," I would urge that to define duty as such a law is to restrict it to limits which are far too narrow. Passing over those meanings of the word "duty" where the notion of obligation is so weakened that it means little more

than "work" or "function," let us consider duty in its higher ethical connotation—Wordsworth's "stern daughter of the voice of God."[19] This is certainly regarded as a check, a restraining influence. It demands self-sacrifice. But "natural impulses and aims" are not repressed by a sort of malicious deity who delights in being a spoil-sport. Wordsworth regarded duty as a lawgiver that disciplined the unruly mind to loyalty to its better self. It is not cruel, but kind. It preserves from wrong, and wears "the God-head's most benignant grace." Some need it not, some,

> In love and truth,
> Where no misgiving is, rely
> Upon the genial sense of youth;
> Glad hearts! without reproach or blot;
> Who do thy work, and know it not.

It is indeed hard to believe that those who have shown conspicuous devotion to duty have been conscious of a hard taskmaster mortifying their impulses and desires. In fact it is not, strictly speaking, duty, but the love of duty, which is a moral motive. The distinction is a vital one; for while an external law, such as Dickinson's idea of duty, may be cruel or malicious, love can be directed only towards that which is believed to be beneficent, although it may be stern and repressive. Not even New Testament ethics makes duty a moral motive. There is no noun in the book, which in this respect is like classical Greek, corresponding to the English word "duty." Duty is not considered the highest moral ideal. "We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do, ὃ ὠφείλομεν ποιῆσαι."[20] Yet surely it could not be said that in the New Testament there is no sense of duty. The Christian moral motive is not duty, but love —the love of God. The Greek moral motive is love also —love of the morally beautiful. But the sense of duty is present in both the Greek and the Christian systems of

morality. They differ, it is true, for in the Christian's duty self-repression is a more prominent factor, but neither is wanting in a feeling of obligation to a moral law.

The idea of duty among the Greeks.

If we regard the voice of duty, not as a purposeless command to repress natural desires, but as a call to subordinate the lower instincts to the higher, then it must be admitted that the Greeks had a keen sense of duty, and felt an obligation, not only to fulfil a law of harmonious development, but to an external divine power, which, however, was believed to be working for the good of the world. This aspect of Greek morality has been well worked out in a recent anonymous work called *Makers of Hellas*. With a fine literary instinct the author clearly traces from Homer downwards the allegiance universally considered due to the great "unwritten laws." The aspect of this allegiance which concerns me now is the ready admission of the Greek that he ought to obey the unwritten laws, and his shame when he transgresses, whereby he acknowledges that sin is a lowering of the self. By his voluntary acceptance he turns an external command into a law of his own being. Achilles considers death a fit penalty for his having failed in his duty to his friend.[21] The Orestes of Euripides is haunted by the consciousness of matricide.[22] Oedipus is driven to blind himself by the discovery of the sin which he has committed. Antigone willingly sacrifices all, even her life, in her devotion to the great unwritten laws.

The sense of duty is greatly strengthened when morality has a religious sanction, and when due value is assigned to the claims of the individual. Either factor by itself may create the feeling, but the combination of the two results in a more than proportional intensity. It is accordingly in the religious brotherhood of the Pythagoreans, the existence of which was a protest against the tyranny of State claims, that we find the idea of duty first clearly expressed. Pythagoras is said to have

imposed upon his disciples a rule of daily self-examination to the following effect. "How have I transgressed? What have I done? What duty (*τί μοι δέον*) have I not performed?"[23] The Pythagoreans held that suicide is impious.[24] It is man's duty to live. Socrates, who "showed that the principle of duty is in the soul of man,"[25] in his defence declared that he would not depart from the post where God had placed him, through fear of death or of anything else.[26] The Cynic philosophy has no faith in the utility of theories, and we are not surprised that it contains no discussion of duty; but the lives of the Cynics themselves, their loyalty to their ideal, which involved renunciation of religion, State, family, and all the comforts of life, clearly show that they were actuated by a sense of duty. To Plato the ethical end is knowledge of the good, for which the philosopher feels the attractive force *ἔρως*. The devotion which Plato shows for his ideal has all the characteristics that are usually implied in a sense of duty. In spite of the longing of the philosopher to escape to the realm of pure reality, he will not commit suicide. He is the possession—the language of the *Phaedo* implies the slave—of the gods, and will not kill himself before they send a command to die.[27] In spite of the eudaemonistic character of Greek ethics, the notion of obligation constantly occurs. In the *Laws* Plato defines true education to be learning to hate what one *ought* to hate and learning to like what one *ought* to like.[28] Aristotle adds his approval. Virtue consists in acting, with reference to pleasure and pain, *ὡς δεῖ* and *ὅτε δεῖ*, and so forth.[29] Although the Greek language had no noun to express the notion of duty, the verbs *δεῖ*, *χρή*, *ὀφείλω* and *καθήκει* imply it very clearly. The fact that they often occur in a weakened sense no more proves that the idea of duty cannot be attached to them than our use of "duty" in the meaning of "work" or "function" implies that we are without that idea.

The Pythagoreans.

Socrates.

Plato.

Aristotle.

Self-development and its resultant, happiness, form the central idea of the Aristotelian ethics. Duty sinks into the background. Aristotle, and those Greeks whose conduct enabled him to mould his ethical theory, belonged to those "glad hearts, without reproach or blot, who do thy work and know it not." The separation of ethics from religion, and the slight moral value of the latter during the closing years of the fourth century, explain why the modern idea of duty is less apparent in Aristotle than in Plato, for whom the moral sanction was practically a religious one. But in the case of the Stoics all causes combined to produce a strong sense of duty—religion, individualism, and circumstances calling for personal self-sacrifice. Accordingly, as Coulanges says, "Zeno taught men that there is a dignity, not of the citizen, but of the man; that besides his duties towards the law he has one towards himself, and that the supreme merit is not to live or to die for the State, but to be virtuous and to please God." [30]

The Stoics.

The very fatalism which brought the Stoics into such inextricable moral difficulties developed and strengthened their sense of duty. The categorical imperative was all the better realised owing to their conviction that there was at work in the world an omnipotent law, the various aspects of which were Fate, Reason, Providence, or, in popular language, Zeus. Man must act, willingly or unwillingly, in accordance with this law.[31] A rational act the Stoic named *καθῆκον*, that which is fitting, or in accordance with universal law.[32] Moral worth lies in the intention which guides a man's conduct. When his will is at one with the divine will, when his reason and universal reason are in harmony, then his action becomes a *κατόρθωμα*, the correct performance of duty.[33]

The Stoic was led to this conclusion by the growth of the human intelligence, involving, as it did, the clear perception of the inevitableness of natural law, and by the value which, since the time of Socrates, had

been attached, with ever-increasing insistence, to the claims and responsibilities of the individual. One other factor remains, which, ever present even from the founding of Stoicism, assumed greater proportions when the school flourished with renewed vigour under the Roman empire. "In making a dogma of fatalism," says Zeller,[34] "Stoicism was only following the current of the age. How, in an age in which political freedom was crushed by the oppression of the Macedonian and subsequently of the Roman dominion, and the Roman dominion was itself smothered under the despotism of imperialism, in which Might, like a living fate, crushed every attempt at independent action—how, in such an age, could those aiming at higher objects than mere personal gratification have any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to the course of circumstances which individuals and nations were unlike powerless to control"? But in this case, as in others, cruel circumstances proved a kind task-master and a beneficent teacher. By developing the idea of duty under these influences the Stoics gave to the world a moral aim which even those who believe it to be a figment of the imagination confess to have been of priceless value to mankind, both to the race and to the individual. But I would urge that the sense of duty was present in Greek morality before the Stoics formulated their ethical theory. The references that I have already given prove this. The work of the Stoics was to insist upon the idea of duty and to give it full and formal expression.

It is difficult to estimate the influence of Stoicism upon morality. But it must be remembered that the Stoics were as much a sect as a philosophic school. Many of them were high-minded men rather than philosophers. Their lives dominated their creed at least as much as their creed dominated their lives. Experience proves the remark of Aristotle that mere verbal teaching has little influence upon conduct.[35] The conservatism of

habit and the attractiveness of pleasure are too strong. But however much circumstances forced upon the Stoics nonconformity with some of their ideals, as was the case with the institutions of the State and the family, they did try to bring their doctrine into line with their lives. Even the inconsistencies which they were compelled to introduce into their ethics are evidence of this. It is when creeds are embodied in societies that they have most influence upon the conduct, not only of the holders of those creeds, but of the world at large.

Moral purity.

In spite of the honourable position held by the wife in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, there does not appear to have been any respect for moral purity in the modern sense. The virtue of chastity was confined to narrow limits, such as loyalty to husband on the part of the wife, or to master and mistress on the part of a maid-servant.[36] Men were under no obligations, except that of avoiding adultery, or dishonour to a neighbour's family. Chastity, in fact, was a family, and not a personal, matter. As the city-state developed, the wife ceased to perform those duties which had given her a position of dignity, and marriage became chiefly an institution for the production and rearing of lawful children. This was not a favourable soil for the growth of the idea of personal chastity. It is hard to find passages in pre-Christian Greek literature where loose intercourse is looked upon as in itself a moral offence. I am inclined to think that the notion was of Eastern origin. Of course the husband was always protected by law, but connections between even married men and *hetaerae* were regarded with disapproval only when the wife was grossly neglected.[37] This attitude is in perfect accordance with the Greek spirit, which considered no natural impulse to be evil. Sexual indulgence stood upon exactly the same moral level as eating and drinking. Self-control, indeed, was admired, as is shown by a well-known story about Xenocrates.[38] Indulgence

might bring with it ceremonial defilement, but in itself it was no sin. Nevertheless, the cults of Artemis and Athene show that the Greeks had some respect for virginity. This feeling is well exemplified in the priggish Hippolytus of Euripides, but his enthusiasm is largely due to Orphic, and perhaps Pythagorean, asceticism. I lay no stress upon the *Supplices* of Aeschylus, because the chorus of that play object, not to marriage as such, but to marriage with their kin (ll. 1035-1043).

Ethics and chastity.

Philosophy made no attempt to alter this moral attitude. It is unnecessary to refer to the stories of the amours of philosophers told by Diogenes Laertius. These may, or may not, be true. But that Socrates himself did not rise above the Greek view is plain from the statements of Xenophon.[39] And there is no reason for supposing that subsequent philosophers rose to a higher moral level. Such at least is the conclusion to be drawn from their writings. Leaving out of consideration the Cyrenaics, Cynics, and Epicureans, let us consider those philosophers in whom purer ideals might be expected. Plato indeed says that the philosopher will not think sensual pleasures to be of much value,[40] but in his ideal State he allows promiscuous intercourse in the case of men and women who have passed the ages fixed for marriage, provided that incest be avoided and care taken that no child be reared from such unions.[41] Aristotle, although aware that premature indulgence is undesirable, takes the same view as Plato of intercourse beyond the limits fixed for child-rearing.[42] Even the Stoics, with their relatively ascetic morality, made no effort to combat the sensuality of the time. They even permitted their wise man to commit incest.[43] Zeller interprets this as a theoretical conclusion drawn from principles to which they were pledged,[44] but still it is impossible to avoid the inference that the Stoics did not regard loose sexual indulgence as *per se* immoral.

παιδεραστία.

The case is similar with unnatural vice. Absent from the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, although the legend of Ganymede in the *Iliad* implies its existence in pre-Homeric times,[45] παιδεραστία appears as early, perhaps, as Mimnermus (630 B.C.),[46] and continues throughout the whole of Greek literature. The purity of tragedy is to be attributed, partly to the Homeric colour of its content, and partly to its associations with other motives than that of love. There can be no doubt that the vice was continuously present, and that, as far as our evidence goes, it aroused little, if any, moral disapprobation. It is true that in the Xenophontic *Symposium* it is said that the boy suffers τὰ ἐπονειδιστότατα, but in the same dialogue we find a father evidently assenting to the practice in the case of his own son.[47] In Sparta and Thebes the vice was esteemed as making the lover desirous to perform brave deeds.[48]

παιδεραστία and ethics.

Philosophic ethics took but little notice of this feature of Greek life. The attitude of Epicurus seems to be one of assent; he objects to passionate desire only because it hinders ἀταραξία.[49] The early Stoics do not condemn it; neither do the minor Socratics. The statements of Aristotle seem to imply that in his day the passion was chiefly concerned with the delight of gazing on τὰ παιδικά,[50] but other evidence forbids the supposition that the more disgusting features of παιδεραστία were wanting in Aristotle's time. Socrates opposed παιδεραστία, but his reason is significant. It causes expense and trouble, he says, while it turns a man into a slave.[51] In the *Phaedrus* Plato is ready to pardon physical παιδεραστία, but it only needs pardon because it is concerned with the body, and marks a falling away from spiritual love.[52] Similarly, the *Republic* censures the physical passion because it shows vulgarity and want of taste.[53] In his latest work, the *Laws*, Plato takes the highest standard ever reached by Greek ethics in this connection. All

intercourse between persons of the same sex is declared to be unnatural.[54]

It appears from the *Phaedrus* that Plato set a great value on spiritual love between men and boys. The notion was not new. It had its origin in Greek sentiment, which, with the degradation of women, had lost its natural channel. Socrates had already playfully used the word ἐρᾶν to describe the relations between himself and his young pupils.[55] With Plato it becomes the master-passion of life, leading to the acquisition of beauty and truth. We are justified in drawing two conclusions. Plato saw around him a lack of passionate devotion, and wanted to remedy the defect. So widespread was παιδεραστία that in it he thought he saw the only means he could use to accomplish his aim.

Greek ethics did not rise above a vice ingrained in the Greek character. All had been done that was possible when it had been pronounced by Plato to be παρὰ φύσιν. Contact with peoples trained in purer ideals was a necessary antecedent to its removal.

Philosophy and politics.

The Periclean Greek did not divorce the philosophic from the practical life. In the Funeral Speech Thucydides makes Pericles praise the Athenians for not allowing their philosophy to degenerate into effeminacy, and for looking upon the man who abstained from political life not as unofficious, but as useless.[56] This is in perfect agreement with the spirit of preceding ages, when the "wise men" were great statesmen like Solon. Aristophanes, a staunch supporter of the old order, attempted in the *Clouds* to prove that the philosophers were bad citizens. But already there were forces at work which tended to change this view. The appearance of demagogues upon the political arena, and the dangers which threatened public characters, caused a distaste for politics. Even in Aristophanes the ἀπράγμων is worthy of praise and respect. The word had by this time acquired a good

sense among the conservative party.[57] To this change of feeling was added the increasing conviction, due to the rapid growth of science and philosophy, that the contemplative life was too absorbing to permit the student to engage in politics. As a result we find Euripides declaring the pursuit of science a happier occupation than politics, and that though the poet was convinced that to increase knowledge was to increase sorrow.[58] Socrates also refrained from public life because he felt that he could not take part in it himself as well as train young men to become good statesmen.[59] After Socrates we find philosophers who kept aloof from politics because, however excellent a thing in itself citizen-life may be, they felt they could not participate therein as it then existed. These include the Cynics, Plato, and some Stoics.[60] Aristippus chose privacy through a selfish love of ease, and so did the Epicureans. We may accordingly omit them from our inquiry.

The Cynics, and to a great extent the Stoics, desired to be independent of the State, but do not seem to have set much store by the contemplative life. Antisthenes, for instance, thought that the only requisite for happiness was virtue accompanied by the strength of will of a Socrates,[61] and Chrysippus condemns the contemplative life as being pursued for pleasure.[62] But Plato, as is manifest from the whole tone of his works, believes philosophy to be the noblest of pursuits. Nevertheless he does not divorce it from politics. The philosopher lives a retired life because, owing to the corruption of existing governments, he cannot be righteous without it. Under a congenial constitution he would develop himself more completely and benefit his country as well.[63] Philosophy could not mate politics, as politics then existed, but would do so in an ideal State. The philosophic life is the best ; statesmen ought to be philosophers —these two propositions comprise a large portion of

Plato's creed. He has defended them vigorously in dialogue after dialogue. To prove their truth he made his hazardous voyages to Sicily; and, not content to wait until rulers turned philosophers, founded his school in the Academy in order to make philosophers of the statesmen of the future. It required not a little courage to teach and defend the doctrines of Socrates in the city that condemned him to death, and the fierce outbursts in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* prove that Plato encountered active and powerful opposition. Diogenes Laertius tells us that when Plato was on his way to support Chabrias, a "sycophant" named Crobulus met him and said, "Do you defend another when the hemlock of Socrates awaits you also?"[64] But in spite of all this he persevered, and lived to see the opposition to philosophy greatly reduced if not destroyed. Much of the credit is due to him, although, of course, philosophy won many supporters through its own merits. Aristotle does not seem to have been conscious of any opposition, for with the shortest of proofs he asserts the supremacy of the contemplative life over the practical.[65] The fragments, indeed, of the New Comedy show us the philosophers held up to ridicule.[66] But it is not as bad citizens that they are condemned, but as fools. There is no trace of the hatred of an Aristophanes. And we must remember that philosophers, including Plato, were regarded not unfavourably by men in power. Besides the connection between Plato and Dionysius, it is known that Alexander was the pupil of Aristotle, and that Zeno was held in high respect by Antigonus.[67] Philosophy, in fact, succeeded in making the *βίος θεωρητικός* an acknowledged virtue. Hence research and study in every form were encouraged by the successors of Alexander. It was no longer considered impiety to study astronomy. Scholars found a congenial home in Alexandria, even though the subjects they studied were of no practical utility. In recent days the

Plato's defence of philosophy as the handmaid of true politics.

The *βίος θεωρητικός* becomes a virtue.

newly-discovered natural science was not received into favour until it showed that it could fill men's pockets, but no sordid aims seem to have sullied the welcome with which philosophy, science, and scholarship were at last received in Greece.[68]

Were the Greeks truth-loving?

Truth may be looked upon as a social virtue, but as it is so self-regarding it is best considered here.[69] In Roman times the untruthfulness of the Greeks had become almost proverbial.[70] It is, perhaps, true that the Greek nation compared unfavourably with the Romans in this respect, but to argue from the assertions of Latin writers that the Greeks were a nation of liars would be monstrously unfair. For when we turn to Greek literature a quite different picture unfolds itself to our eyes. From Homer to the Macedonian period occur passages which prove conclusively the Greek hatred of a lie. Achilles' noble condemnation has been quoted already. "Secrecy," says Sophocles, "is evil, and befits not the noble."[71] In the *Phoenissae* of Euripides Iocasta spurns reticence as slavish.[72] And the Polynices of the same play declares that the "unrighteous word," meaning a lie, "is in itself diseased."[73] It is also quite common to find the lie condemned for prudential reasons. This point of view regards the lie as a social offence. "Honesty is the best policy" was a commonplace with the Greek as with ourselves. The eleventh and twelfth chapters of Stobaeus' *Florilegium* contain a full collection of passages bearing upon this point. One from Menander may be taken as typical.[74] "It is always best to speak the truth in all circumstances. This is a precept which contributes most to safety of life."

The lie sometimes necessary.

On the other hand, with his usual freedom from cant, the Greek did not shrink from confessing that the lie was sometimes necessary. The twelfth chapter of Stobaeus well illustrates this aspect of the untruth. Even as Achilles was regarded as the typical lie-hater, so

Odysseus typified him who set expediency before the truth, as is clear to us from the *Lesser Hippias*. It is the young son of him who hated the lie "like the gates of Hades" that in the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles remarks to Odysseus, "Dost thou not think it shame to speak a lie?" and the latter replies, "Nay, not if the lie brings salvation."[75] We may in fact sum up the Greek view with Schmidt by saying that although the Greek was convinced of the moral ugliness of the lie, he could not shut his eyes to the sad fact that the truth was not always profitable. It is difficult to see any essential difference between the Greek and the modern standpoints.

Three factors in the Greek love of truth: (*a*) religious.

One factor in this result was of religious origin. The honesty of the Delphic Apollo is set forth in warm words by his worshipper Pindar.[76] It was no slight gain to Greek religion, and through it to Greek morality, that one at least of the deities whom Xenophanes had reproached for "deceiving one another" should have been set up before the eyes of the Greeks as a god of truth.

(*b*) linguistic.

A second factor is the happy chance that the Greek language did not distinguish between the unintentional error and the intentional falsehood. Even poetical embellishment was described by the verb ψεύδεσθαι. I cannot think that this tended to lessen the respect for truth. Rather the artistic genius of the Greeks, which regarded error as something ugly and hateful, increased their dislike for the intentional lie with which error was linguistically associated.

(*c*) scientific.

And finally, the pursuit of history and science, whether natural or ethical, which served no party ends and looked for no reward, could not fail to have a most beneficial effect upon the Greek character.[77]

Evil influence of debate.

If the Greeks have been regarded as untruthful, the reason is that debate in the ecclesia and the law-courts occupied much of their time, and it is almost impossible for an advocate not to give colour to the charge of making the worse argument

appear the better. Herein without doubt lay the objections of Plato to rhetoric, which he puts forward with such graphic force in the *Gorgias*.

Philosophic ethics presents an accurate reflection of the current morality on the question of truth and untruth. The three factors, religious, linguistic, and scientific, which have been noticed in the Greek love of truth, find their place also in philosophic literature. The lie is constantly condemned as mean and blameworthy; while truth is honourable and to be praised.[78] To the Greek as to us this was an obvious fact that no one seems to have disputed. Philosophy had therefore no cause to inquire into the reasons why truth is desirable in order to give it a new moral sanction.

Decay of truthfulness.

The task of ethics was to discuss when and why an untruth was sometimes preferable to the truth. It is therefore not to be wondered at that after Aristotle a somewhat laxer view appears to have gained ground. There are signs of it even in Aristotle, for the man who exaggerates for the sake of reputation or honour is said to be "not very blameworthy."[79] The problem which in the *Philoctetes* appears as a distressing moral difficulty was accepted as a necessity which need cause no scruples of conscience. The εἴρων, who in Aristotle is one who depreciates himself, or at worst only displays a contemptible affectation of humility, becomes in Theophrastus a diplomatic liar.[80] I would lay no stress on the fact that the twelfth chapter of Stobaeus furnishes fragments from the later comic poets which assume the permissibility of a lie in certain circumstances.[81] Since the context is unknown, it is difficult to make out the moral tone they imply. It is more important that the Stoics not only allowed the wise man to speak falsely, but denied that he lied in such cases. It was a lie only when he intended to defraud a neighbour.[82] A Greek of the age of Sophocles would have allowed that deception was sometimes necessary,

but to him deception was always lying. The change in language matches the indifference to truth typical of an age when scepticism had found its way even among the successors of Plato.

I have stated that ethics was not called upon to discover a fresh sanction for truthfulness.

Aristotle's view of the lie.

Aristotle, with all the ardour of the scientific inquirer, sets truth even before love to his friends.[83] In the *Metaphysics* he carefully distinguishes between the untrue thing and the untrue man, defining the latter as one who is inclined through a habit of will to indulge in the former.[84] Aristotle adds no express disapproval of such a character. To condemn the liar is unnecessary. There can be no doubt that we have here the normal Greek view expressed in scientific terms.

Plato's view of the lie.

There is no reason for supposing that Plato's views differed in this respect from those of Aristotle. But Plato seems to have regarded metaphysics as something far more precious than ethics. To miss the truth is to him a greater evil than to speak an untruth knowing it to be such. The lie in the soul is worse than the lie in word.[85] From this conviction Plato never swerved. It is manifest in the *Lesser Hippias*, in the *Republic*, and in the *Laws*. It is true that he permits the "medicinal lie" to the rulers only,[86] and insists again and again on the beauty and value of truth, "which leads gods and men to all that is good."[87] It is true that he is convinced that God will not lie.[88] But Plato's depreciation of truth-telling in comparison with knowledge must have been misunderstood. I think that its fruits are to be seen in the increased toleration of lying apparent in the post-Aristotelian period. The present essay shows that Plato was often opposed to the current views of his time, usually with credit to himself. In this case his opposition was productive of harm, or at least helped to strengthen tendencies that were due to the decline of the characteristic

Greek virtues, which owed their being to the city-state and decayed with its decay.

Greek view of material goods.

Since it was a characteristic Greek trait to take happiness as the end of all action, it is only to be expected that great stress was laid upon the possession of material advantages. There is extant a fragment of Solon which expresses admirably the Greek ideal: "Pierian Muses, glorious daughters of Memory and Olympian Zeus, hear me as I pray. Grant unto me wealth from the blessed gods, and to have alway fair fame in the eyes of all men. Grant that I may thus be dear to my friends, and bitter to my foes; revered in the sight of the one, awful in the sight of the other." [89] To complete the picture we must add those natural gifts which were so dear to Pindar—good birth and physical and mental excellences. Pindar, too, lays great stress upon reputation, and in him the desire rises to a higher level in that the good of his children is often present to his mind. "To the paths of simplicity let me cleave throughout my life, that being dead I may set upon my children a name that shall be of no ill report. For gold some pray, and some for limitless lands; mine be it amid my townsfolk's love to shroud my limbs in earth, still honouring where honour is due, and sowing rebuke on the evil-doers." [90] Pindar's conception of ἀρετή as a noble mind in a beautiful body shows that material goods played a not unimportant part in forming the moral ideas of the Greeks. If we turn to Aristotle, in whose eyes every idea sanctioned by the general conscience was worthy of due consideration as practically certain to embody some truth, we find an excellent reflection of Greek feeling on this point. Some, he says, define happiness as pleasure or wealth or honour.[91] But while refusing to allow that happiness is any such thing, he believes that perfect happiness requires certain conditions, without which it falls short of what it might be. These are friends, wealth, political

power, good birth, children who turn out well, and personal beauty.[92]

Exaltation of soul over body.

It is about the time of the Peloponnesian War, a period of trouble as well as of intellectual enlightenment, that definite opposition to this typically Greek sentiment first occurs. Education had caused greater value to be attached to the spiritual side of man, even to the occasional disparagement of the cultivation of the body,[93] while the instability of fortune had been deeply impressed upon men's minds. Democritus, a profound moralist if not an ethical philosopher, recommends him who would be happy to set his affection upon things that do not perish.[94] Happiness and unhappiness, he declares, are of the soul.[95] Happiness dwells not in flocks or gold.[96] Euripides, the contemporary of Democritus, sometimes praises and sometimes disparages wealth and high birth.[97] But it must be remembered that it is often not he himself who speaks, but his characters. Yet it is quite plain to which side the poet's own feeling inclines. While not blind to the fact that wealth brings with it the power to do generous deeds, he holds it to be uncertain, worthless without virtue, and often productive of harm. Good birth he considers to be a valuable possession; yet true nobility lies in goodness.

Socrates.

The disparagement of material goods becomes in Socratic ethics the exaltation of a life of independence and self-sufficiency. Both in his life and in his teaching Socrates showed that the greatest possession is to have few wants.[98] This is a distinct step in advance. It asserts the moral value of the individual soul apart from its environment.

Plato.

Plato, with his passionate longing for spiritual excellence, is enough of a Socratic to lay but little stress upon material goods. All these he would make the common property of the citizens. Good birth to Plato is no mere empty honour, but the result of a parentage physically, mentally, and morally excellent.

The qualities he requires in his guardians are not love of money, power, or honour, but to be philosophical, high-spirited, swift-footed, and strong.[99] But he is not blind to the advantages that wealth brings with it. The beautiful picture of Cephalus in the first book of the *Republic* is surely one which Plato did not regard with entire disfavour.[100] The old man, a typical representative of all that was good in the ancient Athenian character, confesses that his wealth had made a life of righteousness an easier matter than it would otherwise have been. Plato's object in setting such a figure before the reader at the outset of the book is surely to suggest that the polity he is about to describe will try to reproduce, and at the same time improve, the virtues we admire in Cephalus, virtues which, Plato believed, were rapidly vanishing in the vicious atmosphere of existing institutions. Accordingly, in the ideal State the wants of the guardians would be supplied from a common stock. Each man would have sufficient, but there would be no place for greed. Plato was keenly alive to the danger of a money-loving spirit. "There is a gulf," he says, "between wealth and virtue, that when weighed, as it were, in the two scales of a balance, one of the two always falls as the other rises. Consequently when wealth and the wealthy are honoured in a State, virtue and the virtuous sink in estimation."[101] The love of honour, valuable enough when directed towards the good of the State, can sink into mere selfishness, and cause the degradation from the ideal polity to democracy.[102] But the best instance in Plato of Socratic self-sufficiency occurs at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*.[103] A consummately unjust man, who is thought by his fellow-men to be perfectly just, and who has all the advantages and honour to be obtained from such a reputation, is contrasted with a perfectly just man, who is supposed to be altogether unjust, and who through all his life suffers

accordingly. Even in such a case as this Plato is prepared to show, not, indeed, that the persecuted just man is happier than an honoured just man, but that justice is better than injustice. The *Gorgias* emphasises the doctrine that the righteous are happy, and the unrighteous unhappy.[104] This firm resolution not to diminish the prerogative of wisdom and virtue, which that philosopher believed to be identical, is all the more significant when we remember that Plato was no bigoted ascetic, but a typical Greek. When, accordingly, in the *Philebus* he is discussing what is the good for man, after intelligence and wisdom he ranks arts and sciences, true opinions, and such pleasures of sense as are not associated with pain.[105] Reconciliation of these two apparently contradictory tendencies must be sought for in the doctrines of immortality and transmigration. While upon earth the soul is beset with desires, pleasures, pains, and disease, which prevent her from realising her perfect activity. The body needs attention, but for the sake of the soul and not for its own. The true end of man is to develop his intelligence so that after death his soul may take up her abode in the realm of pure being, and suffer no more bondage in the prison-house of a mortal body.

Aristotle.

Something has already been said about Aristotle's opinion on the question of material goods. The tendency to exalt the soul over the body, a tendency which philosophy strengthened by showing from experience the joys of intellectual exercise, appears in Aristotle as the supremacy of the contemplative life over those of action and of pleasure. Self-sufficiency lies, not in the solitary man, but in the man and his immediate environment.[106] This idea, I think, should be connected with Aristotle's conception of friendship as an extension of the self. The extended personality is self-sufficient; the individual is not.

Cyrenaics.

The Cyrenaics, while not disparaging worldly goods,

did not lay any stress upon them. Cultivation of the mind was in their eyes the requisite for that enjoyment of life which they regarded as the highest good for men. It is not in our power to command instruments of pleasure, but we can make the most of such as we have. Man must be, as far as possible, independent of circumstances.[107]

Cynics.

But with the Cynics, Socratic independence, as Zeller says, became a renunciation of the world.[108] They lived as beggars. Their dress, their food, their whole manner of life, was of the simplest. As far as external means of happiness are concerned, they would have placed man on a level with the beasts of the field. Their teaching may be well summed up in the saying of Antisthenes that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and needs nothing else except Socratic strength of will.[109] Reputation they despised,[110] and considered it good to be dishonoured.[111] In spite of the Quixotism, priggishness, and indecency which offend us in the Cynic mode of life, it must be confessed they made a magnificent protest against luxury and artificiality at a time when it was greatly needed. They are the only school which attempted to make proselytes. It is probably in this connection that we should take the story told of Antisthenes.[112] When reproached for associating with bad men he replied: "Physicians visit the sick, but they themselves have no fever." Crates was nicknamed 'Door-opener' "because he used to enter into every house and give exhortation."[113] Diogenes said of himself that other dogs (with a pun on Cynics) bit their enemies, while he bit his friends that he might save them.[114] It is impossible to measure the influence which the Cynics exerted upon their contemporaries. They were probably always few in number, and were brought into prominence more by their eccentricities than by their wide extension. Yet it is likely that they were men of striking personality and strength of character. Diogenes Laertius relates of Diogenes that he had wonderful powers of persuasion.

"There was magic charm (ἴυγξ) in his words."[115] It is also said that many public men came to hear him. The great work of the Cynic school was to prepare a way for Stoicism, both by bringing out in the clearest light the artificiality of Greek life, that had long been expressed in the contrast between φύσις and νόμος, and also by furnishing an example of exaggerated individualism to serve as a warning to their successors.

Stoics and Epicureans.

Both the Stoics and the Epicureans asserted man's independence of material goods. But whereas the Stoic ideal was voluntary harmony with universal law, the Epicurean sought to detach man as far as possible from his environment, in order to acquire ἀταραξία. It is therefore natural to find that although the Stoics refused to allow that material goods, not being in a man's power, could influence his happiness, and maintained that only virtue was a good, they nevertheless gave to beauty, strength, health and life a decided preference over their opposites.[116] It is impossible not to see that these possessions are more in harmony with law and reason than ugliness, sickness, and death. At any rate they are useful as means to the life according to nature. The Epicurean wise man, on the other hand, is self-sufficient because he has need of little. He will nevertheless not neglect external goods when they come in his way.[117] He accordingly restricts his wants to the utmost so that he may not be disturbed from repose of mind.

Reason for the disparagement in philosophy of material goods.

This disparagement of material goods, apparent as it is in nearly every ethical system, is very remarkable. The unanimity cannot be due to a growing popularity of simple living. There is no evidence that the Athenian of 300 B.C. was more frugal in his ways than his ancestor of a century or more before him. On the contrary, the curiously prominent place occupied by cooks and cookery in the later comedy[118] cannot be entirely explained by the fact that the quotations are mostly made by Athenaeus

in his *Doctors at Dinner*. They are much too long and numerous. It seems a fact that during the fourth and third centuries the pleasures of the palate were more highly esteemed than they had been, and Epicurus probably voiced a popular sentiment when he declared that he could not conceive of happiness without them.[119] The real reason for the disparagement of material goods is that philosophy, being an exercise of mind, naturally regards with favour the exaltation of soul over body. Hence, as is shown in another section, the contemplative life was raised by philosophy to the rank of a virtue.

Pessimism.

Of all goods life itself is naturally the most esteemed, and the Greeks, with their exquisitely developed sense of pleasure and beauty, were not behind other peoples in appreciation of the joy of living. It is manifest in their delight in youthful strength and beauty, and in their horror at old age. Nevertheless there often occur passages in Greek literature, possibly more than in any other literature, which express the blackest pessimism. The present discussion is concerned with that form of it which considered death to be preferable to life. Naturally it is to be found mostly in times of trouble. The best lot for men, says Theognis, is not to have been born at all, the next best to die as soon as possible.[120] The lament is repeated by Sophocles [121] and Euripides,[122] the latter declaring that the complaint was often heard in his day.

Suicide.

Now since the Greeks attached no moral blame to the taking of life, it is only to be expected that suicide, as a remedy for the ills of life, was not generally condemned. Certainly Sophocles did not hold up the deaths of Ajax and Antigone as worthy of moral disapprobation. Euripides, indeed, in one passage calls self-slaughter unholy, but elsewhere he regards it as a virtue, and a noble act in certain circumstances.[123]

But although suicide was not condemned on purely

moral grounds, it brought a religious stain of blood-guiltiness upon the State. Aeschines says that the guilty hand of the suicide was buried apart from the rest of the body.[124] All taking of human life was looked upon at Athens as bringing with it religious defilement, but I cannot find that this implied any moral guilt. In the fifth book of the *Ethics* it is decided that the suicide wrongs the State, and not himself, since he acts of his own accord. The fault did not lie in depriving the State of a citizen, because, as Burnet says, the appropriate penalty is not damages, but dishonour (*ἀτιμία*).[125] The suicide is condemned by Aristotle, on legal rather than moral grounds, for polluting the State. The Pythagoreans, who attached a high value to life as such, considered self-slaughter an offence against morality and religion,[126] for, as we have seen, the Pythagorean moral sanction was a religious one. Some mysteries, as Plato implies, compared men to soldiers who must not leave the station at which they have been placed.[127] This doctrine certainly makes it a duty to refrain from suicide. Plato does not see his way to accept this view, but readily admits that voluntary self-slaughter is a sin against the gods, whose possession man is.[128] The Cynics and Stoics carried their views about independence to such a length that they claimed the right of securing their freedom by means of self-destruction. Crates the Cynic recommended suicide when circumstances require it.[129] Metrocles and Menippus put an end to their lives.[130] Zeno and Cleanthes, the first two heads of the Stoic school, committed suicide,[131] and their deaths are mentioned by Stobaeus as instances of courage.[132] Later adherents of the school favoured the practice, especially during the tyranny of the Roman Empire.[133] Theodorus the Cyrenaic, on the other hand, declared that the wise man would not kill himself for the sake of his country. Why should he throw away his wisdom to help fools?[134] Epicurus allowed suicide only

in rare cases, but he did not consider it immoral, seeing that he held the wise man to be independent of everything, including life and death.[185]

Suicide was condemned by the Pythagoreans, the mysteries, and Plato for religious reasons; by the State because of the ceremonial impurity it entailed. Plato's unwillingness to accept the position taken by the expounders of the mysteries implies, I think, that he did not follow the Pythagoreans in holding all human life to be sacred. Socrates, if he did not commit suicide, at least courted death, and his pupil had no fault to find with his action. The Cyrenaics and Epicureans were influenced entirely by hedonistic reasons. It is clear that the Cynics and Stoics practised what they preached. Circumstances certainly made them all the readier to put their theories into practice, but the permissibility of suicide is implied in their fundamental theory of man's independence of circumstances. For the same reason the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who also shared the belief in independence, did not condemn suicide, but only thought it foolish. Except among the Pythagoreans,[186] who possibly influenced the teaching of such mysteries as condemned suicide, there is no trace that it was ever considered immoral to take human life, although such action brought ceremonial defilement. When suicide is condemned elsewhere, it is on grounds other than the sacredness of human life.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Dickinson *The Greek View of Life* p. 17.

2. Schmidt *Ethik* ii. 404, describing the lie.

3. *Iliad* ix. 312.

4. Sophocles *Antigone* 536 foll. The chorus voluntarily suffer with Prometheus *P. V.* 1063-1070.

5. Stobaeus *Flor.* xxiv. 8 (Pythagoras) κακὰ μείζω πάσχει διὰ τοῦ συνειδότος ὁ ἀδικῶν βασανιζόμενος, ἢ ὁ τῷ σώματι καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς μαστιγούμενος.

6. Aristotle's paraphrase of the Platonic definition in *Laws* 646 E. See *Ethics* 1128 b.

7. Stobaeus *Flor.* xxiv. 7 (Antiphanes)

τὸ μὴ συνειδέναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ
ἀδίκημα μηδὲν ἡδονὴν πολλὴν ἔχει.

8. *Ibid.* xxiv. 13 Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνες ἀταράχως ζῶσιν, εἶπεν, οἱ μηδὲν ἑαυτοῖς ἄτοπον συνειδότες.

Isocrates *Nic.* 39 A (quoted by Stobaeus *ibid.* 16) ζηλοῦτε μὴ τοὺς πλεῖστα κεκτημένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μηδὲν κακὸν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συνειδότας· μετὰ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης τύχης ἥδιστα ἄν τις δύναιτο τὸν βίον διαγαγεῖν.

Stobaeus *Flor.* xxiv. 3 (Menander)

ὁ συνιστορῶν αὑτῷ τι, κἂν ᾖ θρασύτατος,
ἡ σύνεσις αὐτὸν δειλότατον εἶναι ποιεῖ.

Ibid. 6 (Sophocles *fr.* 845 Nauck)

ἦ δεινὸν ἆρ' ἦν, ἡνίκ' ἄν τις ἐσθλὸς ὢν
αὑτῷ συνειδῇ.

9. *Ibid.* 1 (Diphilus)

ὅστις γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐκ αἰσχύνεται
συνειδόθ' αὑτῷ φαῦλα διαπεπραγμένῳ,
πῶς τόν γε μηδὲν εἰδότ' αἰσχυνθήσεται;

10. *Ibid.* 5. Euripides *Orestes* 395

ΜΕ. τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;
ΟΡ. ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος.

11. Isocrates πρὸς Δημόνικον (Stobaeus *Flor.* xxiv. 9) μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιζε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λήσῃς, σαυτῷ συνειδήσεις.

12. Stobaeus *Flor.* xxxi. 7 (Democritus)

μάθε δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων σεαυτὸν αἰσχύνεσθαι.

Ibid. 10 (Theophrastus)

αἰδοῦ σαυτόν, καὶ ἄλλον οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσῃ.

Ibid. 17 (Agathon)

ἀδικεῖν νομίζων ὄψιν αἰδοῦμαι φίλων.

13. Aristotle *Ethics* 1128 b.

14. *Ibid.* 1179 b οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν (sc. οἱ πολλοὶ) αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας.

15. Plato *Gorgias* 480 C κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.

16. Plato *Republic* 366 D πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπῄνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ λανθάνον θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾖ.

17. Gomperz *Greek Thinkers* ii. p. 342.

18. Dickinson *The Greek View of Life* pp. 134, 141.

19. See Wordsworth's *Ode to Duty*

Stern daughter of the voice of God!
O Duty! if that name thou love,
Who art a light to guide, a rod
To check the erring, and reprove:
Thou, who art victory and law
When empty terrors overawe;
From vain temptations dost set free;
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity!

There are who ask not if thine eye
Be on them; who in love and truth,
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth;
Glad hearts! without reproach or blot;
Who do thy work, and know it not:
Long may the kindly impulse last!
But thou, if they should totter, teach them to stand fast!

Serene will be our days and bright,
And happy will our nature be,
When love is an unerring light,
And joy its own security.
And they a blissful course may hold
Even now, who, not unwisely bold,
Live in the spirit of this creed;
Yet find that other strength, according to their need.

. . . . .
. . . . .

Stern law-giver! yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face:
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds;
And fragrance in thy footing treads;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong;[1]
And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong.

To humbler functions, awful power!
I call thee: I myself commend
Unto thy guidance from this hour;
Oh, let my weakness have an end!
Give unto me, made lowly wise,
The spirit of self-sacrifice;
The confidence of reason give;
And in the light of truth thy bondman let me live!

20. St. Luke xvii. 10.

21. *Iliad* xviii. 98.

22. Euripides *Orestes* 396
ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος.

23. Diog. Laert. viii. 22
πῆ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

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[1] Cf. Stobaeus *Ecl.* ii. 158 *τοῦτο* [*τὸ καθῆκον*] *διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει.*

24. Plato *Phaedo* 61 E.

25. Coulanges *La Cité Antique* p. 420.

26. Plato *Apology* 28 E ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

27. Plato *Phaedo* 62 B οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι . . οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτιννύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν . . ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.

28. Plato *Laws* 653 B παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

29. Aristotle *Ethics* 1104 b διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.

30. Coulanges *La Cité Antique* p. 423.

31. Cleanthes *apud* Epicteti *enchirid.* 52

ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ πεπρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος,
ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

Seneca *Ep.* 107, 11

ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

32. Diog. Laert. vii. 107 ἔτι δὲ καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τε ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν· οἷον, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ κτλ. to the end of chap. lxii.

33. Stobaeus *Ecl.* ii. 158 τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ' εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα κτλ. See Zeller *Stoics* pp. 265, 287.

34. Zeller *Stoics* p. 332.

35. Aristotle *Ethics* 1105 b ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δὲ οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

36. When Odysseus punishes his handmaids it is because they have brought shame upon himself and Penelope. *Od.* xxii. 418, 425.

37. See Becker *Charicles* p. 241 Eng. trans.

38. Diog. Laert. iv. 7. For the Orphism of Hippolytus see Euripides *Hipp.* 952

ἤδη νυν αὔχει καὶ δι' ἀψύχου βορᾶς
σίτοις καπήλευ', Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων
βάκχευε κτλ.

The religious aspect of purity appears as early as Hesiod *Works and Days*, 733, 754. In Aeschylus it is a family rather than a personal matter.

39. Xen. *Mem.* B ii. 4. Cf. also the visit to Theodote Γ xi.

40. Plato *Phaedo* 64 D.

41. Plato *Republic* 461 B, C.

42. Aristotle *Politics* 1335 a, b.

43. Diog. Laert. vii. 188.

44. See Zeller *Stoics* pp. 308, 309, and the quotations there.

45. Homer *Iliad* xx. 232–235.

46. Mimnermus *fr.* 1 l. 9.

47. Xenophon *Symp.* viii. 19 and i. ch. 1. See also viii. 34.

48. See Schmidt *Ethik* i. pp. 205–208, and also the last reference to the Xenophontic *Symposium*.

49. Diog. Laert. x. 142, 118.

50. Aristotle *Ethics* 1167 a τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή. Cf. 1171 b τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπάς. There is no condemnation implied in *Ethics* 1159 b, 1164 a.

51. Xen. *Mem.* A iii. 11. See also A ii. 29, 30, although this passage is condemned as spurious by Krohn and Hartmann.

52. *Phaedrus* 256 B.

53. *Republic* 403 B.

54. *Laws* 636 C.

55. Xen. *Mem.* Δ i. 2.

56. Thucydides ii. 40 φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας . . μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε (sc. τῶν πολιτικῶν) μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν κτλ.

Herodotus uses the word φιλοσοφεῖν of Solon, i. 30.

57. See Aristophanes *Knights* 261 with Neil's note. See also p. 208 of Neil's edition.

58. See Euripides *fr.* 910 Nauck

ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
ἔσχε μάθησιν,
μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην
μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν,
ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη
καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως.
τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ' αἰσχρῶν
ἔργων μελέδημα προσίζει.

And *fr.* 193

ὅστις δὲ πράσσει πολλὰ μὴ πράσσειν παρόν,
μῶρος, παρὸν ζῆν ἡδέως ἀπράγμονα.

See Euripides *Medea* 294 foll.

χρὴ δ' οὔποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.
χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας
φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.
σκαιοῖσι μὲν γὰρ καινὰ προσφέρων σοφὰ
δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοὐ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι.

May not there be a literary connection between the last two lines and the passage from Thucydides ii. 40 quoted above?

59. Xen. *Mem.* A vi. 15.

60. For the Cynic view see Diog. Laert. vi. 11 καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Also Stobaeus *Flor.* xlv. 28. For Plato *Apology* 32 A ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν. See also *Gorgias* 513 A, 515 A foll. For the Stoics, Stobaeus *Flor.* xlv. 29 Χρύσιππος ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί οὐ πολιτεύεται, εἶπε· Διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρά [τις] πολιτεύεται, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστά, τοῖς πολίταις.

61. Diog. Laert. vi. 11 αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην, ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος.

62. For the Stoic view of the contemplative life see the remark of Chrysippus in Plutarch *Sto. Rep.* iii. 2 ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινὸς ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως.

63. See *Republic* 496 D, 497 A ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ (πολιτείᾳ) αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

64. Diog. Laert. iii. 24.

65. Aristotle *Ethics* 1177 a foll.—the whole of the seventh chapter of the tenth book.

66. For the opinion expressed by comedy of the philosophers see the passages quoted by Diog. Laert. iii. 27, 28, the fragment of Baton in Athenaeus iii. 103, of Theognetus in Athenaeus iii. 104, of Philemon in Stobaeus *Flor.* lv. 5.

67. For the relations between Zeno and Antigonus see Diog. Laert. vii. 7, 8.

68. A typical expression of the freedom of Greek culture from ulterior motives is to be found in Aristotle *Metaphysics* 982 b φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον, καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν κτλ.

69. Aristotle *Ethics* 1127 a, b, where he distinguishes ἀλήθεια as a part of δικαιοσύνη from truthfulness of manner.

70. See Juvenal x. 174

quidquid Graecia mendax
audet in historia.

Whatever the Whore of Babylon has done in history!

The complaint here, however, is directed chiefly against Herodotus. See Mayor's note *in loc.* Cf. also the quotation from Cicero *pro Caecina* given in Mahaffy *Social Life in Greece* p. 123.

71. Sophocles *fr.* 76 Nauck

κακὸν τὸ κεύθειν κοὐ πρὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐγενοῦς.

72. Euripides *Phoen.* 392

δούλου τόδ' εἶπας, μὴ λέγειν ἃ τις φρονεῖ.

73. *Ibid.* 471

ὁ δ' ἄδικος λόγος
νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῷ.

74. Stobaeus *Flor.* xi. 7, 13, 16; xii. 2, 13, 17, 19; and in particular xi. 11

ἀεὶ κράτιστόν ἐστι τἀληθῆ λέγειν,
ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ· τοῦτ' ἐγὼ παρεγγυῶ
εἰς ἀσφάλειαν τῷ βίῳ πλεῖστον μέρος.

75. Sophocles *Phil.* 108

ΝΕ. οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖ δῆτα τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν;
ΟΔ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναί γε τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει.

76. Pindar *Pyth.* iii. 27 (Christ)

ἄμεν . . . βασιλεὺς
Λοξίας . . .
ψευδέων δ' οὐχ ἅπτεται· κλέπτει τέ νιν
οὐ θεὸς οὐ βροτὸς ἔργοις οὔτε βουλαῖς.

Pyth. ix. 42

καὶ γὰρ σέ, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν,
ἔτραπε μείλιχος ὀργὰ παρφάμεν τοῦτον λόγον.

Nem. x. 54 καὶ μὰν θεῶν πιστὸν γένος.

77. Schmidt *Ethik* ii. 413, 414.

78. E.g. Aristotle *Ethics* 1127 a καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν.

79. Aristotle *Ethics* 1127 b ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός.

80. Theophrastus *Characters* i. See Grant on *Ethics* iv. 7. 3.

81. E.g. Stobaeus *Flor.* xii. 5, 9, 11, 12.

82. Stobaeus *Ecl.* ii. 230 λέγεσθαι δὲ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον.

83. Aristotle *Ethics* 1096 a δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

84. *Metaphysics* 1024 b, 1025 a; especially τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται ψευδῆ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτό.

85. Plato *Republic* 382 B ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἄν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.

86. *Ibid.* 389 B εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, δῆλον, ὅτι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον. δῆλον ἔφη. τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῆς πόλεως· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἁπτέον τοῦ τοιούτου. See also *Laws* 663 D, E.

87. See *Republic* 389 B ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον. *Laws* 730 B, C ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις, where he goes on to show that the liar is ἄπιστος and friendless. *Laws* 917 A, where truth towards those to whom one owes respect (parents and elders and so on) is declared necessary. In *Gorgias* 525 A we are told that the habit of untruth produces ugliness in souls.

88. For the belief in the truth of the gods see, *inter alia*, *Republic* 382 D, 389 B. Compare Sophocles *Philoctetes* 991–992.

89. Solon *fr.* 12

Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένῳ·
ὄλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε καὶ πρὸς ἁπάντων
ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν·
εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν,
τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.

90. Pindar *Nem.* viii. 35 κελεύθοις

ἁπλόαις ζωᾶς ἐφαπτοίμαν, θανὼν ὡς παισὶ κλέος,
μὴ τὸ δύσφαμον προσάψω. χρυσὸν εὔχονται, πεδίον δ' ἕτεροι
ἀπέραντον· ἐγὼ δ' ἀστοῖς ἀδὼν
καὶ χθονὶ γυῖα καλύψαιμ'
αἰνέων αἰνητά, μομ-
φὰν δ' ἐπισπείρων ἀλιτροῖς.

See also *Nem.* vii. 30. The translation in the text is Myers'. The same idea is expressed by Isocrates *ad Nicocl.* § 32 περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ δόξαν καλὴν ἢ πλοῦτον μέγαν τοῖς παισὶ καταλιπεῖν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ θνητός, ἡ δ' ἀθάνατος, καὶ δόξῃ μὲν χρήματα κτητά, δόξα δὲ χρημάτων οὐκ ὠνητή.

91. Aristotle *Ethics* 1095a οἱ μὲν γὰρ [λέγουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν. The last class he styles further on χαρίεντες.

92. *Ibid.* 1099a, b φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη [ἡ εὐδαιμονία], καθάπερ εἴπομεν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους. εὐτεκνία implies both the possession of children and their health in body and mind.

93. See Euripides' attack against athleticism, *fr.* 282 Nauck

κακῶν γὰρ ὄντων μυρίων καθ' Ἑλλάδα
οὐδὲν κάκιόν ἐστιν ἀθλητῶν γένους κτλ.

But the attack seems to be chiefly directed against 'professionalism.'

94. Democritus *fr.* 189 Diels ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ βίον διάγειν ὡς πλεῖστα εὐθυμηθέντι καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἀνιηθέντι· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς θνητοῖσι τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιοῖτο.

95. Democritus *fr.* 170 Diels εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίη.

96. *Ibid. fr.* 171 Diels εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος.

97. From the very numerous passages on this subject which could be quoted from Euripides I take the following

Electra 426 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἡνίκ' ἂν γνώμη πέσῃ,
σκοπῶ τὰ χρήμαθ' ὡς ἔχει μέγα σθένος,
ξένοις τε δοῦναι κτλ.

Her. Fur. 511 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ὁ μέγας ἥ τε δόξ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ βέβαιός ἐστι.

fr. 163 ἀνδρὸς φίλου δὲ χρυσὸς ἀμαθίας μέτα ἄχρηστος, εἰ μὴ κἀρετὴν ἔχων τύχοι.

fr. 54 κακόν τι παίδευμ' ἦν ἄρ' εἰς εὐανδρίαν ὁ πλοῦτος ἀνθρώποισιν αἴ τ' ἄγαν τρυφαί· πενία δὲ δύστηνον μέν, ἀλλ' ὅμως τρέφει μοχθεῖν τ' ἀμείνω τέκνα καὶ δραστήρια.

Alcestis 601 τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς ἐκφέρεται πρὸς αἰδῶ. ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσι δὲ πάντ' ἔνεστιν σοφίας.

fr. 336 εἰς δ' εὐγένειαν ὀλίγ' ἔχω φράσαι καλά· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς εὐγενὴς ἔμοι γ' ἀνήρ, ὁ δ' οὐ δίκαιος κἂν ἀμείνονος πατρὸς Ζηνὸς πεφύκῃ, δυσγενὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ,

fr. 52 μία δὲ γονὰ τό τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ τὸ δυσγενές.

With the last two we may perhaps compare Democritus *fr.* 242 Diels πλέονες δὲ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος, and Sophocles *fr.* 532 Nauck, quoted by Stobaeus *Flor.* lxxxvi. 12.

98. Xenophon *Mem.* A vi. 10 ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.

99. Plato *Republic* 376 C φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως.

100. *Ibid.* 328 B–331 C.

101. *Ibid.* 550 E ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ τοὐναντίον ῥέποντος; . . . τιμωμένου δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἀτιμοτέρα ἀρετή τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί.

The translation in the text is from Davies and Vaughan.

102. *Ibid.* 545.

103. *Ibid.* 360 E–362 C.

104. *Gorgias* 470 D foll.

105. *Philebus* 66 B, C.

106. Aristotle *Ethics* 1097 b τὸ δ' αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.

107. Aristippus in Xen. *Mem.* B i. 9 declares that his object is ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. For the value of culture see Diog. Laert. ii. 72 ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί αὐτοῦ ὁ υἱὸς ἀμείνων ἔσται παιδευθείς; Καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, εἶπεν, ἐν γοῦν τῷ θεάτρῳ οὐ καθεδήσεται λίθος ἐπὶ λίθῳ. *Ibid.* 68 ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη, τὸ δύνασθαι πᾶσι θαρούντως ὁμιλεῖν.

For the Cyrenaic independence see *ibid.* 66 ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἁρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἁρμονίως ὑποκρίνασθαι, and the celebrated ἔχω Λαΐδα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι *ibid.* 75.

108. Zeller *Socrates* p. 316.

109. Diog. Laert. vi. 11 αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος.

110. *Ibid.* τήν τε ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ.

111. *Ibid.* 72 εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας . . διέπαιζεν [ὁ Διογένης].

112. *Ibid.* 6 ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε ἐπὶ τῷ πονηροῖς συγγενέσθαι, καὶ οἱ ἰατροί, φησί, μετὰ τῶν νοσούντων εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρέττουσιν.

113. *Ibid.* 86 ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Θυρεπανοίκτης, διὰ τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν εἰσιέναι οἰκίαν, καὶ νουθετεῖν. See Appendix.

114. Stobaeus *Flor.* xiii. 27 ὁ Διογένης ἔλεγεν ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δάκνουσιν· ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα σώσω.

115. Diog. Laert. vi. 75, 76 θαυμαστὴ δέ τις ἦν περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα πειθώ κτλ.

116. Diog. Laert. vii. 105 τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀναξίαν ἔχοντα. ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μέν τινα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν, ἥν τινα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια· τὴν δ' εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ· ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς.

ζωή, ὑγίεια, ἡδονή, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος, δόξα, εὐγένεια and their opposites are styled ἀδιάφορα *ibid.* 102.

117. Diog. Laert. x. 130 καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι.

Ibid. 131 καὶ μάζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδιδοῦσιν ἡδονὴν ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἁπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελέσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Stobaeus *Flor.* xvii. 24 [Ἐπικούρου] εἰ βούλει πλούσιόν τινα ποιῆσαι, μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει. See also *ibid.* 23, 30.

118. See Mahaffy *Social Life in Greece* pp. 299 foll.

119. Diog. Laert. x. 6.

120. Theognis 425

πάντων μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον
μηδ' ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου,
φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι
καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γῆν ἐπιεσσάμενον.

121. Sophocles *Oed. Col.* 1225

μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νικᾷ λόγον· τὸ δ', ἐπεὶ φανῇ,
βῆναι κεῖθεν ὅθεν περ ἥκει,
πολὺ δεύτερον, ὡς τάχιστα.

122. Euripides *fr.* 285 Nauck

ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν δὴ πανταχοῦ θρυλούμενον
κράτιστον εἶναι φημὶ μὴ φῦναι βροτῷ.

Other quotations are given in Stobaeus *Flor.* cxx. See also Decharme *Euripide* p. 120.

123. In Euripides *Her. Fur.* 1212 suicide is called *ἀνόσιον*. It is commended in *Hel.* 298–302 and *Tro.* 1012–1014. See Thomson *Euripides and the Attic Orators* pp. 55, 56.

124. Aeschines *against Ctesiphon* § 244 *ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν.*

125. Aristotle *Ethics* 1138 a *ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὔ; ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι,* where see Burnet's note.

126. Plato *Phaedo* 61 E *οὗ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι.*

127. *Ibid.* 62 B *ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν κτλ.*

128. *Ibid.* 62 B, C *οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι . . . ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.*

129. Diog. Laert. vi. 86.

130. *Ibid.* vi. 95, 100.

131. *Ibid.* vii. 29, 176.

132. Stobaeus *Flor.* vii. 45, 54.

133. For the Stoic view of suicide see Diog. Laert. vii. 130 *εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων, κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.*

134. Diog. Laert. ii. 98 *ἔλεγε δὲ* [*ὁ Θεόδωρος*] *καὶ εὔλογον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος μὴ ἐξαγαγεῖν αὑτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀποβάλλειν τὴν φρόνησιν ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν ἀφρόνων ὠφελείας.*

135. For the Epicurean view of suicide see Zeller *Stoics* p. 489.

136. Aristotle is also a possible exception. See p. 97 of this essay.

CONCLUSION

CHARACTERISTICS OF GREEK MORALITY

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CHARACTERISTICS OF GREEK MORALITY

(*a*) Morality was influenced by environment.

EVEN as early as the Homeric period the Greeks had a highly developed morality. The *dictum* of Hegel that before Socrates there was no morality, but merely propriety of conduct, is only true in the sense that ethics did not yet exist. But who would assert that no man is moral unless he be an ethical philosopher? The lofty ideals of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were to a great extent the outcome of economic, political and social forces at work during a long period of mature civilisation. The Homeric culture seems to have been a happy mean between patriarchal life and monarchy, combining the excellences of the former with few, if any, of the vices of the latter. Environment is a most important factor in the growth of morality. Institutions are the nurseries of virtues and ideals. Bearing this in mind we shall not be surprised at the curious waves, so to speak, which mark the development of morality. There is, indeed, orderly progress. Sudden breaks with the past, such as the French Revolution, are rare and temporary. But periodically there comes a slow, strong wave, emphasising some aspect or aspects of the moral life. Then it recedes, or seems to recede, and there ensues a lull, which in its turn is followed by another wave, emphasising other ideas. Illustrations are the prominence of patriotism, political and social questions, home-life and individualism, which

come to the fore during the period 500–300 B.C. I would suggest that the much-disputed question whether morality declined at Athens during the fourth century has never yet been treated upon the right lines. That there were moral changes will be admitted by everybody. Humane ideals took precedence over the more manly virtues of courage and devoted patriotism. Which morality makes a nation more likely to survive in the struggle for existence is easily answered. But who shall say that one morality is better than the other? The connection between environment and morality explains why there is no even development of the latter throughout Greece from Homer to the fifth century. Each little State lived apart by itself. Some intercommunication existed, but not enough to prevent striking moral differences among the inhabitants. How different prevalent moralities may have been is conclusively shown by a comparison between the Spartan and the Athenian characters.

(*b*) Virtue as harmonious development.

A marked characteristic of the morality of the Greeks was a ready admission that all natural powers were to be developed, yet in such a way as to produce a harmonious whole. The Greek loved a beautiful life. Perfect physical and mental development, happy relations with the State, friends, and family, a peaceful end in old age—all these things and all that they imply, are necessary constituents of the *βίος τέλειος*. *Σωφροσύνη*, a typical Greek virtue, insists upon the presence of activities almost as much as their harmonious development. Accordingly Greek morality approved of practices which are utterly opposed to modern ideas. But although all natural powers should be developed, there must be no exaggeration, no want of proportion. The idea of the "happy mean" permeated Greek life through and through. It is seen in the size of their cities, in the severe form of their tragedy, and in the calm repose of their best sculpture. The conception of

virtue as a mean accounts for the negative character of sin in Greek morality. The Greeks had no devil. The Homeric deities do, indeed, tempt men to sin. But they are non-moral rather than immoral. The early Greeks did not think that the moral law concerned the actions of the gods themselves. Consequently, with the purifying of the idea of God there sprang up no conception of an evil divinity. For this reason the Greek was the more ready to acknowledge that he was himself the cause, or at least a cause, of his sin. Hence he regarded untruth, and vice generally, as a lowering of the self. He felt shame at his failure to be virtuous. He admitted moral responsibility. Virtue may be keeping to the right path. But there is a right path, and many wrong ones.

(*c*) Morality and Religion.

Early Greek morality was intimately connected with religion. But Greek religion was a heterogeneous compound, some of the components of which had no bearing upon morality except in so far as they kept alive a religious feeling, which was, however, much contaminated with superstitions. Moreover, there was in Greece no all-powerful priesthood enforcing a morality from which the common people were inclined to break away. Ceremonial religion enforced no morality but that which appealed to the general conscience of the time. Hence it took under its protection the defenceless suppliant, the orphan and the aged parent. I cannot believe that homicide, which was forbidden by religion, was generally regarded as in itself immoral. The manslayer was purified, not by repentance, but by the performance of certain rites. The religious ban meant ceremonial, not moral defilement. It was the general belief in a divine power, rather than cults and ceremonies, which had the most effect upon Greek morality. And this influence it exerted by acting as a sanction for those moral ideas of which the Greek conscience instinctively approved.

Ethics and Morality.

Greek ethics was generally in agreement with current morality, but not seldom, especially in the teaching of Plato, it definitely opposed it. Yet in not a few cases philosophic analysis transcends the received moral code, and anticipates the convictions of future generations. Thus the *Laws* of Plato condemns unnatural vice, and elsewhere that philosopher maintains that to do harm to enemies, even non-Greeks, is in all cases wrong. Aristotle's conception of friendship is in some respects above that of his age, while signs are not wanting that he recognised the claims of slaves to the rights of humanity. Plato perceived the capabilities of women far more than any other Greek, either before or after him.

Ethics brought consistency into conduct.

Philosophic ethics also helped to illuminate moral ideas which before were felt, but not thoroughly understood. Clear formulation is a great gain. It sets up a landmark which cannot be effaced. Hence we see that the Stoics were greatly influenced by the teaching of Plato and Aristotle. Socrates tried to reduce moral ideas to order by means of definitions. Consistency of action is more likely to be attained when concepts, and not impulses, are made the standards to which conduct has to conform. How far the teaching of Socrates influenced the ordinary Athenian we cannot say, but it certainly influenced philosophers. All ethical schools owed their origin to it. Not unfrequently it happens that in his attempt to explain morality the philosopher does not introduce a new ideal, but ennobles the old. Aristotle's account of friendship and the Stoic development of the idea of duty are good examples.

Ethics gave a new sanction to morality.

But Greek ethics influenced conduct mainly by giving a new sanction to morality when religious faith decayed, and the philosophic doctrine of *πάντα ῥεῖ*, and the contrast of *φύσις* with *νόμος*, were transferred, by sophists and others, to the sphere of morals. Ethics showed that the old morality made men happy. By insisting upon the

happiness of the moral man, Greek ethics considerably strengthened other forces, which were tending in the direction of individualism. Yet although it did not prevent the change from the old to the new, it made the transition-period slow and orderly. The danger of moral anarchy was arrested. Thinking men saw that morality was reasonable, and so lived disciplined lives. The less intellectual followed in their steps. Thucydides tells us what happened when faith in morals decayed as well as faith in religion. That Greece was spared to do good work for at least two centuries after the Peloponnesian War was in no small degree due to the teaching of ethical philosophers.

Greek ethics showed that the source of morality lay in the human soul [1] and its capacity of forming ideal purposes. The philosopher-poet Euripides shows distinct traces of this attitude. "It was not Cypris that tempted you," says Hecuba to Helen,[2] "it was your mind that became Cypris." That Euripides should have criticised the gods of the Olympic pantheon proves that he considered the human intelligence supreme in the moral sphere. Plato held that righteousness is better in itself than unrighteousness, whether the gods perceive our actions or not. He thus clearly distinguished the concept "good" from the "useful," the "pleasant," and all other concepts. Aristotle gives a definition of virtue which implies that the ultimate test of good conduct is the opinion of the moral man (ὁ σπουδαῖος, ὁ φρόνιμος). This is a remarkable anticipation of the spirit of modern ethical science. Nevertheless the religious sanction was not abandoned by every philosopher. It was kept, along with the new ethical sanction, by Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics. Plato brought prominently forward the doctrine of ὁμοίωσις, "growth into the likeness of God," which was derived from the mysteries and Pythagoreanism. This doctrine is hinted at before Plato in Socratic teaching,

but becomes after him a cardinal point of Stoic doctrine. The courageous combination of ethics and religion presented by the teaching of Plato is perhaps the most inspiring lesson of the ancient world to modern times, and the one which modern teachers should take most to heart.

It is not the business of the historian to point a moral. But there are two facts which, be their explanation what it may, stand out so clearly in the present inquiry that they deserve emphasising in conclusion. It was environment which determined the peculiar features exhibited by Greek morality. The true greatness of Athens decayed as her citizens lost their living religious faith.

[1] ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνόν Plato *Rep.* 366 E.
[2] *Troades* 988.

NOTE

ON

XENOPHON AND PLATO

It has been observed that Xenophon suffered from a literary vanity which made him "wish to rival the most admired authors, each in his own special branch of literature. Has Thucydides eclipsed all the historians who preceded him, but left his great work unfinished? Xenophon is at once ready to step into the breach and write a continuation, in which he even imitates the peculiar colouring of the Thucydidean style. Has Plato produced, in the *Symposium*, a marvel of poetic delineation and philosophic insight? Xenophon immediately makes use of the same framework to exhibit a new picture of Socrates and his friends, one which, though not competing in magnificence with the portrait painted by Plato, is intended to surpass it in naturalness and truth to life" (Gomperz ii. 127).

A close examination shows that Xenophon, while aping the form of his models, is often opposed to the doctrine contained in them. Thus the position of women, as described in the *Oeconomicus*, is directly opposed to the standpoint of the *Republic*. Plato favoured "gymnastic" in order to secure the physical health of the citizens; Xenophon, in the *Cyropaedia* and elsewhere, relies mostly on hunting and riding. The political views expressed in the *Republic* and the *Hiero* are poles asunder.

To historians of morality it matters little what an author thinks personally, because, unless he be speculating, the views expressed will probably represent some opinion current at the time. In the present essay I have assumed that Xenophon's works, although intended to uphold views definitely opposed to those of Plato, are

not speculative, but give a fair picture of the general morality. But Xenophon is Hellenic rather than Athenian, both in sentiment and in conviction, and it would be an interesting study, though one much too long for the present work, to inquire how far the un-Athenian characteristics of Xenophon's views were due to his travels and to his long residence outside Athens. My own opinion is that Xenophon, in spite of his prejudices and commonplace intellect, was very susceptible to new influences; and his healthy instincts led him to approve the good points in characters, manners, and institutions, which his fellow Athenians regarded with dislike or unconcern. Gomperz, I feel sure, is wrong when he says that "[Xenophon] was well aware that his own way of thinking was not that of his times" (ii. 135). His opinions, indeed, were not the opinions of the Athenians of his day, but they seem to reflect those of his contemporaries in various other parts of Greece.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY

A COMPARISON of ethics and morality will give at the best the minimum effect which the former may be said to have exercised upon the latter. The actual influence may have been greater than can be proved to demonstration. Accordingly, it is pertinent to inquire how great it may possibly have been; in other words, what were the means of disseminating philosophic doctrine.

Was the influence of ethics upon conduct greater than we can prove?

In modern times this function is performed by books, universities, and schools, the churches, and the public press. It is considered a duty to raise every citizen to the highest moral level possible. Every effort is made, successfully or unsuccessfully, so that the highest thought of the time may work, either by way of guidance or direct teaching, upon the lives of even the most insignificant. In Athens it was not considered a duty to instruct the masses, and the means of spreading knowledge were somewhat different from ours. In particular there were no churches, which, by the weekly instruction they give, exercise a great influence upon modern life.

Modern means by which this influence works.

Ancient means.

During the fourth and third centuries B.C. books were fairly common and apparently cheap. Euthydemus, the young friend of Socrates, collected a library of books by poets and sophists.[1] By the year 400 B.C. the work of Anaxagoras could be purchased "for a drachma at most."[2] Most of the philosophers who flourished during the two centuries under discussion wrote numerous works. We are told that Chrysippus was the author of more than 705 treatises.[3] Epicurus was another voluminous writer.[4] The lives of philosophers written by Diogenes Laertius contain list after list of philosophic works. Apart from this late testimony, the writings of Aristotle still extant are by no means few, and many, including his popular works, have perished. Books were more used than is generally supposed. Plato

Books.

saw drawbacks to the use of them for teaching.[5] By itself this proves little, but taken along with the other evidence tends to show that in his day books were becoming more common. Isocrates made his views known in political pamphlets.

Neither the public assemblies nor the comic stage can have helped to widen the influence of philosophy between the years 400 and 200 B.C.

The teaching of philosophers.

But the philosophers, besides writing books, taught their scholars personally. The first paid teachers of higher education were the sophists, who, however, did not found schools like many of the philosophers, but wandered from town to town. They appear to have been eagerly welcomed by the young men, if we may trust the picture drawn by Plato in the *Protagoras*.[6] That they lectured instead of using the dialectic method advocated by Socrates and Plato was partly due to the size of their classes. But it must be remembered that they taught what most young men wanted to know, how to get on in the world, so that perhaps their audiences were larger than those of the philosophers, who were more independent in their views.

Socrates confined his teaching to Athens, and was certainly a well-known figure.[7] How far he was misunderstood by the many victims of his cross-examination is a difficult question. The caricature of Aristophanes appears to be an unrecognisable monstrosity, and Socrates himself complains of διαβολή, a word which implies misrepresentation.[8] But his influence was nevertheless very great, as is proved not only by the numerous schools which owed their origin to his teaching, but also by the attraction he had for commonplace intellects, such as those of Crito and Xenophon.

The rich the chief pupils.

Apparently most philosophers after Socrates required fees from their pupils, although it is a difficult question to decide in all cases.[9] If they did it implies a desire to hear them, for a man will not pay for what he does not want. Their pupils were usually the cultured and rich. Dionysius asked Aristippus why philosophers haunted the houses of the rich,[10] and Plato's pupils had a reputation for their foppish dress.[11] There seems to have been no attempt to reach the lower classes, which accordingly retained many old beliefs long after they had been discarded by the more cultured section of the citizens.[12] Aristotle himself distinctly affirms that λόγοι have no influence whatever upon οἱ πολλοί (*Ethics* 1179 b).

The lower classes and philosophy.

Preaching uncommon.

As a general rule philosophic teaching appealed to the intellect

only. Of preaching we hear little. The Cynics and certain Stoics alone appear to have practised it, and "we have no means of gauging the influence of the Cynic moral sermon."[13]

Number of students.

The number of students was in many cases large. "Nearly all Hellas" came over to the side of Stilpo, says Diogenes with rhetorical exaggeration.[14] Plato's pupils were so numerous and influential that his enemy Athenaeus is at pains to show that the statesmen he educated proved themselves tyrannical.[15] Arcesilas had numerous pupils.[16] So had Epicurus.[17] Theophrastus taught as many as two thousand.[18]

Personality of the philosopher.

Many of the philosophers were men of magnetic personality, who won the respect, and sometimes the love, of their fellow-citizens. Xenocrates was highly esteemed.[19] The repute of Aristotle was so great that he became tutor to Alexander the Great.[20] His pupil Theophrastus was affectionately treated by the Athenians.[21]

Nowadays there are fixed curricula in the universities, and when the student has completed his course he usually returns to the world of affairs for his life-work. No doubt many Greeks did the same, especially those who left their native city to hear a famous teacher. But there were others who remained longer, thus giving their masters an opportunity of exercising all the influence of which they were capable. Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years.[22] The philosophic school was often a sect also. We know from Plato that there were some who condemned this long devotion to philosophy.[23]

Greek attitude towards philosophers.

After all deductions for exaggeration and the glamour of the past, it is impossible to read, say Diogenes Laertius, without the conviction that the philosophers were honoured men, in whose lives their fellow-citizens took a deep interest. Modern professors and schoolmasters usually sink into unremembered graves, but the Greek philosopher became a treasured memory. His habits of life were noticed; his pupils and writings carefully recorded. Anecdotes clustered thickly about philosophers' names, a sure sign of esteem and affection. They were certainly ridiculed by the comic poets, but this in itself is no proof of disrespect, rather the reverse. Much of this popularity was due to the high personal character of the philosophers, which could not be unnoticed in the open-air life of a small Greek city-state. But even when allowance for this has been made there is still no doubt that philosophy found a cordial welcome in Greece, or at least in Athens, for the sake of its own value.

NOTES TO APPENDIX

1. Xen. *Mem.* Δ ii. 1.

2. Plato *Apol.* 26 E.

3. Diog. Laert. vii. 180.

4. Diog. Laert. x. 26.

5. Plato *Phaedrus* 275 D.

6. Plato *Prot.* 310 B.

7. Xen. *Mem.* A i. 10 *ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ· πρώ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἤει καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι.*

8. Plato *Apol.* 18 A–19 A.

9. Aristippus is said to have been the first Socratic to demand a money payment, Diog. Laert. ii. 65. Gomperz thinks that Plato's school was supported by voluntary contributions, *Greek Thinkers* ii. pp. 271, 272. Zeller says that his instruction must have been gratuitous, *Plato* p. 28.

10. Diog. Laert. ii. 69.

11. Gomperz ii. p. 271.

12. See Rouse *Greek Votive Offerings* p. 12.

13. Gomperz ii. p. 166.

14. Diog. Laert. ii. 113.

15. Athen. xi. 508, 509.

16. Diog. Laert. iv. 37.

17. Diog. Laert. x. 22.

18. Diog. Laert. v. 37.

19. See Zeller *Plato* p. 559 (quot.).

20. Diog. Laert. v. 4.

21. *Ibid.* 37.

22. See Zeller *Aristotle* i. pp. 7, 8.

23. Plato *Gorgias* 484 C foll., and see Adam on *Republic* 487 C.

GREEK MORALITY

ILLUSTRATED FROM

AESCHYLUS, SOPHOCLES, AND EURIPIDES

AESCHYLUS

[Born 525 B.C., died 456. *Suppliants* 492 (?); *Persae* 472; *Prometheus* 468; *Septem*, 467; *Agamemnon*, *Choephori*, *Eumenides* 458. References to Oxford text.]

(*A*) RELIGION

Providence: (*a*) **assurance.** *Supplices* 26, 27; 77, 78; 91, 92; 100; 228-233 (punishment in the next world); 343; 381-386 (Zeus protects the suppliant); 395, 396 (the ruler must judge according to divine justice); 402-406; 413-415 (sanctuary sacred, violation of it punished); 418-437 (the wronger of the suppliant punished in himself and his house); 478, 479; 582-599 (Zeus, by marriage with a mortal, founds a great race); 616-620; 643-655; 671-673; 707-709 (honour to parents the third of the great unwritten laws); 733; 1047-1049 (will of Zeus identified with fate); *Persae* 293, 294 (men must bear pains sent by the gods); 515, 516; 725, 726 (some god led Xerxes astray); 740, 741; 744-751 (Nemesis); 772 (God hates not the wise); 821-828 (ὕβρις begets ἄτη, and Zeus punishes the overweening); *Septem* 69-77; 157; 226 (God stronger than discipline); 445; 514-520; 625; 662, 663; 720; *Prometheus* 34; 188, 189 (Zeus keeps justice to himself, i.e. his will determines right); 234, 235 (Zeus wished to destroy the human race and create another); 518 (Zeus less powerful than fate); 551, 552 (the wills of mortals disturb the "harmony" of Zeus); 936 (it is wise to bow to fate); 1032-1033 (the word of Zeus is always accomplished); 1093 (Prometheus says he suffers unjustly); *Agamemnon* 55-59 (some god punishes animals which are cruel to other animals); 68-71; 160-167; 374-384 (offences against δίκη punished); 461, 462; 699-708; 749; 772-781; 1485-1488; 1564; *Choephori* 61-65 (justice punishes both on earth and in hell); 244, 245; 322-331 (murder will out);

400-404 (blood calls for blood); 559 (Apollo truthful); 639-645; 900-902; 910, 911 (fate); 949 (justice daughter of Zeus); 957; 985; *Eumenides* 213-224 (marriage under the protection of heaven); 273-275 (punishment in hell); 339, 340 (murderers punished in hell); 465 (Apollo author of the deed of Orestes); 614-621 (Apollo declares truly the decrees of Zeus); 949-955; *fr.* 70 (pantheism); 156 (heaven finds a cause to bring a house to ruin); 362 (fatalism); 395; 464 (God not like man; God is Nature); 475.

(*b*) **Doubt or antagonism.** *Supplices* 893, 894 (Egyptian herald: οὗτοι φοβοῦμαι δαίμονας τοὺς ἐνθάδε· οὐ γάρ μ' ἔθρεψαν, οὐδ' ἐγήρασαν τροφῇ); *Septem* 427, 428 (Capaneus: θεοῦ τε γὰρ θέλοντος ἐκπέρσειν πόλιν καὶ μὴ θέλοντός φησιν); 531, 532 (enemy will sack Thebes βίᾳ Διός); *Agamemnon* 369-372 οὐκ ἔφα τις θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν ὅσοις ἀθίκτων χάρις πατοῖθ'· ὁ δ' οὐκ εὐσεβής); *fr.* 350 (Phoebus deceitful); 476. For the *Prometheus* see below. The dominant attitude towards Providence is unswerving belief.

In Aeschylus the gods still retain traces of their immoral character which had aroused the disgust of Xenophanes. But there is an evident desire on the part of the poet to show that the sinfulness of the gods' actions is more apparent than real. See the treatment of Io by Zeus as told in the *Prometheus* (736), and the character of Apollo in the *Eumenides*. Cf. especially *Agamemnon* 1202-1212 (Cassandra and Apollo), and *fr.* 350. There is no devil in the Aeschylean theology. Sin begets sin *Agamemnon* 758-771 τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίκτει κτλ. Cf. *Eumenides* 934, 935. Sin runs in families; the curse upon a family works crime after crime, *Agamemnon* 1188-1193; 1431-1433. Yet the Erinyes are just, *Agamemnon* 462-470; 58, 59. They stand for law, order, and discipline, *Eumenides* 508-565 (a most important passage). Nevertheless it is the sinner himself who is to blame in every case. Upon his own choice depends whether the curse will act or not. See the dialogue between the fatalist Eteocles and the chorus, *Septem* 686-708; cf. also *Eumenides* 550-552 ἑκὼν δ' ἀνάγκας ἄτερ δίκαιος ὢν οὐκ ἄνολβος ἔσται· πανώλεθρος δ' οὔποτ' ἂν γένοιτο.

A striking characteristic of Aeschylus' presentation of Providence is the way in which he conceives the divine government to develop.

The Zeus of the *Prometheus* is a "young tyrant" who has overthrown a preceding divine order, *Prometheus* 35; 201-215; 736; 942; 960. The Furies complain of the "younger gods," *Eumenides* 162, 731 (see 721, 722); 778, 779; and they themselves change from Erinyes (avenging spirits) to Eumenides, Semnae (kind or august goddesses), having the family (οἶκος) under their protection, 895. It is even hinted that the reign of Zeus may come to an end, *Prometheus* 510-520; 910; 940; 948; although we do not know how the *Prometheus Unbound* solved the difficulty. It should be noticed that the human race is regarded as a relic of a former era, unfit for the reign of Zeus, *Prometheus* 233-235. Prometheus enabled men to survive by giving them material civilisation (τέχναι 506), including divination 487-499. We do not hear that he took thought for their moral welfare. According to Hesiod (*W.* and *D.* 279) δίκη was the gift of Zeus. Such is the hint thrown out by Aeschylus as to the origin of physical evil; it is the survival of an old order into a fresh era. He spiritualised the doctrine by insisting on the discipline of pain, *Agamemnon* 250 Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει. *Eumenides* 521 σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει.

Throughout Aeschylus' works there is an attempt to reduce the Olympic pantheon to order. See e.g. *Eumenides* 614-621, where Apollo says that he is merely the mouthpiece of Zeus. But there is no monotheism. The view of Aeschylus is that of Xenophanes, "There is one god greatest among gods and men" (*fr.* 23 Diels).

The above references show that Aeschylus believed strongly in punishment after death. This was not a very prominent feature of Greek religion, and its reiteration in Aeschylus may be in part due to the poet's leaning towards the mysteries. Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs* 886

> Δήμητερ ἡ θρέψασα τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα,
> εἶναί με τῶν σῶν ἄξιον μυστηρίων.

For Pythagoreanisms see Headlam, *Supplices* p. 6.

With regard to the "envy" of the gods, Aeschylus believes that it is not over-prosperity, but sin itself, which begets sin, *Agamemnon* 750-760; *Persae* 744-750; 820-822 (ὕβρις produces a harvest of ἄτη).

Immortality: (*a*) **Positive.** *Supplices* 416; *Persae* 598 foll.; *Septem* 978; *Agamemnon* 1528; 1555; *Choephori* 37-41; 88;

142-149; 476-488; 500-509; *Eumenides* 598; 767. Add to these the passages referred to above, where punishment after death is mentioned.

(*b*) **Negative.** *Choephori* 517 (a very doubtful instance); *fr.* 255.

Sanctuary (always respected). *Supplices* 84; 347; 359-364; 410-417; 478-485; 616; 652-655; 893 (the herald tries to violate sanctuary); *Septem* 78 foll.; *Eumenides* 64 foll.; 232-234.

Value of ceremony. *Persae* 610-622; *Choephori* 84 foll.; 483-485; *Eumenides* 280-283 (blood of swine washed away stain of matricide); 447-452.

Divination. *Prometheus* 484-500 (certain kinds of divination the gift of Prometheus); *Agamemnon* 1202-1213; *Choephori* 559 (Apollo truthful); 900; 1029; *Eumenides* 465; 594; 615-621; *Septem* 24-29.

(*B*) POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Supplices 365-369 (ruler must consult people); 397-401 (people to be consulted); *Persae* 591-594 (disaster relaxes discipline); *Septem* 1-38 (necessity of patriotism); 662-671 (Polynices the rebel an enemy of δίκη); 1034, 1035 (Antigone will bury Polynices in spite of the prohibition—State *versus* family); *Prometheus* 226, 227 (a tyrant does not trust his friends); *Agamemnon* 540, 541 (love of country); *Eumenides* 508-565 (need of discipline μήτ' ἀνάρχετον βίον μήτε δεσποτούμενον αἰνέσῃς. παντὶ μέσῳ τὸ κράτος θεὸς ὤπασεν 526-530; βωμὸν αἴδεσαι δίκας 539); 861-866 (evil of civil strife); 976-987 (blessing of unity).

Friendship. *Septem* 597-614 (danger of evil associates; the gods may punish him who associates with criminals); *Prometheus* 1063-1070 (the chorus hate a traitor and will suffer with Prometheus).

Lex talionis. *Choephori* 122, 123; 313 (δράσαντι παθεῖν); *Agamemnon* 1564 (παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα).

Pity. *Supplices* 489 (τοῖς ἥσσοσιν γὰρ πᾶς τις εὐνοίας φέρει).

Animals. *Supplices* 226 (ὄρνιθος ὄρνις πῶς ἂν ἀγνεύοι φαγών;); *Prometheus* 466; *Agamemnon* 48-59 (pity for animals; the gods avenge them); 134-138 (same as preceding); 140-145 (same as preceding); *Eumenides* 861; 866 (cock-fighting).

(*C*) FAMILY

Importance of family relationships. *Supplices* 8-10 (marriage with kindred detestable. So *passim*); *Septem* 681, 682 (sin of slaying kindred); 1034-1037 (Antigone puts family before State); *Prometheus* 39 (τὸ συγγενές τοι δεινόν); 291 (power of kinship); 855; *Choephori* 139 (power of the murdered father to raise up an avenger. So *passim*); 500-509 (the family must not die out); 623-630 (sin of wife's conspiring against husband); 924 (power of mother's curses); 1027-1028 (Orestes justified in killing Clytemnestra, because she had murdered her husband); *Eumenides* 212 (it is kinship which makes killing a sinful pollution); 545 (honour to parents: τοκέων σέβας εὖ προτίων . . αἰδόμενός τις ἔστω. Cf. *Supplices* 707-709 τὸ γὰρ τεκόντων σέβας τρίτον τόδ' ἐν θεσμίοις Δίκας γέγραπται μεγιστοτίμου — honour to parents the third "unwritten law"); 605 (stain of killing member of one's own family); Eumenides to control family matters 909; 956-967.

Women and family life. *Supplices* 338 (marriage with kin a source of strength); 1034, 1034 (the chorus do not despise marriage, δύναται γὰρ Διὸς ἄγχιστα σὺν Ἥρᾳ); *Septem* 186-202 (women a nuisance; haughty when in power, a plague when in terror); 232 (women's duty to remain at home in silence); 333-344 miseries of women when captured in war; 363-368 (miseries of women captives); 1031 (Antigone prefers family to State); *Prometheus* 901-906 (marriage with equals best); 1063-1070 (chorus of ocean nymphs faithful to Prometheus); *Agamemnon* 483-487 (women fickle); *Choephori* 596-601 (passion of women leads them to crime); 665-667 (it is necessary to use veiled language before a woman); 920 (women lustful—spoken by Clytemnestra); *Eumenides* 657-666 (the father the real parent); 737 (men superior to women).

Children. *Agamemnon* 216-247 (child and father); 1417 (child and mother); *Choephori* 500-509 (importance of children to keep alive the father's name); 749-760 (affection of nurse for child); 908-930 (mother and child); *Eumenides* 909.

Slavery. *Septem* 333-339 and 363-368 (miseries of women captives); *Agamemnon* 1040-1046 (the *nouveau riche* cruel to his slaves; slaves in families of hereditary wealth kindly treated);

1084; *Choephori* 75-84 (noble women compelled to conceal their true sentiments because enslaved in war); 734-765 (affection of a nurse).

Aeschylus seems to have been struck by the facts of heredity. In his eyes the family is the great institution. Hence the stress laid upon the continuity of sin, the horror expressed at the violation of natural ties, the fear of polluting the race by marriage with kindred, and the intimate relations between the living and the dead. Can it be that when Aeschylus was at the most impressionable age (the closing years of the sixth century), the State had not yet superseded the family as the most important institution?

(*D*) THE INDIVIDUAL

Material goods. *Prometheus* 436-471 (the gift of Prometheus); *Agamemnon* 250 (discipline of pain); 750-756 (wealth not the producer of sin); *Eumenides* 520 (discipline of pain).

Old age. *Agamemnon* 72-75.

Chastity. *Supplices* 227 (πῶς δ' ἂν γαμῶν ἄκουσαν ἄκοντος πατρὸς ἁγνὸς γένοιτ' ἄν;); 787-791 (suicide rather than marriage with kin); 1013 (τὸ σωφρονεῖν τιμῶσα τοῦ βίου πλέον); *Choephori* 71 (adultery a sin). Chastity in Aeschylus is chiefly a family matter.

Truth. *Prometheus* 1032, 1033 (Zeus does not lie); *Agamemnon* 620 (οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλά); *fr.* 301, 302.

Suicide. *Supplices* 455-466 and 787-791 (suicide commended in certain circumstances).

Pessimism. *Choephori* 1018.

The soul and morality. *Persae* 767 (a man is blessed who has φρένες); 772 θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἤχθηρεν, ὡς εὔφρων ἔφυ); *Septem* 592, 593 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος); 662, 663 εἰ δ' ἡ Διὸς παῖς παρθένος Δίκη παρῆν ἔργοις ἐκείνου καὶ φρεσίν, τάχ' ἂν τόδ' ἦν). Notice the conception of morality in φρήν afterwards worked out by Euripides.

Necessity of discipline, awe. *Eumenides* 525; 546; 699 (τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν;).

Beauty of heroic pain. *Agamemnon* 1304 (ἀλλ' εὐκλεῶς τοι κατθανεῖν χάρις βροτῷ).

SOPHOCLES

[Born 496 B.C. *Antigone* 442-441; *Ajax*; *Oedipus the King*; *Trachinian Women*; *Electra*; *Philoctetes* 409; *Oedipus at Colonus*, brought out 401. References to Teubner text and to Nauck for fragments.]

(*A*) RELIGION

Providence: (*a*) **Positive.** *Ajax* 86; 118; 131-133; 455, 456; 758-783 (wrath of the gods falls upon the over-proud); 835-844 (summons to the Erinyes to wreak vengeance); 950; 1036-1039; 1130 (unwritten law); 1390; *Electra* 175; 1062-1065; 1093-1096 (unwritten laws); *Oed. T.* 151 foll.; 469-475; 863-871 (unwritten laws); 881; *Oed. C.* 275-281; 371 (God sends evil upon men); 964, 965 (gods cruel); 998; 1382 (Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις); *Antigone* 127, 128; 369; 584, 585; 604, 605; 683 (θεοὶ φύουσιν ἀνθρώποις φρένας); 797 (unwritten laws); 856 (inheritance of sin); 921 (unwritten law); 951 (fate); 1103, 1104; 1113, 1114 (unwritten laws); *Trachiniae* 130, 131; 280; 1264-1278; *Philoctetes* 446-452 (the gods spiteful in their dealings with men); 992; 1360, 1361 (crime begets crime); 1441-1444; *fr.* 197 (fatalism); 208; 226; 809; 876; 879.

(*b*) **Doubt.** *Oed. T.* 910; *Philoctetes* 1036; *fr.* 103.

Immortality. *Electra* 244-250

> εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θανὼν γᾶ τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὢν
> κείσεται τάλας,
> οἱ δὲ μὴ πάλιν
> δώσουσ' ἀντιφόνους δίκας,
> ἔρροι τ' ἂν αἰδὼς
> ἁπάντων τ' εὐσέβεια θνατῶν.

355, 356 (doubt, εἴ τις ἔστ' ἐκεῖ χάρις); 400; 442-446; 459-463; 837; 969; 1066; *Oed. C.* 1410 (importance of burial); 1567;

1702, 1703; *Antigone* 71, 72 (importance of burial); 74, 75; 897, 898; *Philoctetes* 1443, 1444 (piety does not die with the pious man); *fr.* 753 (Orphism); 867.

Sanctuary. *Oed. C.* 229-236 (chorus wish to drive away Oedipus); 634; 921, 922; 1285.

Ceremony. *Electra* 431-434 (religious purity); *Oed. T.* 132-136 (religious defilement); *Oed. C.* 155-169 (value of ceremony); 465-484 (value of ceremony); 1134; 1595-1603; *Antigone* 247, 775.

Divination. *Ajax* 758-783. *Oed. T.* 316 foll.; 709 (doubt); 952, 953 (doubt); 971 (doubt); *Antigone* 1035-1039 (doubt); 1055 (doubt, τὸ μαντικὸν γὰρ πᾶν φιλάργυρον γένος).

(*B*) POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Ajax 1096-1118 and 1052-1090 (references to contemporary history (?)). See the chorus 1185 foll. (where the miseries of war are dwelt upon); 1132 (cruelty to enemies good); 1289-1307 (birth may be "good" even when non-Hellenic); 1350 (tyrant cannot be pious); 1356, 1357 (appreciation of worth in enemies); *Oed. T.* 56, 57 (men make the State); 584-589 (royalty not happy); *Antigone* 182-210 (the State must take precedence over every other claim); 368-371; 658-680 (necessity of law and order); 736-739 (people and ruler); *fr.* 528 (all barbarians greedy).

Is the second part of the *Ajax* (974-1420) a political allegory?

Friendship. *Ajax* 679-683 (a friend may become an enemy, an enemy a friend); 1267 (gratitude commended).

Animals. *Electra* 566-569; *Antigone* 1000-1004.

Lex talionis. *Oed. C.* 229-236; 271, 272; 1191; *fr.* 209.

Mercy. *Oed. C.* 1267, 1268; *Trachiniae* 243 (pity); 311-313 (pity).

(*C*) FAMILY

Marriage and women. *Ajax* 293 (γυναιξὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει); 580 (φιλοίκτιστον γυνή); *Electra* 770 (δεινὸν τὸ τίκτειν); 1243 (spirit even in women); *Oed. T.* 1078 (women proud); *Oed. C.* 337-360 (some women prove themselves better than men);

445-449; 1368; *Antigone* 781-805 (power of love); *Trachiniae* 144-149 (life of women, marriage brings care); 441-448 (power of love); 545 (wife cannot have a rival); 818, 819 (motherhood); *fr.* 187 (women a curse); 621 (same as preceding); 855 (what is Κύπρις?).

Children. *Ajax* 545-582 (love of father for child); *Electra* 532, 533 (love of mother greater than that of father); 1071 (strife between sisters); *Oed. T.* 1459-1462 (boys and girls); *Oed. C.* 1102-1111 (father and daughter); 1377 (honour to parents); *Antigone* 73; *Trachiniae* 1065 (honour to parents); 1178 (obedience); *fr.* 623 (*μητρὶ παῖδες ἄγκυραι βίου*).

Parents. *Ajax* 850 (Ajax thinks of his mother's sorrow); *Oed. T.* 999 (sight of parents dear); *Oed. C.* 1189-1191 (parent must not retaliate on child); 1617-1619; *fr.* 61 (honour to parents).

Slavery. *Trachiniae* 61-63 (even a slave may be noble); 908, 909; *fr.* 60; 854 (*εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος*).

If Aeschylus insists upon the solidarity of the family, Sophocles insists upon family love—the love of sister for brother, child for parent, betrothed for betrothed (unique in Greek literature).

(*D*) THE INDIVIDUAL

Material goods. *Electra* 308, 309 (influence of circumstances upon morality); *Oed. C.* 880 (justice gives strength to a cause); *Antigone* 295-299 (money the cause of evil); *fr.* 85; 260; 328; 535.

Pessimism. *Ajax* 124-126; *Oed. C.* 607-613; 1211-1248 (old age a curse); *fr.* 859; 863 (old age); 864 (old age).

Suicide. *Ajax* 815-865; *Oed. T.* 1071, 1072; *Antigone* 1220-1243; 1282; *Trachiniae* 899-946; (in none of these places is it condemned as a moral offence); *fr.* 448, 866.

Nature. *Philoctetes* 902 (*ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὅταν λιπών τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσεικότα*).

Nobility. *Ajax* 479, 480 (*ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι τὸν εὐγενῆ χρή*); 1094 (value assigned to noble birth); 1229 (value assigned to birth); *Oed. T.* 1080-1083 (birth disparaged); *Philoctetes* 475, 476 (the noble love the good); *fr.* 84 (the good are noble); 100; 532 (all men of one nature).

Value of awe. *Ajax* 1079.

Value of intellect. *Ajax* 1252 (ἀλλ' οἱ φρονοῦντες εὖ κρατοῦσι πανταχοῦ); *Electra* 1023; *Oed. C.* 371 (νῦν δ' ἐκ θεῶν του κἀξ ἀλιτρίας φρενὸς εἰσῆλθε τοῖν τρὶς ἀθλίοιν ἔρις κακή); *fr.* 854.

Selfishness commended. *Ajax* 1366, 1367; *Electra* 1042 (ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔνθα χἡ δίκη βλάβην φέρει—utilitarianism); *Antigone* 1165-1167 (hedonism).

Conscience. *Electra* 363, 364; *Oed. C.* 547, 548 (what is done in ignorance is not sin); 974-987 (same as preceding); *Antigone* 540, 541; *Trachiniae* 410 (duty); *Philoctetes* 1234 (the bow restored to Philoctetes); 1251; *fr.* 845.

Chastity. *Electra* 587-590; *Oed. T.* 1403-1408.

Truth. *Oed. T.* 356; *Oed. C.* 1127; *Trachiniae* 450; 453, 454; *Philoctetes* 83; 109 (a lie not always wrong); *fr.* 59; 76; 77; 326; 529.

Beauty of morality. *Antigone* 72; *fr.* 296; 616.

Work. *Fr.* 374.

EURIPIDES

[Born 480 B.C., died 407-406. *Alcestis* 438; *Medea* 431; *Andromache*, 431-421; *Hippolytus* 428 (?); *Hecuba* 423 or earlier; *Heraclidae* early; *Supplices* 421-420; *Iphigenia in Tauris* 418-412; *Hercules Furens* before 416; *Troades* 415; *Electra*, *Helena*, *Phoenissae*, traditionally assigned to 413-409; *Ion* not after 412; *Orestes* 408; *Iphigenia in Aulide*, *Bacchae*, appeared after death of Euripides; *Cyclops* uncertain; *Rhesus*, probably spurious. References to Teubner text.]

EURIPIDES, owing to peculiar difficulties, requires fuller treatment than can be given here. The reader is referred to *The Moral Standpoint of Euripides* (Blackie), from which are here reprinted the conclusion and the index.

Euripides discarded the popular faith on moral grounds, and could see no reason for supposing that there was a divine Providence guiding human affairs and working out the moral law. The unseen power that controls the universe (φύσεος ἀνάγκη) is probably non-moral. But he refused to infer that the result must be moral anarchy, for, whatever its origin, virtue is beautiful. It is just possible that he conceived the seed of morality in the human φύσις to have been planted by God and left to grow, but the evidence does not warrant a confident verdict, and he certainly put no faith in the *soi-disant* interpreters of the divine will. More probably he did not feel it necessary to look beyond the human φύσις itself for the origin of moral ideas. φύσις develops with time and training, and hence the true contrast between φύσις and νόμος, the latter being manifestations of the former which become obsolete in time, in much the same way as a child outgrows the garments which once fitted his body. As necessary corollaries Euripides inferred:—

(*a*) that the cultivated human intelligence (φρήν, νοῦς) is the supreme judge in the moral sphere.

(*b*) that human institutions ought to be regulated by the principle that the human φύσις, wherever manifested, even in women and slaves, should be honoured and carefully cultivated.

INDEX

(*A*) RELIGION AND PROVIDENCE

[p = *Providence. The asterisk denotes especial importance.*]

Alcestis 39, 40; 56; 962-984 (p); *Bacchae* 72-82; 200-209; 221-225; 255-258; 847-861; 890-896; *Hecuba* 163, 164; 488-491* (p); 799-801*; 958-960* (p); 1295 (p); *Helena* 711, 712; 759, 760 (p); *Electra* 190-197; 583, 584 (p); 743, 744; 971; 1169 (p); 1245; *Heraclidae* 350, 351; 718, 719; *Hercules Furens* 62; 212; 339-347*; 1135 (p); 1243; 1308-1310; 1316-1319; 1340-1346*; *Supplices* 139; 195-249[1] (p); 301-303; 504, 505* (p); 594-597* (p); 610-613; 731-733; *Hippolytus* 952-954* (Orphism); 1363-1369* (p); *Iph. in Aul.* 1034; 1189, 1190; *Iph. in T.* 380-391*; 570-575*; 711-715*; 975-978; 1012-1015; *Ion* 252-254; 331-368; 370-380*; 436-451*; 551-555*; 876-922*; 1523-1527; 1615-1622*; *Orestes* 416-418; 1179, 1180 (p); *Troades* 26, 27 (p); 469-471; 884-888* (p); *fragments* 149 (p); 150 (p); 209; 224 (p); 256; 257 (p); 288; 354 (p); 355 (p); 395 (p); 401 (p); 475 (Orphism); 478 (ἀνάγκη[2]); 483; 493; 508 (p); 509 (p); 558 (p); 757 (the law of nature not evil); 832* (p); 893 (p); 904; 905 (p); 935; 942 (p); 970 (p); 981 (p); 1007*.

Besides the above, whatever the 'gods' say in the prologues and *dénouements* should be considered important.

Divination. *Helena* 744-757; 919-923; 1626; *Electra* 399, 400; 981; *Supplices* 155; *Iph. in Aul.* 956; *fr.* 793*; 963.

Sanctuary. *Heraclidae* 101-104; 253-273; *Ion* 1312-1319*; *fr.* 1036*.

Immortality. *Alcestis* 364; 381; 995-1005*; *Hecuba* 422; *Helena* 1014-1016*; 1421; *Electra* 682-684; *Heraclidae* 592-594*; *Supplices* 531-536; *Iph. in Aul.* 1250-1252; *Troades* 632; *fr.* 536; 537; 639*; 734.

[1] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* A iv.

[2] For φύσις and ἀνάγκη see *Troades* 886 and *fr.* 902.

(*B*) POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Alcestis 452 (Athens); *Andromache* 173-176 (barbarians); 445-453* (Sparta); 699-702 (democracy); *Hecuba* 123-129 (Ath.); 254-257 (demo.); *Heraclidae* 181, 182 (Ath.); 901-903* (Sp.); *Supplices* 187-190* (Sp.); 229-245 (Ath.); 353 (Ath.); 376-380 (Ath.); 429 foll.; *Hippolytus* 486-489 (demagogues); *Iph. in Aul.* 1400, 1401 (barb.); *Ion* 29, 30 (Ath.); 262 (Ath.); 621-633 (tyranny and demo.); 1038 (Ath.); *Medea* 119-121 (tyr.); 461-463 (exile); 536-544* (Greece and barb.); 649-651 (love of country); 824-845* (Ath.); *Orestes* 696-703 (demo.); 772 (demo.); 901-913 (demagogues); 1506-1525* (barb.); *Troades* 207-209 (Ath.); 386, 387* (patriotism); *Phoenissae* 388, 389* (exile); 406 (love of country); 512-516; *fr.* 93 (demo.); 193 (ἀπράγμων); 194 (ἀπράγμων); 608 (tyr.); 628* (demo.); 879 (patriotism); 902 (ἀπράγμων); 1034* (cosmopolitanism).

Friendship. *Andromache* 376, 377*; *Hercules Fur.* 57-59; 1338; 1425, 1426; *Iph. in Aul.* 334; 408; *Iph. in T.* 498; 674-676; 684-686; *Ion* 730; *Orestes* 735; 804; 806; 1014, 1015; 1072; 1155, 1156; *fr.* 465; 894.

(Mercy to enemies) *Heraclidae* 966*; (*lex talionis*) *Andromache* 437, 438; *Hecuba* 844, 845; *Ion* 1046, 1047; *Medea* 807-810; *Orestes* 413; *fr.* 1076, 1077.

Animals. *Hercules Fur.* 1386-1388 (Verrall *Four Plays of E.* p. 194); *Hippolytus* 110-112; 1219; 1240; *Ion* 179; 1202-1205.

(*C*) FAMILY LIFE

[w = *Women or married life*; c = *Children.*]

Alcestis 309-319 (step-mother); 415* (motherhood); 473-475 (w); 879-880 (w); 882-888 (c); *Andromache* 173-180 (w); 241 (w); 352-354 (w); 373 (w); *Hecuba* 1181, 1182 (w); *Electra* 931-933 (w); 1035-1040 (w); 1051-1053 (w); 1072-1075 (w); 1097-1099 (w); *Heraclidae* 476, 477 (w); *Hercules Fur.* 280, 281 (c); 574-578 (c); 634, 635 (c); *Supplices* 40, 41 (w); 294 (w); 1099-1103 (sons and daughters); *Hippolytus* 616-668* (w); 640

(w); 966 (w); *Iph. in Aul.* 376, 377 (brothers); 508-510 (brothers); 917 (motherhood); 1157-1161 (w); 1394 (w); *Iph. in T.* 57 (c); 1005, 1006 (w); 1298 (w); *Ion* 398-400* (w); 472-491* (c); 1090-1105 (w); *Medea* 229-266* (w); 407-409 (w); 1033-1035 (c); 1081-1093* (w); 1094-1115* (c); 1206-1210 (c); *Phoenissae* 198-201 (w); 355, 356 (w and c); 374, 375 (brothers); *fr.* 36 (w); 104 (c); 111 (honour to parents); 318* (c); 320 (w); 321 (w); 322 (w); 339 (step-children); 360* (children and parents); 405, 406, 466, 467, 496, 497, 499, 500, 501, 503, 504, 547, 548, 549, 658*, 673, 805, 819 (all w); 848 (honour to parents); 901* (w); 943 (honour to parents); 1042 (w); 1043 (w).

Slavery. *Alcestis* 194, 195; 210, 211; 769, 770; 813; 948, 949; *Andromache* 56-59; 89, 90; *Hecuba* 332, 333; *Helena* 728-731; *Electra* 633; *Iph. in Aul.* 1400, 1401; *Ion* 854-856*; *fr.* 50; 87; 216; 515; 533; 828; 966.

(*D*) THE INDIVIDUAL

Good birth. *Alcestis* 601; *Andromache* 1279-1283; *Hecuba* 379-381; 592-602; *Electra* 37, 38; 367-390*; 550, 551; *Heraclidae* 297-301; *Ion* 239, 240; *fr.* 9; 22; 53; 54; 168; 234; 331; 344; 345*; 378; 514; 529; 530; 531; 739; 966; 1051.

External goods. *Alcestis* 163-169; *Electra* 37, 38; 362, 363; 426-431; *Hercules Fur.* 303, 304; 511, 512; 780; *Medea* 561; *Phoenissae* 405; 554; 597; *fr.* 55; 80*; 96; 143; 164*; 248*; 249; 250; 251; 326; 327; 328; 329; 364*; 441; 461; 642; 773; 810; 884*.

Pessimism. *Alcestis* 802; *Hecuba* 956-961; *Helena* 298; *Hippolytus* 189*; 1102-1110; *Medea* 195, 196; 1224; *fr.* 287; 452; 696; 956.

Old age. *Supplices* 1108-1113; *fr.* 579; 580; 638; 802; 1065.

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Beauty. *Andromache* 207, 208; *Helena* 304, 305; *fr.* 552*; 921.

φύσις ἀνθρωπίνη.

Bacchae 314, 315 (σωφρονεῖν in *φύσις*); 895, 896; *Helena* 1002, 1003 (*ἱερὸν δίκης ἐν τῇ φύσει*); *Electra* 941; *Hippolytus* 79, 80 (σωφρονεῖν in *φύσις*); *Orestes* 126, 127 (*ὦ φύσις, ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὡς μέγ' εἶ κακόν, σωτήριόν τε τοῖς καλῶς κεκτημένοις*); *Ion* 642-644 (*ὃ δ' εὐκτὸν ἀνθρώποισι, κἂν ἄκουσιν ᾖ, δίκαιον εἶναί μ' ὁ νόμος ἡ φύσις θ' ἅμα παρεῖχε τῷ θεῷ*); *fr.* 168; 170; 187; 205*; 344; 378; 620; 635; 807; 831; 912; 1050 (*ἡ φύσις ἑκάστῳ τοῦ γένους ἐστὶν πατρίς*).

φρήν.

Hippolytus 317; *Orestes* 1604; *fr.* 199; 211; 828. Cf. *fr.* 284 on athletics.

νοῦς.

Troades 987, 988 (chastity in *νοῦς*); *fr.* 211; 552; 1007 (*ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός*). Cf. *fr.* 894 (the *σοφός* is a true *φίλος*).

Personal virtue. *Electra* 50, 51; 256 (moral purity); *Hippolytus* 102 (moral purity); 316, 317 (conscience); 612 (oath); *Iph. in Aul.* 394 (oath); 1005 (oath); *Medea* 439-440; *Orestes* 395, 396* (conscience); 492 (virtue beautiful); *fr.* 11 (virtue shown in death); 291 (truth); 737 (truth); 1017 (virtue beautiful); 299*; 609* (origin of evil is in men).

Idleness and work. *Electra* 80, 81; *fr.* 37; 238; 239; 242; 396; 464; 477; 719.

ADDENDUM

That the Greeks did not regard homicide as a sin is illustrated by the fact that human sacrifice was not unknown in historical times. See Herodotus vii. 197.

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THE END

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